Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

331. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 1, 1980, 9:10–10:36 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of PRC Meeting on Iran (S)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Under Secretary David Newsom
  • Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders
  • Ambassador Vanden Heuvel

• Treasury

  • Robert Mundheim
  • William Anawaty

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Frank Kramer

• Justice

  • John Shenefield
  • John Harmon

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General John Pustay

• DCI

  • Bruce Clarke
  • Robert Ames

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Hedley Donovan
  • Lloyd Cutler

• NSC

  • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Secretary Muskie opened the meeting by reviewing for the PRC an options paper for an Iran strategy over the next two months (Tab B)² and a proposed memorandum to the President reporting the recommendations of the PRC.³ Some participants expressed doubt that the course of action would succeed in achieving the release of the hostages; however, all agreed that the strategy proposed was necessary as a first step toward developing the contacts and channels of communication required for further progress. After some minor revisions, the PRC unanimously recommended approval of the memorandum at Tab A. (C)

Approve⁴ As Amended

The bulk of the discussion related to the question of possible trials of the hostages. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that it may be useful to have a trusted intermediary on his own raise with or suggest to the Iranians a possible resolution of the crisis involving a swift trial and immediate expulsion of the hostages in no more than 48 hours. Although we should continue to stand by our public and private position of November 1979 that we would respond to trials by an interruption of Iranian commerce,⁵ we should also recognize that some form of trials may prove unavoidable. We should provide a scenario which offers an alternative to an automatic U.S. military response and which provides the basis for a prior understanding that we could restrain our reaction for a brief period in order to resolve the crisis if there were assurances that a trial will be followed by release. (S)

Secretary Brown noted that prearrangements in the past had always come apart, and this kind of scenario would be no different. In his view, the most realistic course would be to leave our position of opposing all trials as it is. He felt that Beheshti and Khomeini are determined to bring down the U.S. government, and they would use the situation against us. Bruce Clarke commented that the Iranians would be able to agree on having real trials more easily and more quickly than they could agree on such a scenario. (S)

Mr. Cutler commented that the ICJ ruling forbids all trials involving the hostages,⁶ and he did not accept that the U.S. could sit still for trials of any nature. Since we would have to misrepresent our position, it was not an honorable course. The United States should never lie. (C)

Mr. Christopher also disagreed with the proposal on the grounds that it would suggest U.S. acquiescence in trials, thereby opening that issue to negotiation. It is also possible that the Iranians would lose control of the process and the scenario would get out of hand. Secretary Muskie commented that the Iranians would probably take our proposal and then escalate to a discussion of additional concessions they may want. If we have to offer some bait in advance to the Iranians, he would prefer consideration of monetary inducements or a carefully drafted apology of some sort rather than accepting trials. In any event, we lack a credible interlocutor in Tehran. (S)

Mr. Donovan disagreed with the notion of trials or an apology, on the grounds that it would promote hostage-taking elsewhere around the world. (S)

All agreed that this should be regarded as a preliminary discussion of possible alternate courses of action. The issues had not been examined sufficiently to permit any decision or recommendation. The nature of the discussion should be reported to the President for his information, and a small working group should examine in more detail the kinds of contingencies we may face suddenly and how we might deal with them. (S)

Mr. Cutler noted that we are progressively losing control of any ability to return the frozen assets. The court cases are proceeding and he believes we will not be able to stop a judgment. Mr. Shenefield commented that this issue was really a lawyers’ discussion that had to be worked out among Cutler, Treasury and Justice. Dr. Brzezinski noted that it also affected our negotiating position on the hostages. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 10. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Ed–Zbig, C.”
2. Tab B, an undated paper prepared in the Department of State, “Strategy for Iran—the Next Two Months,” is attached but not printed. Tab B also included the U.S. Position Paper, Document 137. The undated paper summarized the May 8 strategy (see Documents 278 and 279) and listed developments since then. It also noted that “fanfare surrounding the alleged Bakhtiar-backed coup” had increased hostility toward the United States since Iran believed it had “detailed and convincing evidence” of U.S. support for Oveissi and Bakhtiar. The paper concluded that results of the May 8 strategy were limited because Iran was preoccupied with its own internal power struggle. The last half of the paper discussed future scenarios and U.S. options. (See footnote 8, Document 332) In a July 31 memorandum, Sick informed Brzezinski: “You do not need to read it.” (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 10) The CIA concurred with the paper’s judgments but believed that it was “virtually certain” the Majles would opt for trials. (Undated memorandum by NESA; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator, Box 18, Folder 9: PRC Meeting—1 Aug 80 Iran)
3. Tab A, the proposed memorandum, is printed as Document 332.
4. Carter approved this option with a checkmark and wrote “See Notes” in the right margin. Carter’s notes on the memorandum are in the annotation to Document 332.
5. See Document 52.
6. See footnote 2, Document 286.