Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

180. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State¹

Bern, February 10, 1980, 1923Z

781. Eyes only for President, Secretaries Vance and Christopher, Dr. Brzezinski from Jordan and Saunders. Subject: Scenario for Resolving Hostage Crisis.

1. S–Entire text.

2. We met our contacts two hours Saturday midnight and all day Sunday.² As a result, we believe we have an acceptable revised scenario (text below). The main lines are as you earlier approved³ with one addition—statements by Presidents Carter and Bani-Sadr. The changes primarily develop a more exact schedule of steps for establishing the Commission and a more precise description of events surrounding the end of the Commission’s work and the release of the hostages. Although the exact time it will take to play out this scenario cannot be determined now, we have stressed that the period must be short, and it looks to us as if the scenario should be completed in something less than three weeks from today.

3. One important proposal outside the scenario below is that Jordan (with Saunders) meet secretly with Ghotbzadeh in Paris next Sunday.⁴ He is taking a trip to Athens, Rome, and Paris on official Iranian business of various kinds. The purposes of the meeting would be (a) to demonstrate good faith on both sides; (b) to confirm or refine the last stages of the scenario, hopefully to get Ghotbzadeh’s agreement to direct release of the hostages rather than going through the intermediate stage of moving them to a hospital in Tehran; (c) to reach understanding on the contents of the two Presidential statements now added to the scenario; (d) to review any details on the remainder of the scenario. We recognize there are risks in such a meeting because it may leak, but we recommend that it take place in order to assure ourselves on the release of our people. It will be in the mutual interest of both parties to keep this secret. Since we have asked for direct contact and they have responded positively, it might be a setback if we shied away now.

4. We propose the following immediate steps:

—Jordan and Saunders would arrive in New York by 0900 Monday⁵ and see Waldheim as early as possible, with Secretary Vance if at all possible. (If this is approved, we hope the Secretary might call Waldheim Sunday and arrange this appointment secretly at Waldheim’s residence.)

—Precht and interpreter would move to Paris as point of communication with our French contacts throughout the week and to arrange the Sunday meeting. Our contacts will be on the phone to Tehran from Paris daily, and direct communication may be essential in keeping this scenario on the tracks.

—It would be extremely helpful if Hamilton could call around midnight here (1800 Washington time) to determine whether or not to proceed on the basis of this message.

5. We want to emphasize that it is essential to do everything possible to limit knowledge on our side about the meeting next Sunday.

6. Begin text.

Revised Scenario

I. Principles and Procedures (no change from earlier draft)

The United States and Iran agree:

1. To accept the principle of the establishment of a scenario, the first stages of which would be defined precisely, and the subsequent stages would be defined in detail as events evolve;

2. To manage this scenario with the help of persons agreed to by both sides;

3. To proceed, within the framework of this scenario, by stages each involving reciprocal actions to be defined in advance;

4. That these points are intended to allow the earliest possible resolution of the present crisis by peaceful means.

II. Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry (changes show detailed sequence of events—all times below are New York time)

1. It is agreed in the approval of this scenario that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should establish a Commission of Inquiry to hear Iran’s grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the U.S. and that Iran desires to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.

2. Monday night: Secretary-General Waldheim sends a message to Ghotbzadeh confirming his readiness to send to Iran within a week the Commission of 5–7 members which he discussed in Tehran early in January “to hear Iran’s grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the U.S.”⁶

3. Tuesday: Ghotbzadeh would respond by agreeing that the Commission should come to Tehran within a week and stating Iran’s desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.⁷

4. Tuesday night: The U.S. would remove its objections to the establishment of this Commission by a direct private communication to the Secretary-General.⁸ In that communication, the U.S. would state importance that Commission look into the grievances of both sides and work for early release of the hostages. At this time, the U.S. would take the following position publicly: The U.S. will discuss with the Secretary-General the concept of a Commission. The U.S. will reserve its comment until it knows what the terms of reference of the Commission will be. The U.S. has stated its position many times before and need not repeat it. While we have opposed the formation of a Commission under past conditions, we would support any steps by the UN that might lead to the release of the hostages while protecting essential international principles.

5. Tuesday night: Secretary-General Waldheim sends a second message to Ghotbzadeh which would (a) state briefly the purpose of the Commission as a fact-finding mission (not a tribunal) to help end the crisis and (b) recommend the membership of 5–7 for the Commission. In proposing the membership, the Secretary-General would propose Aguilar as Chairman plus 4–6 members, including (1) M’Bow (UNESCO Director), (2) Bedjaoui (Algerian PermRep at UN), (3) Petitti (former head of Paris Bar Association and Association of Catholic Jurists), (4) Martin Ennals (Amnesty International Secretary-General), (5) Abu Sayeed Chowdhury (former President of Bangladesh), (6) Daoudi (Advisor to President Assad of Syria) or Sabah el Rikabi (Head of Union of Syrian Bar Associations). If any of the proposed members is not acceptable to Iran, Iran could suggest that one or two be dropped.⁹

6. Between Tuesday and Friday: Either Bani-Sadr himself would confirm by phone to the Secretary-General or the Imam would issue a statement that he has authorized the Revolutionary Council to resolve the crisis.¹⁰ The Secretary-General would not proceed until he has received confirmation in one of these forms from Iran.

7. Friday at 1600 hours: The Secretary-General would announce establishment of the Commission and its purposes, including Iran’s desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.¹¹

8. After SYG Waldheim’s announcement: The President of Iran would publicly present the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry as a success of Iranian diplomacy, would interpret the visit to the hostages as one of the elements in the investigation into Iranian grievances, and would state the desire of the Imam to see the Commission conclude its work rapidly. The Iranian President would instruct government administrations to place their documents at the disposal of the Commission.¹²

9. After the Iranian statement: The U.S. would state that the Commission is going on a fact-finding mission to Tehran, to hear the grievances of both sides, to meet with each of the hostages, and to report to the Secretary-General. The U.S. would object publicly to having the Commission subject the hostages to interrogation in connection with its inquiry during any of its meetings with them.

III. Work of the Commission

1. The Commission would not leave New York for Tehran until the U.S. announcement above has been made. It would aim to begin work in Tehran early next week.

2. The Commission would hold its meetings in private and will receive evidence and documents to be submitted to it by Iranian authorities.

3. The Commission would visit the Embassy as soon as possible to meet with the hostages.

4. As soon as the Commission has concluded its work and drafted its report, it: (a) would tell the Revolutionary Council that the credibility of its report would be seriously limited unless the hostages are released immediately or at least moved from the compound to a hospital; (b) would inform the Revolutionary Council that it is ready to return to New York to submit its report to the Secretary-General.

IV. Final Stages:

1. Transfer of the hostages to the protection of the Government of Iran either in a hospital or in the Embassy compound after the “students” have left the premises. (Day number 1.)

2. Return of the Commission to New York. (Day 1 plus 1)

3. Submission to the Secretary-General of the Commission’s report which will contain findings and recommendations. Publication of the report as a UN document. The report would express inter alia the following principle as a recommendation to all governments:

—Governments should respect and facilitate within the framework of their internal laws the right of Iran:

(a) to file suits against the Shah, his family or associates on the basis of the grave presumption of any serious crimes set forth in the report;

(b) to file suits to recover assets which in the report are presumed to have been illegally taken from Iran by the Shah, his family or associates.

(Day 1 plus 2)

4. Release of the hostages and their departure from Iran. (Day 1 plus 3).

5. One hour after their departure, the SYG will release statements by President Bani-Sadr and President Carter both previously agreed by Iran and the U.S. and, before the Commission left Iran, deposited privately with the SYG.

(a) The Iranian statement will admit the moral wrong of holding hostages, express regret, promise to respect international law and affirm a desire to establish normal relations based on mutual respect, equality and international law.

(b) The U.S. statement will:

(1) accept the principle stated in 3 above

(2) express understanding and regret for the grievances of the Iranian people, including the widespread perception of U.S. intervention in Iran’s internal affairs;

(3) affirm the right of the Iranian people to make decisions governing their political future and the policy of the U.S. to respect that right;

(4) affirm a desire for normal relations based on mutual respect, equality and the principles of international law.

6. Establishment of a Joint Commission to resolve all unresolved bilateral problems. (On a date to be determined by Iran and the U.S. within one month after day 1.)

Vine

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 2/80. Secret; Nodis; Cherokee; Flash. An unknown hand wrote “advance copy” in the upper right corner. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.
2. February 9 and 10. Saunders, Precht, and Jordan met with Bourguet and Villalon at the Bellevue Hotel in Bern. (Crisis, p. 150) Sick later complained to Brzezinski that he had been cut out of the Bourguet and Villalon scenario and his inclusion needed to be clarified in order to maintain his credibility. (Memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, February 11; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 32, Subject File, Iran [Retained] 2/80)
3. See Document 168.
4. February 17.
5. February 11.
6. Waldheim confirmed to Ghotbzadeh his intention to establish a commission on February 13, reiterating the sentences in this step of this scenario. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Box 8, UN and Security Channel) A report of Waldheim’s trip to Iran in January is in Document 132.
7. Ghotbzadeh fulfilled this step of the scenario in two messages. The first, February 12, informed Waldheim that Iran would accept the Commission “to make the inquiry about the crimes committed by the deposed Shah and the funds stolen by him and his family. On this basis the Commission will hear the American hostages as well.” In a second note of February 13, he acknowledged that his message had given rise to “erroneous interpretations,” and stated that the Commission “will have as its mission to examine the grievances of Iran and to allow a rapid solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States.” (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Box 8, UN and Security Channel)
8. On the basis of the exchange of messages between Waldheim and Ghotbzadeh, Vance reiterated the sentences in this step of the scenario in a February 13 message to Waldheim. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Box 8, UN and Security Channel)
9. In the right margin, an unknown hand wrote “D’Quello.”
10. February 11–15. Waldheim received this confirmation on February 13 for the initial go-ahead and also announced publicly on February 19 that Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council had approved the Commission and invited it to Tehran. (Vance, Hard Choices, p. 403–404)
11. Waldheim made this required announcement at 12:30 p.m. on February 20. (Telegram Tosec 45792/10049 to Vance, February 20; Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Box 1, Iran NODIS Cables Feb 1980) The announcement and Waldheim’s press briefing were reported in Michael Weisskopf, “U.N. Commission Plans Interviews With All Hostages,” Washington Post, February 21, 1980, p. A1.
12. See Document 189.