326. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- President Jimmy Carter
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan
- General K. M. Afir (Notetaker)
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
[President Carter:] We share a common concern over the Soviets in Afghanistan. And it is important for the UN to maintain its condemnation. The foregoing, together with the fall of the Shah, has caused us to increase our presence in the region. We now have two carriers in the area. We have pre-positioned military cargo. We are developing the Rapid Deployment Force. We are conducting exercises with some of the countries in the region. We have acquired facilities in Oman and Kenya, and we are determined to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Moreover, we have recently deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia. We want to contain the conflict, and we have discouraged the Saudis and Omanis from becoming involved.
In my State of the Union message, I stated the region was vital to our national security and that we would act to protect that security. I wanted Brezhnev to know we would feel our vital interests are engaged if there was a Soviet intrusion. They might have moved into Poland if not for the world reaction to their invasion of Afghanistan.2 I see no possibility of business as usual while the Soviets are in Afghanistan. Again, let me say how much we admire your courage as well as your support for the refugees.
I am disappointed and regretful that we did not have an adequate communication in the past on an economic/military package.3 The public/press exchanges were mutually embarrassing. I understand that you do not want military assistance, but we will continue to be helpful in modest ways with regard to the refugees. We also understand your aversion to U.S. military aid, which in any case is forbidden by Con [Page 869] gress, but we are willing to discuss purchases, if you want, of military equipment. If you need the assurance from us that you could purchase F–16s, we would be forthcoming. I know you have access to French planes, but we are willing to sell if you so desire it. If you want it, let’s work it out between us directly.
We are deeply committed to the security of your country. We will be forthcoming if you want to purchase military equipment. We both have military backgrounds, so we can deal, if you want, directly.
President Zia: We admire you personally and we are grateful. We are a developing country and our dream is to have what is best for our military. We have only China, France, or the USA from whom to get aircraft; and only China or the USA for our tanks. We understand your sensitivity about India and we also understand that the U.S. must have an interest in Pakistan before it does anything for us. We do not ask you to sever your relations with India, but we are sensitive about any India veto over your relations with us. (Clifford apparently told Mrs. Gandhi that the Brzezinski visit was only an eyewash.)4 We should get your aid on our own merits, not because of an Indian veto or wishes.
We do not have any money for purchases. We will not get it from Saudi Arabia unless the Saudis feel a genuine interest in Pakistan. Our problem is that the Soviet Union is now our neighbor. I have told the Soviets that we will resist to the end and in the meantime, with your help, we will continue fighting the battle of Pakistan in Afghanistan.
President Carter: It is our fight too.
President Zia: I am 100 percent certain the Afghanistanis will not surrender. The Soviets will feel the pinch.
President Carter: What is your assessment of the effectiveness of resistance?
President Zia: Excellent. And they could do more.
President Carter: Do you think more is needed?
President Zia: Yes. Not enough has been given so far. I feel that Pakistan should continue to fight in Afghanistan, but Pakistan must be safe. It is in the interest of both Pakistan and the U.S. to support the freedom fighters. But Pakistan will be punished by the Soviet Union, and we are prepared for that. If they escalate, and they will do so in the next few months in order to humiliate us, we will stand up and we will need your assistance.
I could greatly improve the spirit of my Air Force if I had six more planes, but if I am able to feed more effectively 650,000 people, I can [Page 870] tell the military the country is getting stronger. I do not need direct military assistance. Our real need is in debt rescheduling. That would be the greatest favor to us.
President Carter: The three year part is the most difficult.
President Zia: One year to start and then the others will follow.
President Carter: We will do the one year and the food supply will be sustained by us. And if you want to buy military equipment, including F–16s, we will be forthcoming.
President Zia: I need your support with the Europeans. They are too scared.
President Carter: Giscard and Thatcher said we should do more to help the freedom fighters. What should I tell them?
President Zia: Tell them to contact me.5 The freedom fighters need more anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons (discussion of some defective SA–7s). France has good weapons and the Europeans should be more helpful.
On another issue, I just want to say that Mrs. Gandhi is no friend of Pakistan or the U.S.
President Carter: Do not hesitate to approach me directly. You can also use a personal emissary to keep in touch with me.
There was an exchange of pleasantries and then the meeting concluded.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 8–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In the top right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “OK” and initialed “J.” Zia was in the United States to attend the UN General Assembly session.↩
- The mention of Poland is a reference to the crisis caused by workers’ strikes and the Solidarity trade union movement in September.↩
- See Documents 151 and 171.↩
- For Clifford’s trip to India, see Document 190. For Brzezinski’s trip to Pakistan, see Document 193.↩
- In a memorandum assessing U.S.-Pakistani relations following the Zia visit, October 9, Thornton asserted to Brzezinski that Zia’s request that Carter instruct European leaders to contact him directly was a sign that Pakistan wanted to keep an “arms-length relationship” with the United States regarding the covert program to provide arms to the Afghan rebels. In Thornton’s view, Zia did not want the United States “to get involved in organizing other countries’ support of the insurgents.” Thornton’s memorandum was attached to a memorandum from Odom to Brzezinski, October 11. Odom described Thornton’s memorandum as “excellent.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 80, Sensitive X: 10/9–31/80)↩