331. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State1
3908. Subj: Concerns of Carazo re Border Situation Increase.
1. Carazo called me night of September 13 to advise that while there were no further attacks during the day, he is increasingly preoccupied over the border situation.2 Three reasons: (a) Nicaraguan planes continue to overfly Costa Rican areas, including one incident involving passes over fishing boats in CR territorial waters; (b) the GON has delivered a sharp note protesting a further crossing north of FSLN forces in a zone being closely watched by GOCR security forces and where Carazo believes such passage could not have gone undetected; and (c) reports of considerable fighting still underway between Rivas and the border, apparently centered around San Juan Del Sur, suggesting that the Nicaraguan areas closest to Costa Rica remain active.
2. In view of the accumulating dangers Carazo sees in the above, Costa Rica will be requesting that the OAS focus urgently on the violations of its territorial sovereignty. Carazo did not suggest that his current thinking had gone beyond a hope for a condemnation of the GON and the expectation of a call for an end to GON incursions. (As of early morning Sept 14 this had crystallized into a GOCR decision to seek to invoke Rio Treaty, after and independent of vote on Venezuelan resolution.)3
3. Though no mention has been made of any specific measure such as posting of observers, Carazo’s continuing preoccupation and the [Page 819] possibility that incidents and recriminations may continue and mount suggest that the time may be approaching when raising the possibility of an OAS observer presence could prove desirable. Costa Rican public acceptability for such a move undoubtedly is greater now than it would have been three days ago, and Carazo may well find such a measure prudent and welcome relief from the growing squeeze. This would certainly be more likely to hold true if an observer mandate could be fashioned and agreed to in such a way that Somoza did not come out looking like the principal bereaved party and major beneficiary. Should there be any serious Costa Rican resistance to the idea, posting observers on the Honduran/Nicaraguan border also, if otherwise desirable and feasible, would probably reduce or eliminate any major misgivings.4
4. Carazo raised the number of Sandinistas who have surrendered to GOCR security forces during the last 24 hours to ten and said that it has been decided to send them packing. Presumably, Panama will be their destination, but Carazo did not specify beyond saying they would be heading south. [1 line not declassified] the detention of a total of 15 FSLN members in Costa Rica. Included in this number are Eden Pastora (Coandante Cero) and Plutarco Hernandez, who are Costa Rican citizens.
5. Carazo addressed the nation night of Sept 13. He confirmed publicly that not only would OAS MFM be supported, but that Costa Rica would urgently request that meeting deal with GON violations of its territory. If that does not produce success, Carazo added that Costa Rica was ready to carry its case to UN.5 Septel follows summarizing speech.6
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780374–0461. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Managua.↩
- In telegram 3879 from San José, September 12, Weissman indicated that Carazo had informed him that a Nicaraguan aircraft had machine-gunned an automobile within Costa Rican territory. The Government of Nicaragua held that that the incursion was in reprisal for an FSLN attack that had originated on Costa Rican territory. Carazo pledged to secure an OAS response on an urgent basis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780371–0364)↩
- The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), was signed in Rio de Janeiro by many South and Central American countries in 1947 and it entered into force in 1948. In essence, members pledged to consider an attack on one member to be an attack on all members and committed members to provide reciprocal assistance. The Venezuelan resolution regarding Nicaragua at the OAS, September 2, and resolution delivered by Echeverria on September 14 to the Permanent Council alleging the bombing and machine-gunning of Costa Rican civilians by Nicaraguan aircraft, led to a September 18 resolution approved by the OAS Permanent Council to convoke a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider “the grave events in the Central American region” and to inform the UN Security Council. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, August–September, 1978)↩
- Telegram 3998 from San José, September 21, reported that Carazo informed Weissman “that the OAS could put troops on the Nicaraguan side, but he simply could not go along with uniformed soldiers patrolling Costa Rican soil.” Carazo noted that the idea was “abhorrent” and “would do little to stop the Sandinistas, but would give Somoza an incentive and convenient mechanism for making further wild claims,” and justify Somoza’s continuing control of Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780395–0015)↩
- For information about Carazo’s efforts at mediation and the Venezuelan request for an OAS response to the situation in Nicaragua, see Documents 90, 91, 93, and 96.↩
- Not found. In telegram 4960 from San José, November 22, the Embassy reported that the Nicaraguan National Guard and Costa Rican security forces had engaged in a firefight in the area of La Cruz during the night of the 21st. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740480–0329) In telegram 4961 from San José, November 22, the Embassy reported that Carazo had announced in the late evening of the 21st that his government had broken diplomatic relations with the GON, citing “continuing incursions” by the Nicaraguan National Guard. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740480–1027)↩