Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

332. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter ¹

Washington, August 1, 1980

SUBJECT

• A Strategy for the New Phase in Iran

The Issue

The purpose of this memorandum is to report to you as Chairman of the PRC the views and recommendations from the PRC meeting on Iran.² A draft of this memo and the attached options paper (“Strategy for Iran—The Next Two Months”) were circulated before the PRC as a basis for discussion.³

The purpose of this exercise is to establish a strategy for approaching the new situation in Iran which you have described—the functioning of the new parliament, the formation of a government, the focus of the parliament’s attention on the hostage issue, Queen’s release and the end of Ramadan. Some elements of this new situation already exist; others may come fully into play in a couple of weeks; still others may not jell for a month or more. The strategy discussed incorporates the steps you have already directed as well as other possible initiatives.

The attached options paper analyzes what we have done since you approved the last strategy paper early in May⁴ (pp. 1–5), the present trends in Iran (pp. 6–8), and the full range of options available to us (pp. 10–17). Each of those options is argued in that paper and was considered by the PRC.

This memorandum explains my recommendation to the PRC that we broaden the immediate effort already begun with your telegram to friends around the world to probe the Iranian situation from every angle and generate approaches in light of this new situation urging the Iranians to resolve the crisis.⁵ As the results of those initial probes begin coming in, we will sharpen specific initiatives of our own, such as hostage family⁶ and Congressional contacts with the Iranians. Even before the results of those probes are in we can begin laying the foundation with possible family and Congressional groups while avoiding immediate public identification with them.

The discussion in the PRC, as you will see from the minutes, produced general agreement that we should begin by pursuing the course outlined in this memo. There was detailed discussion of such issues as how we might handle a trial situation as it arose, and it was agreed that this should be the subject—along with other specific ideas—of some follow-on work⁷ which will be done by a very small group for the next PRC meeting on this subject. The course of action outlined in this paper, in addition to introducing the new ideas mentioned above, is designed to develop a range of active approaches on which we could call as the situation in Tehran clarifies. It was agreed in the PRC that the work that we will next be doing will focus on refining further the ideas which we may have to put into such exchanges.

The Last Three Months and Where We Stand Now

The strategy you approved on May 8 was designed to broaden our channels and range of contacts in Tehran in preparation for the moment when the top Iranian authorities would be devising their approach to the parliament on the hostage issue. A number of exchanges took place with new contacts, but the internal power struggle so preoccupied the key figures that no one in Tehran in the end was able to give systematic thought to how they would manage the decision on the hostage issue with the new Iranian parliament.

The power struggle is now approaching one of its climaxes over the selection of the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Whatever the outcome, it is expected to signal a further weakening of Bani-Sadr and the moderates, and at least the temporary ascendancy of the clerics. The latter may well be even more intransigent on the hostage issue than the moderates; there is however at least a chance that their victory in this key phase of the ongoing struggle and their assumption of responsibility for the functioning of the government will lead them to want a final resolution of the hostage issue.

We believe there is an opportunity for new efforts to resolve the crisis. We have concluded that—after reviewing the six options identified in the attached study⁸—we should put together a new diplomatic effort, combined with family and Congressional initiatives.⁹ There is no assurance of success by this route, but given the fact that Khomeini has said the parliament would decide, it seems wise to act for the moment on the assumption that we have something new to work with and that we should pick the Iranians up on Khomeini’s prescribed approach. We will be refining approaches for the specific further steps that we may want to consider in the next few weeks.

Elements of a Proposed Strategy

The main objective of the proposed strategy would be to try to encourage the new government to take control of the hostage issue as it is put before the Iranian parliament so as to assure to the extent possible that the parliament’s decisions on the issue do not preclude a reasonable settlement.

In pursuing this objective, we would work on two parallel tracks:

—encouragement of private and Congressional initiatives to test the potential for a people-to-people approach such as you discussed with hostage wives¹⁰ and

—a series of approaches through diplomatic and private channels to key Iranians to establish a negotiating channel with the most powerful elements in the new government.

At the same time, we would try to generate renewed support from enough other quarters outside Iran to keep the Iranians alert to their stakes in resolving the crisis. During this period, we would continue—and would press our allies to continue—the economic and psychological pressures on Iran.

Hostage Families. As you instructed, I am discussing with the leaders of the hostage family organization ways in which they might propose a meeting with some Iranians. As they said to you, they are hesitant about going to Iran themselves, although it has to be recognized that this may be the only realistic way to arrange direct contact. We will be working out separately possible ways for them to conduct their own appeals and probes for possible contact which might open the door to the hostages being turned over to their families.

Congressional Initiative. We know that some Iranians have been interested for some time in the possibility of a meeting involving members of our Congress and the Iranian parliament. We could approach members whom we know interest the Iranians and encourage them to try to arrange such a meeting. We understand that Senators Stevenson and Bellmon¹¹ have been considering the idea, and they might be an appropriate nucleus for a small group. We would have to tell them that we would publicly distance ourselves from their effort to increase the likelihood of its acceptability in Tehran and its independence of the Executive. Their first objective might be to arrange a meeting with counterparts simply to explore how issues between Iran and the United States might be worked out. They might go prepared to agree—in the context of an understanding on a scenario for the release of the hostages—that hearings would be held in the U.S. examining Iran’s grievances and past U.S. involvement in Iran. From our perspective, it would be more desirable for them to trade the commitment to hearings for release of the hostages than to agree that the report on the hearings would be issued concurrent with the release.¹²

The advantage of both the Congressional and the hostage family initiatives is that both provide independent mechanisms for dealing with the hostage situation which would be available should Khomeini decide the time is right for release. They could be complemented by exchanges between our two governments to the extent that would be necessary to lend credibility to these non-Executive initiatives and to provide a channel for working out arrangements for such steps as unfreezing blocked assets.

A Proposed Scenario

We have divided our proposed scenario, somewhat arbitrarily, into three steps. The further approaches under Step #1—some of which have already begun at your direction—would be taken at an early date, once it becomes more probable that the formation of a new government is underway. This is a stage of probing and exploration designed to give us a wide and immediate picture of what is possible in Tehran. We will assess the results of those probes as they come in to determine how to shape follow-on approaches. Those approaches under Steps 2 and 3—outlined below as illustrative of the kinds of moves we could make—would likely follow the actual formation of the government and our assessment, as the information from the first probes becomes available, of the best way to approach key individual leaders in the government and the new parliament.

Step #1. As a first step, we would continue immediately to encourage a new series of approaches to key Iranian officials, i.e., the new Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, Beheshti and other leaders of the religious party, and Bani-Sadr. Specifically, we would instruct the following approaches:

—The telegram that you have already directed¹³ instructs approaches to EC–9 members to ask them, now that the formation of a new government may be near, to reconsider a statement of their own along the lines of their Middle East statement¹⁴ and sending an emissary or a message to Tehran. We laid the groundwork for this approach in June by asking the EC to study such an approach. They replied that they were prepared to consider such an approach but did not feel the time was ripe in early July. We agreed. The advantage of our June approach is that they have now done their homework and should be prepared to move quickly at the right moment.

—Also via the telegram you directed, we would approach key governments represented in Tehran, important members of the Islamic Conference, and other Europeans and ask them either to make direct approaches in Tehran or to make public statements appealing to the authorities in Tehran. The substance of these approaches would be an appeal to the Iranian government to take advantage of the convergence of the formation of the new government, the end of Ramadan, the death of the Shah, humanitarian concerns generated by Richard Queen’s illness and release to bring an end to the hostage crisis.

—Ask Kreisky and his Socialist International group to consider an approach of their own either by going back to Tehran to visit the new leadership or by sending a message to the new leadership.

—Urge both Waldheim and the President of the UNGA (if we can manage this without offending Waldheim) to establish either direct or indirect contact with both the new Foreign Minister and Beheshti (Waldheim) and the leadership of the parliament (UNGA President). The substance of the approach would be much the same as that described above. The appeal might not have all that much effect, but it might have some freshness for officials who have not been previously involved with the UN. Waldheim might explore whether the return to Iran of a member of the UN Commission or some other unpublicized emissary from him might be useful.

—We might again approach Agha Shahi and Habib Chatti as leaders in the Islamic Conference and members of the Standing Committee on Afghanistan, urging them to make a special approach urging the Iranians to put the hostage crisis behind them in order to be able to concentrate on the Soviet threat from Afghanistan.

—Ask the Algerian Government to instruct its Ambassador in Tehran to make his own probes, particularly among the religious leadership, to provide us with analysis of what the demands and objectives of that leadership are with regard to resolving the hostage crisis. In asking the Algerians to make this approach, we would probably have to provide them with a short statement of our own position so that they could have that to draw on in their conversations. Such a statement would be drawn from the position paper which you approved in November and reconfirmed in January.¹⁵ The Algerians might even raise the question of whether the Conference earlier discussed by them with the Swiss chaired by the two of them or other neutrals might be useful in bringing Iranians and Americans together to resolve bilateral issues which will have to be dealt with when the hostage issue is resolved.

—We would crank up private individuals such as Richard Cottam here in the U.S. or Bourguet and Villalon in Paris to make whatever contacts they could. We would particularly ask Cottam to try to open a channel to Beheshti.

—We would inform the Swiss of what we are doing but reserve them for the next step.¹⁶

Step #2. Following relatively soon after we have some feedback from the above approaches, we would launch approaches of our own by sending direct messages to key figures in Iran. These messages would as much as possible take advantage of the efforts of intermediaries during Step #1 to determine how a resolution of the crisis might be shaped. These messages might include:

—A letter from me to the new Foreign Minister through the Swiss stating readiness for discreet exchanges or discussions through an agreed channel in order to manage an acceptable conclusion to the crisis. This could include our positions on key issues.

—The hostage families have just sent via a visiting minister a letter to Ahmad Khomeini. They could send a follow-on message either to Ahmad Khomeini or to Beheshti or perhaps copies to both introducing the idea of contact between the hostage families and an appropriate Iranian group, and possibly a visit by a family delegation to Iran. This would follow through on your conversation with Mrs. Keough and Mrs. Kennedy, which I am further exploring with them.

—We might work out a direct message to Beheshti from a private or Congressional group to be delivered by the Algerian Ambassador or through their own contacts. One purpose of approaching Beheshti through the Algerian Ambassador would be to try to determine the basis for Beheshti’s participation in an agreed final solution.

—A letter from Members of our Congress has been delivered to the new President of the Iranian parliament by the Swiss Chargé and he has reacted substantively.¹⁷ There might be a role for a more pointed Congressional message to him or to other members of the Iranian parliament. Once we have gauged Iranian receptivity, we might consider proposing to the Congressional leadership a bipartisan Congressional delegation to visit Tehran to seek the release of the hostages from the parliament. The delegation, as noted above, would presumably be in a position to assure an appropriate Congressional investigation of U.S.-Iranian relations once the hostages are released.¹⁸

—It is also possible in addition to the private approaches described above to make a substantive public statement at an appropriate moment. A written message to an individual may not be sufficiently dramatic or may not be politically useful in the Tehran context to catch the attention of the Iranians or to develop a situation in which those who want to resolve the crisis can proceed. We have hesitated to make public statements which would fall on deaf ears in Tehran, but if we thought the time was right we might say something about our policies toward Iran after the release of the hostages. Now that the Shah is dead, a statement incorporating our position that we will not stand in the way of Iranians who wish to seek assets in this country might have a political impact.

Step #3. As these various approaches progress, our purpose would be to narrow the field and to identify a target in Tehran for a negotiating effort and to identify the best channel for communicating with that individual or group. Depending on responses to our more general approaches, our purpose at this stage would be to introduce a specific package on which the Iranians could focus and which could become the basis of a negotiation. We would try to design the approach and the package in such a way as to include a suggestion for the Iranians on how the hostage issue might be presented to the parliament. Our staff work will continue in a very small group to develop short papers on each of the main elements of a possible package so we will be ready to move promptly.¹⁹

In proceeding through these steps, we would start with the position paper which you approved early in the crisis and which we have used repeatedly throughout (attached).²⁰ We will weave that into messages we send ourselves as well as trying certain language which might encourage the Iranians to open a dialogue.

Hostage Trials

In addition to the above, we will have to prepare ourselves to deal with what may be the increasing likelihood that there will be trials of some kind.

We are on record as telling the Iranians in November privately and in December through the press that we will interrupt their commerce if any of the hostages are tried.²¹ We have also gained the ruling of the International Court of Justice that the hostages may not be subjected to trial. There is the grave danger that we have worried about continuously that even a trial which started out as a show trial could turn into one which would jeopardize the safety or even the lives of some of the hostages.

Against that background, we will continue to do everything we can to discourage trials of any kind, but it is possible that we will at some point have to consider the possibility of accepting a scenario in which some sort of trial/pardon element is introduced. Clearly there would be risks in any such situation, but we will be developing a separate paper in order to help think through ways in which we might manage such a situation so as to build in the maximum number of safeguards.²²

The Hostages

We have used every opportunity to keep open the possibility of a medical or humanitarian visit to the hostages, but these approaches have been flatly rebuffed since the rescue mission. At the moment of a new diplomatic initiative, it seems to me that we should concentrate our energies and those of the Iranians on release of the hostages rather than settling for a visit to them.

Meanwhile, extensive efforts by the Agency and our Iran Working Group continue in an effort to locate the hostages. As you know, Richard Queen’s account tended to confirm both that some of the hostages remain in the Embassy and that a number of them had been moved away from the compound, either elsewhere in Tehran or outside. While we have indications of where some of them might be, we still cannot be sure where they are at any given moment since we suspect they may be moved around periodically.²³

Public Affairs Strategy

It will be crucial for the Administration to enlist the support of the American people for its strategy.

I believe that it will be possible to mount an effective defense of this strategy in the weeks to come, but we need an agreed and consistent position that will be used by all members of your administration who speak about it publicly. It will be important to stress that our overriding objective in dealing with Iran remains the release of the hostages while protecting this nation’s honor. There is a new situation in Iran (formation of a new government, death of the Shah, release of Queen, establishment of the parliament, end of Ramadan) which should be analyzed and explained by Administration spokesmen. It should then be possible for us to outline in general terms our strategy for pursuing the matter without holding out false hopes for an early resolution—and without identifying ourselves with family and Congressional initiatives which depend for their success on remaining independent of us. The problem in dealing with the Iranian authorities and terrorists should also be frankly stated.

The rescue attempt has, I believe, made it less likely that you will be criticized for not taking further military action to try to free the hostages. If you are criticized for failing to take strong enough measures to obtain the hostages’ release, I believe that we are in a strong position to challenge the detractors of our policy to come up with alternatives that will produce safe and early release of the hostages. We can emphasize that our purpose is the return of the hostages with honor. We will not act in irresponsible ways. Any attempt to use this issue for partisan advantage would be irresponsible.

I believe that you will continue to enjoy the private and public support of the hostage families if you adopt the strategy that I outlined.

Recommendation:

That you approve the strategy outlined above as the framework within which we will work in the weeks ahead with the understanding that we will continue to refine each of the steps on a contingency basis and as we begin to hear responses to our approaches.²⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 10. Secret; Sensitive. Brzezinski returned a copy of this memorandum to Muskie with Carter’s marginalia. He informed Muskie that Carter’s marginal notes were “on almost every page,” conveying the President’s feeling that the United States should be moving “more aggressively” on a “wide front.” Brzezinski asked Muskie to let him know if he could be helpful in meeting Carter’s requests. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Muskie, August 5; Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran 1980–81)
2. See Document 331.
3. See footnote 2, Document 331.
4. Document 279.
5. Presumably telegram 202298; see footnote 2, Document 327.
6. Carter underlined the words “hostage family” and wrote in the left margin: “Why wait?”
7. Carter underlined the words “follow-on work” and wrote in the left margin: “Expedite.”
8. The options listed in the strategy paper were: 1) intensify support for opposition groups in order to destabilize Iran; 2) implement a blockade or mining of Iranian ports and make efforts to block air transport links; 3) intensify negotiations; 4) make a humanitarian appeal for release; 5) develop a response should Iran demand trials as part of a release scenario; and 6) put any U.S. initiatives on hold and wait for Iran to make the next move.
9. Carter wrote in the left margin beside this sentence: “I agree—move on it.”
10. See Document 320.
11. Senator Adlai Stevenson III (D–Illinois) and Senator Henry L. Bellmon (R–Oklahoma)
12. Carter wrote in the left margin beside this paragraph: “All of this should be pursued aggressively & without delay.”
13. Presumably telegram 213548, August 12. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 33, Iran Update 8/80)
14. The EC–9 issued the “Venice Declaration” on June 13, establishing an independent European policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. The full text is in the New York Times, June 14, 1980, p. 4.
15. See Document 137.
16. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “There is no reason for delay on doing all of these things. They are not mutually incompatible.”
17. See Documents 309 and 329.
18. In the left margin beside these paragraphs, Carter wrote: “Draft these now. Have them ready.”
19. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Ok—Get Bill [Miller] & Lloyd [Cutler] to help.”
20. See footnote 15, above.
21. See Document 52. The White House issued a statement on trials on December 18. See footnote 9, Document 104.
22. In the left margin beside the two previous paragraphs, Carter wrote: “We should remind UN, Western friends & others of our earlier statements. Don’t wait until we face the trials. Prevention of them is what we want.”
23. In the left margin beside this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Keep up PR re hostage abuse & lack of accountability for them.”
24. Carter approved the strategy with a checkmark and wrote at the bottom of the page: “Put this now into action. Give me a plan—step-by-step with dates, for implementation.”