171. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
438. Also for Ambassador Hummel (NEA). Subject: Agha Shahi Gives Preliminary Views of Pakistan Government on Aid Package.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. I was called in this evening (Jan 17) by Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi to receive what he described as preliminary reaction of Pakistan Government to U.S. aid offer.2 Agha Shahi prefaced remarks by saying U.S. should understand that GOP appreciates firm stand by President Carter over Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his offer to come to Pakistan’s assistance. However, he would like Washington to have his “informal and preliminary” assessment of initial GOP reaction to aid package. Fuller and more formal GOP reaction would be forthcoming.
3. Agha Shahi said that initial reaction of government leaders was one of disappointment. Considering the immensity of the threat, U.S. offer of $400 million viewed as inadequate to meet the situation in terms of the kinds of military equipment that Pakistan required, $200 million would not go very far, particularly if one took into account requirements such as high performance aircraft. He had also discussed offer of $200 million in economic assistance with Economics Minister Ghulam Ishaq, who felt that this amount would not go very far in meeting Pakistan’s needs, particularly with questions of debt rescheduling still hanging over their heads. However, Agha Shahi added, aid package more inadequate in regard to military needs.
4. GOP also concerned about degree of American resolve, since already the “liberal” press in U.S. is attacking provision of assistance to “undemocratic” government in Pakistan.3 Certainly Pakistan did not enjoy an ideally democratic government and martial law prevailed, [Page 489] but such a reaction was disappointing in view of the critical threat posed by Soviet aggression.4
5. A further concern, said Agha Shahi, is fear of Indo-Soviet alliance against Pakistan. He had learned on good authority that visit to Moscow by Indian defense team (sent by caretaker government) had resulted in firm Soviet offer of $2 billion in arms. Pakistan wanted to reach an understanding with Indira Gandhi on response to Soviet expansion, and GOP had authorized Lord Carrington to convey this view to Indian Government.5 He felt Soviet military aid offer could go a long way to explain pro-Soviet statement made prior to UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan which should have dictated a negative Indian vote on resolution. Indian Government now backing down somewhat only because of massive UN vote against Soviets. In any case, overtures to India had been made. Ambassador Bajpai had brought message from Indira Gandhi accepting President Zia’s congratulations on her election and proposing visit to Islamabad by Indian Foreign Secretary early in February. Proposal had been accepted.
6. In response, I said that “preliminary reaction” would be immediately transmitted to Washington. In regard to doubts that Foreign Advisor expressed there would be ample opportunity to discuss matters further. Ambassador Hummel would be returning to Islamabad around Jan 21 and as he was aware, Deputy Secretary Christopher would be paying a visit in very near future. There should be no doubt at all regarding American resolve in face of Soviet aggression. Pakistan should not expect unanimity of views in American press on situation. There would, of course, be comments critical of Pakistan Government among reports of huge number of journalists already assembled in Islamabad. More could be expected out of Tehran and we had just had report foreign journalists in Kabul being expelled and many of those would no doubt come here. In long run, however, Pakistan should expect to benefit from world attention being focussed on Soviet aggression, and I thought it would be particularly beneficial to have plight of Afghan refugees given full publicity. In any case, there should be no confusion over what free press may or may not say and U.S. Govern [Page 490] ment position. I had provided Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz with full texts of Hodding Carter’s press briefings, which I thought spoke for themselves.6
7. Comment: Agha Shahi’s expression of disappointment over aid package came as no surprise. In backgrounder yesterday to several American journalists, he was even more critical of U.S. $400 million aid package (Islamabad 437).7 From our contacts we believe there is a continuing debate on this question within the GOP. While Agha Shahi and others may be taking negative view, which we must remember may be largely for bargaining purposes, there seems to be much more positive attitude on part of Pakistani military. We will have better idea of whether President Zia will now modify his original positive public reaction to aid offer after press briefing he quite willingly gives to several American journalists, which will take place this evening.
8. Department may wish pass this message to New Delhi and Moscow.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- For the U.S aid package, see Document 151.↩
- An apparent reference to an editorial in the New York Times, January 15, entitled “The Tilt in South Asia,” which questioned Zia’s reliability as a U.S. partner. (New York Times, January 15, 1980, p. A18)↩
- An intelligence memorandum prepared [text not declassified] for the Secretary of Defense, January 16, addressed the Pakistani reaction to the U.S. aid offer. The memorandum relayed comments by Pakistani Air Chief Marshall Shamim, a “Zia protégé and supporter,” who “welcomed the prospect of US military aid for Pakistan, but cautioned that such assistance would be perceived by the population as a show of support for Zia and the Martial Law Administration (MLA). Since Pakistanis, including the all-powerful army officer corps are ‘fed up’ with the MLA, Shamim acknowledged that US aid could have a negative impact and would inhibit the emergence of a democratic political system in Pakistan for another 5 to 10 years by bolstering Zia’s position.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217B, Box 14, Pakistan, 1 Jan–16 Apr 1980)↩
- See footnote 6, Document 145.↩
- A news report quoted Hodding Carter as saying: “The Soviet Union has created a destabilizing situation where Pakistan, with good reason, can feel threatened. Our response, in the first instance, must deal with that situation.” The report concluded, quoting Carter: “Since we don’t know why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, we can’t rule out a second, third, or fourth operation against other countries.” (Don Oberdorfer, “Pakistan Offered $400 Million Aid,” Washington Post, January 15, 1980, p. A1)↩
- Telegram 437 from Islamabad is dated January 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800029–0032)↩