189. Editorial Note
In a February 20, 1980, message, the Iranians, in accordance with Step 8 of the scenario developed in Bern (see Document 180), sent a message to Secretary-General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim agreeing to the Commission of Inquiry. The message deviated from the previously agreed-upon language. The message stated: “Now that [Page 494] the wish of the Imam and the people of Iran regarding a study and investigation into the past interferences of the U.S. into the internal affairs of Iran through the regime of the deposed shah and with a view to establishing a tribunal to determine their treason, crimes and corruption has been accepted” the Commission was accepted. (Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, page 129)
As Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders later recalled, Waldheim’s Chef de Cabinet Rafi Ahmad had called him at 1:30 a.m. on February 20 to relay the Iranian message and to alert the Carter administration to the deviation from the agreed-upon text. Saunders then called Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who consulted by telephone with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Bonn. Vance urged that the United States require Iran to stick scrupulously to the script. Saunders and Christopher relayed this information to President Jimmy Carter at a 5 a.m. meeting in the Oval Office at the White House. (Sick, All Fall Down, page 310; Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, page 129; Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) Saunders recalled that Carter decided that the United States would accept the Iranian message and the Commission (Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, page 129) The original language, however, was reiterated in a White House statement, in which the United States agreed to the fact-finding Commission of Inquiry to hear Iran’s grievances, to allow an early solution of the crisis, and to speak with each of the hostages. (Public Papers: Carter , 1980–81, Book I, page 356)
The appointed members of the Commission of Inquiry were Mohammed Bedjaoui, the Algerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations and former Minister of Justice; Andres Aguilar, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and former Justice Minister; Adib Daoudi, former Syrian Ambassador to India and the Benelux and key political adviser to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; Louis-Edmond Petitti of France, a member of the International Commission of Jurists and a judge of the European Court of Human Rights; and Harry Jayewardene, member of the United Nations Subcomission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities and close adviser to his brother, Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. Bedjaoui and Aguilar served as co-chairmen. (The UN Commission of Inquiry on Iran, February 29; Carter Library, White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler’s Files, Box 2)
The Commission members gathered in Geneva where they remained for 3 days as Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadegh Ghotbzadeh sorted out technical arrangements. They arrived in Tehran February 23. Meanwhile, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini proclaimed [Page 495] his staunch support for the students holding the hostages and announced that release of the hostages would be determined by the National Assembly in April after the scheduled February elections. (Telegram 49316 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800095–0822)
Hamilton Jordan recalled that he and Carter, Vance, Saunders, and Henry Precht consulted by telephone to determine what Khomeini’s remarks meant for the Commission’s success. Jordan and Saunders both wondered if Khomeini was even aware of the carefully constructed scenario. Later that day, Jordan received a message from Christian Bourguet, one of the French negotiators who helped develop the scenario, to convey that Khomeini could change his mind at any moment, to encourage optimism, and to allow the Commission do its work. As Jordan wrote in his memoir, Carter agreed “because we really had no choice.” (Crisis, pages 179–181)
The Commission remained in Tehran from February 23 until March 11. Its members met with Ghotbzadeh, Bani-Sadr, and other members of the Revolutionary Council and visited revolutionary shrines and took testimony from SAVAK victims, Iranian jurists, human rights campaigners, and other Iranians. (Telegrams 50220, 50233, 50774, and 52037 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 24, 25, 26, and 27, respectively; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800097–0146, D800097–0838, D800098–0893, and D800100–1082, respectively) The students regularly rejected any visits by Commission members to the hostages or the Embassy compound. (Telegram 52956 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800102–0502.
On February 28, Revolutionary Council member Hajatolislam Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, speaking from the Tehran hospital where Ayatollah Khomeini was being treated for a heart condition, told the press that the Commission would visit the hostages within hours, accompanied by a senior Iranian official appointed by President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. (Telegram 53028 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 28, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800103–0027) The students prevented this visit over disagreements about how many Commissioners would make the trip to the compound and how many hostages the Commissioners could see. (Telegram 56992 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800108–1290) In a March 3 message, Swiss Ambassador to Iran Erik Lang reported that, according to French lawyer Hector Villalon, Khomeini “has indeed given the order that the visit should take place, but if I understand correctly he gave the order to the Revolutionary Council, to be executed by the Revolutionary Council, therefore he did not give the order directly to [Page 496] the students.” The Revolutionary Council lacked the unanimity necessary to order the hostages released. Villalon counseled a wait-and-see attitude. (Carter Library, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler’s Files, Box 2)