327. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Komer) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Afghan Insurgency (U)
(S) While our support for the Afghan insurgency has been far from miniscule, there is reason for concern that the weight of proximate Soviet resources and military strength will gradually weaken the Afghan resistance to the point we will no longer be able to justify our contribution.2 Can we figure out ways to keep the Soviets involved and suffering for a longer time? Can we somehow develop the kind of guerrilla capability which could keep the pot boiling at a lower level of intensity? If the USSR starts to press Pakistan harder, such a force also could be most useful.
(S) To this end, why don’t we begin now to plan for a smaller more professional and better organized cadre of guerrilla forces for long-term operations, as well as for qualitative improvements in the tactics and effectiveness of the present loose-knit insurrection? I suggest we look into the formation of a small trained guerrilla cadre additive to the current guerrilla bands. The latter are probably too ingrained in their tactics and motivated by tribal and personal goals to be easily molded into a more organized force—even if we wanted to. What I have in mind is drawing upon the available manpower to provide the basis for a far more professional guerrilla cadre which could supply small, well trained hit-and-run teams to sustain resistance even if the present loose-knit rebellion gets overwhelmed. Obviously this would have to be done in close cooperation with Pakistan.
(S) I recognize there may be serious risks in the proposals above—particularly for a more professional guerrilla force, among other things, the GOP might not play. But I believe we should develop a proposal [Page 872] along these lines with some urgency. I am prepared to task my staff and the JCS to support this planning effort if you agree.3
- Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–031, Sep–Dec 1980. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Aaron.↩
- In response to a query on the strength of the Afghan insurgency, Charles Cogan wrote Carlucci, October 14, that the rebels were continuing their activities at a “normal pace.” Cogan surmised that the perception of a “faltering insurgency” might be attributable to the fact that “Afghanistan has been pushed off the front pages, primarily by the Iran-Iraq war.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 05 Sep 80–30 Dec 80, Afghanistan) The Iran-Iraq war broke out on September 22 when Iraq attacked across Iran’s western border.↩
- In a memorandum to Komer, November 4, Carlucci replied that, in the view of the intelligence community, Soviet efforts had not weakened the insurgency; on the contrary, the rebels’ efforts were “alive and well.” Carlucci agreed with Komer’s suggestion on the advisability of developing contingencies should the insurgency take a turn for the worse. To that end, Carlucci reported, the CIA was involved in its “first experiment in providing special training to independent Afghan units” involving “the SA–7.” Carlucci further noted that he wanted to assess this experiment before considering a broadened effort as Komer suggested. (Ibid.)↩
- Komer initialed “RWK” above his typed signature.↩