Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

329. Message From the Swiss Chargé to Iran (Kaiser) to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 30, 1980

Letter from U.S. Congressmen²

1) The delivery, which was delayed by the resignation of the chief of protocol, and which finally could be arranged by one of his deputies, took place last night at 7 p.m Since Rafsanjani speaks only Persian and Arabic, I had taken along one of this Embassy’s translators to the appointment. In accordance with State Department instructions,³ I stressed the independent initiative of the 187 congressmen, who had by no means acted on the orders of the Executive, and emphasized that the reader of this letter must become aware of the serious desire of these congressmen to end this crisis situation as quickly as possible and in a peaceful manner protecting the honor of all sides. Finally, I requested the speaker to bring the letter to the attention of all parliamentarians at the most suitable moment. After Rafsanjani had been read the content of the letter in Persian, he agreed to acquaint the Parliament with the text at a favorable opportunity,⁴ and then began a monologue lasting almost half an hour in answer of the letter. He then asked me to transmit this reaction to the congressmen.

Rafsanjani declared that if the U.S. Government were really interested in a peaceful solution, it would have had to take a much more sensible attitude. It had attempted numerous actions which had worsened the atmosphere constantly and widened the gulf between the two countries. He cited the following examples:

1. The freezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks had been an illegal action. These assets derived from the sale of oil which had been concluded at low prices, about 1/10 of the actual value.

2. Also illegal is the blockage of delivery of spare parts for projects which had been forced on Iran in the first place, with a guaranty of ongoing supplies. Fortunately, in the meantime, Iran is in a position to make its way even without these, partly vital, spare parts.

3. He referred to the strong U.S. pressure on its satellite countries to join the economic boycott. But Iran can stand on its own feet and bravely withstand the effects of the economic boycott.

4. The military offensive in Iran (Tabas), of which there are still many details missing.⁵ This act could in no way be put in a favorable light before the eyes of the world.

5. The continued active support of the Shah before and after his overthrow and to the very end, and the support for the minions of his regime in Iran and abroad constitutes an unfriendly act towards the Iranian people.

6. Extensive propaganda activities in the whole world with the object of defaming the Iranian revolution. After all, it is obvious that the Iranian revolution must be considered the most humane revolution in recent times, marked by the spirit of mercy and forgiveness.

7. U.S. support for leftist groups active in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan trying to weaken the Iranian revolution, although supporting these groups can certainly not be in the interest of the Western World.

8. Active subversive propaganda by the Farsi service of the VOA with the goal of bringing about a military coup as planned by Bakhtiar and other accomplices of the Shah. General U.S. support of all those who are actively considering a coup.

9. Active American involvement in the recent abortive coup.⁶ This coup was the work of all counterrevolutionary groups (Bakhtiar/the Shah’s people, etc.) as well as the United States and its mercenaries (Israel, among others). The names of those involved had been found in the U.S. Embassy. Only thanks to God’s mercy and the vigilance of the people, this sinister attempt had failed.

10. The U.S. Government is putting cruel and unjust pressure on faithful Islamic Iranian citizens who live in the the United States and are therefore guests of the country. The most recent example for this is the brutal attack by the police on the Islamic pro-Khomeini demonstrators in Washington, which Rafsanjani condemned publicly in Parliament. The day before, that same police force had tolerated the demonstration by the exiled criminals who had insulted Iran’s “sacred leadership.”

Returning to one of the basic arguments of the letter, Rafsanjani asked how an atmosphere of understanding could possibly be created in view of all that had happened in all these years and was still happening, and how could the Majlis understand it. Would it not have been better for the United States to fulfill at least the minimal demand of the Iranian people: the extradition of the corrupt Shah who had plundered the country. The trial of this felon would at least have helped soften the revolutionary anger. The non-extradition, however, was tantamount to a flagrant insult to the people and the government. Rafsanjani continued that it had not been wise that the United States had changed its motives vis-à-vis Iran. The U.S. was still dreaming, as in the past, of an Iran under its control and colonial yoke.

In order to achieve an improvement in the atmosphere between the two countries, it is necessary that the United States does everything in its power to heal the unjustices of the past. However, if the United States does not change its attitude and the old unfriendliness and enmities are allowed to continue, how can the Iranian nation, which is so forgiving, forget all the mistakes of the past and the injustice it has suffered. With this, Rafsanjani concluded his comments.

2) Last night, after the ambassadors of the PLO, Lebanon, and Romania, it was my turn to talk with Rafsanjani. The President of the Iranian Parliament seems to be a very charming man. But in conversation or negotiations he clearly reveals himself as a hardliner of the Beheshti circle in the IRP.

His monologue listed routinely—and as if learned by heart from a catechism—the all too well-known charges vis-à-vis the U.S. His doctrinaire fixation on this question made any factual discussion of the matter, which was not sought by Rafsanjani anyway, appear hopeless. His entire disposition makes it unlikely that he could be the man who could or would at this point effectively preach understanding to the Majlis moving in the dangerous direction of possible clerical-fascist tendencies. Therefore it is most doubtful whether he should be entrusted with any more messages for the time being.

While I myself did not have an opportunity to mention the hostage problem (time for presentation), the Austrian Ambassador, who had delivered a letter of the President of the Austrian Parliament to Rafsanjani two days earlier, the main concern of which had been the hostage problem, told me that Rafsanjani had told him that the question would be submitted to Parliament soon. This will depend first of all on how long and with what consequences the domestic power struggle (prime minister and subsequent formation of a cabinet) will drag on.

Kaiser

1. Source: Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update Aug 1980. No classification marking. Attached to a July 31 briefing memorandum from Saunders to Muskie, Christopher, and Newsom.
2. See Document 309.
3. In a July 8 message from the Department, the Swiss Embassy was instructed to share the contents of the letter with Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh, and then deliver it to Sahabi. The Swiss Embassy was to tell Sahabi that the letter was a congressional initiative taken independently of the Executive branch and that the letter “describes a sincere desire on the part of the Congress to end the crisis with Iran as quickly as possible in a peaceful and honorable manner.” (Message attached to a July 7 briefing memorandum from Saunders to Muskie, Christopher, and Newsom; Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update July 1980)
4. According to a July 31 message from Kaiser, Rafsanjani read the letter to the Majles July 30 but blocked a debate on its contents, promising that U.S.-Iranian relations would be debated soon. Kaiser reported that Rafsanjani told the Tehran Times that “these problems cannot be solved peacefully,” and that in exchange for every step toward solution of the hostage crisis, the United States had to admit that its actions toward Iran had been “inhuman and that mistakes have been made.” (Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update August 1980)
5. Reference is to the rescue attempt.
6. See Document 313.