Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

181. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 13, 1980

SUBJECT

• Our Options if the Soviets Intervene in Iran

I want to provide you with some anticipatory thoughts on our options for reaction if the Soviets intervene in Iran.²

Soviet activity and capabilities.

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified] (TS)

Some capability factors are useful to hold in mind:

Approaches. [3½ lines not declassified] (see Tab A for a map).³ (TS)

Timing. [1½ lines not declassified]

[3 paragraphs (4½ lines) not declassified]

Conclusion. [5 lines not declassified] (TS)

U.S. Options.

There are three major choices in response to a Soviet move into Iran:

1. [5 lines not declassified]

2. [7 lines not declassified]

3. [3 lines not declassified]

—Fight in Iran.⁴ [10 lines not declassified]

—[5½ lines not declassified]

[3 paragraphs (15 lines) not declassified]

Tab A

Map of Iran⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 64, Subject File, Iran Non-Meetings Hostage Crisis 1/80–3/80. Top Secret. Drafted by Odom. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 2/80) Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. A February 5 DIA report, “USSR: A Military Option,” concluded that Soviet troop movements in the Transcaucasus region meant the Soviet elite “will move” into Iran if the decision is made. (Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 2 Iranian Hostage Crisis 1979–1984, 163–165 Perception Consideration)
3. Not attached to this copy. A copy of the map, attached to an Odom draft, is printed here as Tab A. On Odom’s draft of this memorandum, after this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: “How many days in the 3rd arrow?” As shown on the map, the third arrow refers to a potential Soviet advance from Herat southward. Odom responded that 14–21 days was reasonable. (Memorandum from Odom to Brzezinski, February 18; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 2/80)
4. From January 29 until February 9, Jones and Brown met with various congressional committees on the global military balance, emphasizing the growing Soviet ability to project power in the Persian Gulf region. Jones urged Congressmen to approve Carter’s proposed military budget, which would give the United States the capability of rapid deployment of American forces into the region, including Iran and the Persian Gulf oil fields. Both Jones and Brown emphasized that this projection of U.S. military power could offset the Soviet advantage of proximity. (Norman Kempster, “Peril of Clash With Soviets To Grow, Congress Warned,” Los Angeles Times, January 30, 1980, p. B5; Kenneth Bacon, “Defense Department Tries To Allay Doubt on Capacity To Defend Mideast Oil Fields,” Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1980, p. 1; “Pentagon Sees Peril From Skeptics of U.S. Strength,” Washington Post, February 9, 1980, p. A1)
5. Secret.