130. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5564. For Assistant Secretary Vaky and Ambassador Luers only from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 94: NG Meeting with Somoza
1. NG met for half an hour with Somoza in the “bunker” at 4:00 pm on November 2. The purpose of the meeting was to:
—Ask him to refrain from commenting publicly on the FAO plan in ways which would close options,
—Inquire whether he could advance the timetable for delivery of the PLN proposals from Monday, November 6 to at least Saturday, November 4.
—Urge him to intercede with the PLN directorate so that the proposals which are given to the NG contain the necessary flexibility to allow sigificant advance in the negotiating process.
2. Somoza said that he had refrained from commenting on the FAO plan and would continue to do so. He would, however, make reference to it in a speech he will deliver on Sunday, but he indicated his remarks would not foreclose options.
3. On the second point Somoza said he could not advance the date. The PLN directorate would meet Friday, November 3 and it would take until Monday to complete preparation and consultation of the paper.
4. Somoza’s comment on the third point was to the effect that we will be surprised by the degree of flexibility in the PLN position. He charged that it was the FAO which was imposing rigid requirements. They are the ones demanding surrender of the PLN and GN. I pointed out to Somoza that this sweeping assertion was not accurate. While it was true that the FAO paper had a fixed point of departure, what it contemplated was a sharing of power in the interest of national reconciliation and not surrender. Somoza did not respond.
5. Somoza then turned to the IMF action yesterday.2 He said the decision represented a serious deviation from IMF practice of acting on purely technical grounds. Nicaragua would now have to default on its international payments. If the GON was not allowed to acquire [Page 345] dollars, it would not meet its dollar obligations. Not only had the fund action deprived Nicaragua of this line of credit, it had also led a group of European banks to withdraw a $15 million dollar loan that was to have been signed today. Somoza went on to describe the IMF decision as “removing Nicaragua from the Western group of countries and he had still not applied for entry into the Eastern Bloc.” Turning to me he asked that I convey to Washington that he was under great pressure from persons in the government (unidentified) who regarded the USG as no longer neutral and questioned US impartiality in the negotiations. I explained to Somoza that the three week postponement was not a hostile or punitive measure but an effort to avoid, within the context of the delicate Nicaraguan situation, actions which might complicate the search for a solution. Somoza’s only comment was that the IMF decision worked to the advantage of the opposition.
6. Comment:
(A) After the meeting I discussed with my colleagues the noticeable differences in demeanor of Somoza from previous sessions. We all agreed that there was a change. We found him subdued (apagado). The ready smile, self-assurance, and flow of words was not there. He was cordial as ever but clearly showed signs of stress.
(B) Nevertheless, throughout his various interventions there was a perceptible tone of defiance as he made reference to:
—How long suffering the Nicaraguan people are.
—How independent of outside pressure they have been throughout their history.
—How the solution to the present crisis will come from inside Nicaragua and not from outside.
We got the impression that these remarks were more in the nature of barbs tossed by a man under pressure than a signal that he was about to pull out of the negotiations.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 39, Nicaragua Cables: 11/1–3/78. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 128.↩