333. Paper Prepared by the Head of the Iran Working Group, Department of State (Saunders)1
PAPERS NOW IN TRAIN
In the light of the emerging situation in Tehran and following Friday’s PRC meeting2 we have set for ourselves the following work agenda for the next few days in order to refine our approaches to the main openings we may have to deal with:
—Bob Owen and I have reviewed with our colleagues the work on claims settlement that was done back in February, and Bob is now developing a series of position papers which would each include three elements: a simple statement of our position as it could be conveyed to the Iranians; a layman’s explanation of the position which could be used as argument in a negotiation; whatever more detailed legal or technical material might be necessary as back-up in coordinating the positions of State, Justice, Treasury and NSC. The series of position papers would lead from an optimal settlement to our bottom-line fallback.
—A second series of papers in similar format would deal with responses on the Shah’s assets, whatever they may be.
—We will develop the strategy options for dealing with hostage trials along the lines discussed in the PRC. This paper would discuss our broader options in response to the possibility of trials.
—As a more specialized paper in conjunction with the paper on trials, Bob would review the extensive work done during the winter and develop a paper on the question of providing counsel for the hostages if there are trials.
—We are working with Brian Atwood and colleagues on a paper dealing with the shape of possible Congressional initiatives. In addition to the Congressional letter which has already been delivered and Rafsanjani’s response,3 there are glimmers of other possible moves involving members of Congress, and we will be developing our own thoughts [Page 891] in following through on the memo which you sent to the President after the PRC.4
—We will provide a draft of a possible statement covering the past US role in Iran to see what range of choice we have in formulations that might meet the Iranian demand for “apology” in ways consistent with US dignity.
—We will also have a draft of a message to the new foreign minister from you for consideration.
Pending a decision on a comprehensive Congressional strategy, we believe we should carefully consider following up Rafsanjani’s reaction to the letter from 187 Congressmen. His comments to the press indicated there might be an opening there, and we recommend sending Swiss Chargé Kaiser back to see Rafsanjani with comments on his remarks and some further hints of the desirability of dialogue with the Congress. If you approve this approach, we would brief Congressmen Hamilton and Gilman5 on Rafsanjani’s response through the Swiss which you read Friday. We would then discuss with them the possibility of their sending an oral response to keep the channel open. We have developed a draft response (attached)6 to give the Congressmen an idea of what we have in mind. Rafsanjani’s reaction to this second approach would give us a somewhat better idea of the kind of man who we are dealing with as a member of the Iranian Parliament and could then provide a basis for deciding whether and when to try for a meeting.
Approve approach to Hamilton/Gilman7
Other
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 33, Iran Update 8/80. Secret; Sensitive. Attached to an August 3 briefing memorandum from Saunders to Muskie, Christopher, and Newsom.↩
- See Document 331.↩
- See Documents 309 and 329.↩
- See Document 332.↩
- Congressman Lee Hamilton (D–Indiana) and Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman (R–New York).↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- There is no indication that Muskie approved this approach.↩