179. Telegram From the British Embassy in the United States to the Department of State1
Please pass following to Iran Task Force, Operations Centre, State Dept. Following received from British Embassy Tehran. Begins:
Secret. Fm: Tehran 100805Z Feb 80. To: Immediate FCO. Telegram Number 146 of 10 February. Info Immediate Washington.
MIPT: US Embassy—Laingen.
1. The Danish Ambassador was telephoned on Friday, and again yesterday afternoon2 by Howland, one of Laingen’s companions in the MFA. Howland was hurried and furtive and was clearly making the call clandestinely. He said that Laingen had been told officially that all his contacts with the outside world (but the Danish Ambassador is not sure if this includes newspapers and radio) were being cut in [Page 469] retaliation for the Canadian affair.3 He would be allowed no letters, telex, telephone calls or visitors. Laingen asked in the first call that the US administration should protest against this treatment and, in the second call, that they should authorise him to request formally to be permitted to leave Iran.
2. The Danish Ambassador is naturally passing this on to the Americans through his channels (but not, I think, to other community colleagues here) and it is not for us to intervene. Nevertheless he and I have discussed the question. We wonder whether it would in fact be wise to make an oral protest. There is the problem of how the US authorities would have come by the knowledge on which the protest was based (though their own direct telex and telephone links with Laingen have presumably been cut off, which might be enough). It would be tempting, and perhaps more effective, to place restrictions on the Iranian Chargé and staff in Washington without explanation, except reciprocity. Nor are we sure what Laingen has in mind in making his second request, since it seems out of character for him to be ready to abandon his staff in the Embassy. We can only presume that he wishes to put the Iranian Government in the position of refusing his departure, thereby making clear that he is a prisoner. (Ghotbzadeh referred to him the other day after the Canadian affair as a hostage, drawing a distinction between him and the six Americans who escaped, a change from the MFA’s earlier claim that he was a guest who was free to leave, although his safety outside the MFA could not be assured). If that is Laingen’s intention he may have in mind that such clarification would strengthen the grounds for protest or, as a pure speculation, he might regard it as releasing him from his de facto (underlined) parole and freeing him to attempt an escape. Alternatively he might be courting removal from the MFA to the Embassy to join his staff.
3. I suspect that these restrictions are a piece of spite by Ghotbzadeh who, when he saw the press after the Canadian affair, was clearly very angry. If they were to be effective as retaliation, he would surely have to publicise them but he has not. Ghotbzadeh may well also have seen ill-judged and, I presume, untrue accounts in Time magazine and Newsweek suggesting that the Canadian Ambassador used visits to the MFA to study its visa and passport procedures. However Ghotbzadeh may well not last long under Bani-Sadr. It might be as well to wait a bit to see.
Graham
Ends.
- Source: Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Box 1, Iran NODIS Cables Feb 1980. Secret; UK Secret; Nodis; Immediate.↩
- February 8 and 9.↩
- Danish Ambassador to the United States Otto R. Borsch discussed Laingen’s situation personally with Constable on February 9 and with Clement on February 10. (Memoranda of conversation; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 31, Subject File, Iran 2/80)↩