Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

325. Information Cable Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

[cable number not declassified]

Yokota, Japan, October 2, 1980, 0830Z

1. (U) Country: USSR (UR), Afghanistan (AF), Pakistan (PK)

2. (U) Title: Political and Military Aspects of the Situation in Afghanistan.

3. (U) Date of Info: 800729

4. (U) Orig: Det 1, 7602 AINTELG

5. (U) Req Refs: T-2C3–20376, G-OSG-0079, S-UAP-A0018, SD-T2C2–321, and SD IAG-100²

6. [5 lines not declassified]

7. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Summary: This report discusses political and military aspects of the Afghan situation as perceived by the Afghan guerrillas. It is divided into six general areas: (A) Soviet pacification/rapproachment efforts, (B) preparations for a protracted conflict, (C) counter-insurgency tactics, (D) feelings toward the Karmal government, (E) tacit support provided by the Government of Pakistan, and (F) relationships between guerrilla tribes and leaders.

8A. (U) Details:

(1) ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Soviet pacification/rapproachment efforts. The guerrillas all expressed a strong hatred for Russians/Soviets. They spoke frequently of Soviet pacification/rapproachment efforts. These efforts have consisted of determined attempts to gain the support of majority sects/tribes while completely annihilating the smaller minority sects. The guerrillas claim that the Soviets have begun giving aid to the Baluchis who want to achieve independence from Pakistan. As a consequence, the guerrillas have begun to encounter hostility from Baluchi tribes in Afghanistan. The guerrillas believe that the Baluchis are preparing to fight against the guerrillas and feel that the fighting will spread to Baluchistan. The guerrillas point out that with the Baluchis as allies, the Soviets would be able to attain their long sought access to the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea. There are also three sects along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that support the current Afghan Government, i.e., Soviet control (NFI). The Soviets are trying to avoid at all costs a united opposition from the entire Afghan population and are using their own ethnic Asian and Arabic minorities as occupation troops in Afghanistan as a means of appeasing the Afghan populace. In spite of Soviet efforts, the guerrillas believe that they can counter pacification/rapproachment activities through high morale and strong anti-Soviet feelings.

(2) ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Preparations for a protracted conflict: The Soviets are preparing for a protracted war by occupying the cities and concentrating their troops there. They have allowed unrestricted movement of people between cities and throughout the rural areas. Neither the Soviets nor the guerrillas attack lines of communication and neither side is seriously disrupting the supply routes of the other. Both sides are currently engaged in harassment tactics while trying to win the support of the populace, particularly the city dwellers. The Soviets do not attack the guerrillas unless the guerrillas engage Soviet forces first. According to the guerrillas, the Soviets are not currently undertaking any large scale offensive actions due to international public opinion. The guerrillas are growing impatient with the lack of Soviet activity, but are resigned to a war of at least ten years duration.

(3) ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Counter-insurgency tactics: The guerrillas claim the Soviets are using napalm, but have little actual knowledge of napalm. They also claim the Soviets are changing troops frequently, replacing “inappropriate” (NFI) units with other units. The guerrillas deny that the Soviets have ever used paratroopers in Afghanistan. Although there have not been any major Soviet efforts to search out and destroy the guerrillas, they did attempt to surround the guerrillas in the mountains near Kabul during June of 1980. During this offensive, the Soviet helicopters dropped bombs, booby traps and mines along the guerrillas’ rear supply routes near the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. According to the guerrillas, the approximately 100,000 Soviet troops and less than 30,000 Afghan Government troops are not enough to control all of Afghanistan, and for this reason, the Soviets have seized only the cities and will not attack unless attacked.

(4) ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Feelings toward Karmal government: The guerrillas claim they no longer hate Karmal and in fact have begun to think favorably of him and sympathize with him. They feel that after he attempted suicide he came to his senses and will no longer execute Afghan citizens as Amin and Taraki did.³ The guerrillas predict that the two possible successors to Karmal are Asadora Sakuwari (phonetic) of the Haruku (phonetic) sect (correct spelling believed to be “Assadullah Sawari” of the “Khalq” group) or Maamaddo Haan (phonetic) (possibly “Mohamad Han”) of the Uzbeki sect. Either of these two men would be acceptable. The guerrillas feel that the current Afghan administration has adopted the same political policies as the prior administration and that agricultural reform will not be achieved. They feel that the Karmal administration would resist a U.N. peacekeeping force, attempting to delay it until after guerrilla resistance had collapsed.

(5) ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Tacit support provided by the Government of Pakistan: The refugee/guerrillas are neither encouraged nor seriously discouraged from entering Pakistan by the Pakistani Government. Although Pakistani border patrols have been heavily increased, the refugee/guerrillas cross the border easily. The border near Tor Khan is only lightly guarded by the Pakistani Government and on the Afghan side is guarded by only two soldiers, one of whom is unarmed. Further, the border area in the vicinity of Tor Khan is only delineated by two strands of barbed wire and no fortifications or border patrols are observable. Thus, movement across the border is unimpeded and people and trade goods pass freely. According to the guerrillas, all Afghans become refugees upon entry into Pakistan. They become guerrillas when they return to Afghanistan. When Afghans reach receiving areas in Pakistan, they are processed and then bused to refugee camps. At the refugee camps, they are given four Pakistani rupees and an identification card with their photo on it. The refugees/guerrillas are permitted to move freely in and out of the refugee camps. Some refugee camps are also known as “guerrilla bases”. The term is used interchangeably for at least two “refugee camps” in Pakistan, one at Peshawar and one at Bajaur. Weapons are not supposed to be carried inside the camps, but instead are supposed to be left at refugee camp headquarters. Nevertheless, arms are carried openly in the camps. Only a few Pakistani officials and no guards are available to staff the camps. The guerrillas are even negotiating to establish a refugee government in Pakistan (NFI). There was no evidence of either any other support given to the refugees/guerrillas by the Pakistani Government or of any friction between the Pakistani Government and the refugee/guerrillas.

(6) ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]) Relationship between guerrilla tribes and leaders: The traditional fighting between the various Afghan tribes still continues. The guerrillas state that even if the Soviets were to pull out of Afghanistan and another government were established, the fighting would continue between sects/tribes. The guerrillas want to establish their own government. According to the source, the guerrillas do not presently have a leader who can unite the country as the intellectuals are all seeking asylum in Western countries. The guerrillas would only accept a leader who came from a royal family and who has been, and is now, a devout Muslim. People who might meet these requirements are Professor Rabani (phonetic), who is a leader of the Jemiato (phonetic) Islami sect, and Herumacharu (phonetic) (probably Hektyamar), who is a leader of the Hezb-i Islami sect. Both of these men are currently vying for overall leadership.

[9 paragraphs (14 lines) not declassified]

1. Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 2, 14 Kabul Sitreps, PT 11. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent for information to multiple military addressees, CIA, and the Department of State.
2. None of the referenced cables was found.
3. The question of Karmal’s attempted suicide arose during a Department of State press conference, June 20, and again during a press background briefing conducted on Air Force One, June 25. During both exchanges, a reporter asked if rumors of Karmal’s attempted suicide were valid; in both cases the official response was that the United States could not verify the rumor. The Department summarized the first exchange in telegram 162876 to multiple posts, June 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800300–0515) The Embassy summarized the second exchange in telegram 9675 from Madrid, June 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800307–0310)