190. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
2112. Subject: Clark Clifford’s January 30 Meeting With Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao.
1. S—Entire text.
2. Summary
Mr. Clifford conveyed to FonMin Rao President Carter’s view of the world situation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.2 Mr. Clifford emphasized the need to take measures that would effectively deter the Soviets from further aggression in the sensitive Persian Gulf area. Projected U.S. arms deliveries to Pakistan would be defensive in character to meet Pakistan’s needs arising from the new Soviet military presence on its border. There was nothing threatening to India in this renewed U.S. interest in Pakistan’s security, or the further development of Sino-American relations. FonMin Rao focused his remarks on the resumption of U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan, which he requested should not take place. End summary.
3. Mr. Clifford and FonMin Rao met for 20 minutes prior to the larger meeting with MEA officials. Foreign Secretary Sathe and Joint Secretary D’Souza (notetaker) were also present, as was Ambassador Goheen (notetaker).
4. Mr. Clifford opened by speaking of the President’s special interest in India. He also described his own close relationship with the President, which had led to the President’s asking him to come to India as his Special Emissary. The President, he said, very much wishes to achieve better understanding and closer relations with India, and hopes that the candid exchange of views now and in the future can help the two countries get past some of the misunderstandings of past periods. Mr. Clifford then described the seriousness we attach to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the necessity of not letting such aggression go unchallenged. The President wants India to understand clearly the considered reasons behind his decision to provide assistance to Pakistan, and he wants also, through Mr. Clifford, to have a full understand [Page 535] ing of how India views the situation created by the Soviets’ move into Afghanistan.
5. The Foreign Minister responded by first expressing appreciation to the President for having sent you (Mr. Clifford) as his emissary. The closeness of the relationship between the President and Mr. Clifford gave the latter’s visit a special dimension and assured the authenticity of the views that he expressed. He said also that Indians generally have great respect for President Carter and feel he has a sense of affinity for India. Thus, the Foreign Minister was confident that there was goodwill on both sides and that it could help the two governments overcome friction and setbacks arising from differing perceptions. On strictly bilateral matters, he said, there seemed to be few problems, but, as Mr. Clifford had intimated, there were differences in the way the two countries perceived world events. It was good that there could be candid exchanges of view on these differences.
6. The situation arising from the Soviets’ action in Afghanistan, the Foreign Minister said, had indeed serious implications. Rather than speculating about what led to it, or arguing about the rights or wrongs involved, it was a situation that everyone should now be seeking to “defuse.” Moreover, while there are no doubt wider implications, for India the paramount concern had to be the new threat of big power confrontation within the South Asia region. India’s concern was how it could pursue its critical development objectives free of these tensions, without the impediments that they threaten.
7. Then, speaking very deliberately, the Foreign Minister expressed objection to America providing arms for Pakistan. Any introduction of arms for Pakistan, he said, will not achieve security for that country; it will simply escalate the tensions.3
[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram, unrelated to Afghanistan.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800054–0767. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, USUN, Bonn, USNATO, Seoul, Ankara, Athens, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Carter asked Clifford to go to India as his Special Emissary to explain U.S. policy in the region. Clifford recounted his trip in his memoirs, Counsel to the President, pp. 639–642.↩
- Clifford met with Carter in the Oval Office, February 6, to report on his meeting with Gandhi. He relayed that Gandhi “opposes what the United States is doing in Pakistan. India has no confidence in President Zia; his government is very narrowly based. India is concerned that Pakistan may use arms from the United States against India. Mrs. Gandhi does not like Zia or Pakistan but she did not favor intervention.” Clifford reported that he responded that Gandhi “should not worry” that U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan would be used against India. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 2/80)↩