168. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Iran—Alternative Negotiating Strategies
Over the next month a new political situation will evolve in Iran. The purpose of this memo is to take a look at a fresh approach to negotiating the release of our hostages in that period.
[Page 441]The Time Frame
The time frame is set by the series of elections which began with the first round of the Presidential elections on January 25. Bani Sadr appears to be the winner. The Assembly elections are scheduled for February 15 but may be delayed until later in the month. The next step will be appointment of a Prime Minister by the President and the selection of a Cabinet by the Prime Minister, but none of them will have authority until approved by the newly elected Assembly.
During this transitional period, a major religious celebration is scheduled the week of February 10 to commemorate the 15th centennial of Islam and the anniversary of the Revolution. These dates could provide an occasion for releasing the hostages if the way is paved.
The new government will take office only when the Assembly sits and gives it a vote of confidence, presumably around the end of February.
Analysis of the Present Negotiating Situation
We have been frustrated until now by the absence in Iran of a firm decision to resolve the crisis and negotiating partners who could with authority negotiate with us directly or designate a particular intermediary to negotiate for them.
If the word brought by our French contacts is correct, Ghotbzadeh and the President-elect may now be receptive negotiating partners. We are told by our visiting French contacts that, before the election, Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council placed the hostage problem in the hands of Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh, who was to keep the President-elect and Khomeini informed. (A summary of the January 25 talk with the French contacts is Attachment 1.)2 That may have changed with Bani Sadr’s landslide victory. He may well decide to take full charge of the hostage crisis and impose his own views which may differ from the ideas of Ghotbzadeh. Therefore, our first task is to check with him any ideas on procedures and on a scenario.
In addition to our French contacts, other potential intermediaries are waiting in the wings.
Alternative Approaches
There are two views of how the release of the hostages might be negotiated:
Approach 1: The first is reflected in our approach to date and in the position given to the Iranians by Waldheim on January 12 [Page 442] (Attachment 2).3 Until now we have concentrated on ending the crisis by seeking to arrange a package in which (1) all elements of the package would be firmly agreed in advance and (2) release of all hostages would take place simultaneous with initial gestures toward the Iranians.
Approach 2: More and more, we are hearing from the Iranians that Khomeini’s way of operating makes it impossible to agree in advance on all elements of a scenario. They say it will be necessary to take several steps to begin changing the climate in Iran and then to go to Khomeini for agreement to release the hostages. They admit that he may reject that step; there is no way of assuring a positive decision in advance, so this approach would involve risks on our side. The Iranians would like the maximum in gestures toward them before beginning release of the hostages—for instance, completion of an international inquiry and the acceptance of its report. Our French contacts feel we should begin with the early steps in a scenario fully agreed but leave the later steps to be worked out in detail as we proceed. At the outset, we would aim only at a general understanding of the later steps.
If we are to consider seriously moving to an approach like the second above, the issues for us are: (1) how far we can proceed before insisting on release of the hostages; (2) what means we can build into a scenario for testing at each stage the Iranians’ ability to respond to our moves so we don’t give away too much without a response; and (3) how we can justify each step to the American public since this approach would alter some of the strong positions we have taken previously.
Channels for Communicating
Our French contacts have suggested agreeing on an international figure, for example Sean McBride, to play the dual role as head of a commission of inquiry and as intermediary. They recognize that Sean McBride may not be acceptable to us and are prepared to try out other suggestions on the Iranians. In my view, Sean McBride is not the right person because he is too committed to his own ideas and is not likely to listen well to our concerns. I will be talking to Waldheim about other possibilities. The French contacts would be willing to assist in implementing the scenario.
The full range of potentially active channels includes the following:
—The Panamanians and their French lawyers. The Panamanians complicate this channel and have stumbled badly, but they have wisely taken themselves out of our most recent discussions. We probably can decouple them to a substantial degree from our talks with the French-based lawyers. The Frenchmen have two advantages. They have access [Page 443] to Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr and they are trusted by the Iranians. Although we cannot be entirely sure they are trustworthy, they have already provided evidence that Ghotbzadeh is willing to deal with them. They are workmanlike, and one of them from a human rights background seems to have a genuine personal interest in a solution and in the long-term success of Iran’s Revolution.
—The PLO. There are two lines: (1) through Arafat and (2) through a senior official close to the PLO representative in Tehran who has offered mediation. The PLO has excellent access to Khomeini, but they are hesitant to commit themselves until the conditions for settlement are almost perfect. They are now talking of February 15. They are also very self-interested and slow in communicating results of discussions. We do not know the extent of their influence with key Revolutionary Council members.
—Richard Cottam, Professor at Pittsburgh, is excellent in learning Ghotbzadeh’s views and in communicating ideas from us. But communications via telephone and Ghotbzadeh’s “code” are not efficient for active negotiations.
—Waldheim is not entirely trusted by the Iranians. He will inevitably play a role in implementing and possibly in working out the final details of a settlement because there seems to be a growing consensus that the commission of inquiry will be appointed by the Secretary General.
—Mohammed Heykal, renowned Egyptian journalist who is writing a book on Khomeini, is in London awaiting word from Hosain Khomeini (grandson) on a date to come to Tehran. He has received one message from Khomeini inviting him to come as soon as Khomeini leaves the hospital.
—Sadiq al Mahdi is a religious leader and the former Sudanese Prime Minister who visited Iran in the late fall and is ready to go back when told by the Iranians that the time is ripe.
—Mansour Farhang, Iranian Ambassador at the UN, is apparently trusted by Ghotbzadeh but said to have better ties with the chief presidential candidates. He is not above putting his own interpretation into the negotiations.
—Delegation from the Islamic Conference. We hope they will act to persuade the Iranians but we cannot expect them to negotiate on our behalf.
—Swiss Ambassador Lang has been excellent at communicating with the Iranians in a timely fashion, but using him as a negotiating channel might jeopardize his usefulness in humanitarian support.
[Page 444]A Possible Scenario
The substance of our negotiating position remains as you approved it to be given to Waldheim January 13 (Attachment 3).4 The issue is how to construct a series of steps which can lead to the release of the hostages and to a resolution of those U.S.-Iranian issues which must be resolved.
We would operate on the assumption that it continues to be desirable to have a variety of approaches to the Iranians, especially Khomeini if he is well enough. A number of contacts tell us that no one can ask Khomeini to do something; it is necessary to create a situation which he analyzes as ripe for a certain step. Several prominent figures are already planning visits to Tehran. As part of this process, various visitors to Iran would concentrate on two points: (1) the need for a decision to release the hostages or at least to remove them to more humane conditions in custody of responsible authorities; (2) the need to help publicly in Iran to change the climate of opinion. These people would not have a mandate to negotiate on our behalf. Most of them are already in the process of trying to go to Tehran. They would include:
—Any representatives of the Islamic Conference who decide to approach the Iranians.
—Mohammed Heykal can meet with Khomeini if he is well enough and the captors in our compound as well as with Bani Sadr.
—Andy Young could also presumably see both.
—Sadiq al Mahdi would go with significant Islamic credentials and can see Khomeini.
The following steps are an elaboration of Approach 2 above, taking into account suggestions made by our French contacts. They are developed as a controlled set of steps so each step contains a move by each side and the process can be stopped before the next step begins if Iran does not do its part.
—Step 1 would be a combination of moves designed to confirm with President-elect Bani Sadr as well as with Ghotbzadeh that an agreed channel for managing a scenario exists and that a decision has been made on both sides to make a series of reciprocal moves that could lead to a resolution of the current problem:
—Ghotbzadeh has responded to the Jordan/Saunders trip to London by sending the French lawyers to Washington with tangible evi [Page 445] dence of good faith. The Iranians also regard your written message to Congress as a positive step on our side.5
—To establish the channel, at least in the next stage, we could send a message via Cottam to Ghotbzadeh from Hamilton that we have taken the Washington talks with the Frenchmen seriously and are sending a message to Tehran with them. They could also carry a letter from Hamilton.
—To establish the procedure we could send a message via the Frenchmen to both Bani Sadr and Ghotbzadeh that we are prepared to begin a series of reciprocal moves. We would start by removing our objection to Waldheim’s appointment of a commission of inquiry provided Ghotbzadeh (a) will ask Waldheim for a commission “to hear Iran’s grievances and to help achieve an early end to the crisis between the U.S. and Iran” and (b) will assure Waldheim in writing that the commission will, in the course of its investigation, meet with each of the hostages.
—Since we would be changing our position to allow the commission to go to Tehran and begin work before release of the hostages, we would need to be able to say publicly that the commission is going on a fact-finding mission to Tehran to hear Iran’s concerns, to meet with each of the hostages, and to report on the present situation to the Secretary General. We would object publicly to any contact with the hostages for interrogation in connection with the inquiry. We would say it remains important for us to determine the well-being of each of the hostages. The Iranians, of course, would play the appointment as a victory and the visit to the hostages as part of the inquiry into Iran’s grievances.
—We would need to assure ourselves that Waldheim is prepared to cooperate with us on this basis. I would send Hal Saunders to see Rafi Ahmed and perhaps go to talk with Waldheim myself. We would need to assure that Waldheim puts a responsible person in charge of the commission and that Waldheim has some agreed control over the limits within which the commission will operate. We would want to work with him on its terms of reference. Because the Iranians have stressed that U.S. objections on technical grounds to the creation of the commission would enhance its credibility in Iran, we would have to work this out with Waldheim.
—Step 2 would bring the commission of inquiry into being only when the Iranians had made their formal request to Waldheim under Step 1:
—Waldheim would announce appointment of the commission. He would act using his good offices authority and referring to his talks [Page 446] in Tehran and to the Iranian request. Before making his announcement, he would have to select a chairperson and agree on the timing of the commission’s report and its terms of reference. The mandate would insure that the commission would remain a fact-finding mission as contrasted to a judicial tribunal.
—Iranian authorities would announce in the name of the Imam (with assurance that the captors in the compound will acquiesce) that the commission will have Iran’s cooperation in seeking a resolution of the crisis and will meet with all the hostages individually.
—The commission would not leave New York until the Iranian announcement had been made.
—Step 3 could involve consolidating and restraining Panama’s position on the extradition proceedings. This is already underway. Since this was Ghotbzadeh’s ploy, Bani Sadr may not be interested. We have no interest in it. But if some movement is necessary, the following moves may serve Iranian needs and limit the risks:
—Iranian authorities would state that they will seek extradition within the framework of Panamanian law.
—Iran would appoint a Panamanian attorney to participate in the extradition proceedings.
—The Government of Panama would ask the Shah to “place himself at the disposal of the Panamanian government.” The Shah would not be arrested.
—The legal proceedings would then drag out without result.
—Step 4 would focus on the commission’s work in Tehran:
—While the commission’s movements will be public, the commission would hold discussions privately in Tehran. It would go to the compound as early as possible to review evidence with the captors and to meet with each of the hostages privately, ostensibly as part of the inquiry but primarily to determine the condition of their confinement and their health.
—The commission (1) would announce that it is ready to return to New York with its report to the Secretary General on Iran’s grievances and (2) would report to the Revolutionary Council, which would pass the report to Khomeini privately, that the conditions of the hostages’ confinement are inhumane and that no report to the Secretary General will have credibility if these conditions are not changed.
—Khomeini would have the hostages transferred to a hospital under the shared custody of Iranian authorities and representatives of the commission.
—The commission would not take its report to New York until the hostages had been transferred from the compound.
—Step 5: report and release.
—The Commission would report to the Secretary General two days before Iran’s religious celebration, which is scheduled the week of February 10.
—The commission could recommend that the U.S. and Iran form a joint U.S.-Iranian Commission to resolve outstanding issues between [Page 447] the U.S. and Iran, including lifting the freeze on Iran’s assets and resolving claims. The recommendation could stipulate a period within which work should be completed.
—Khomeini would “pardon” and expel the hostages in connection with Iran’s religious celebration.
—The U.S.-Iranian talks would not start until the hostages are released.
While key Iranians would know the entire proposed scenario, we would have to start not knowing that they could deliver in the end. But each step has built into it a step that the Iranians would have to take before that step is completed or the next step taken.
One other factor could figure into the above scenario. If it seemed useful at some point, we could delay implementation of economic sanctions.
Monitoring and Negotiating the Detailed Scenario
Implementing this scenario would require someone on the ground in Tehran to reach an understanding on the scenario as an objective, to keep it on the tracks, and to make necessary adjustments as it evolves.
The Chairperson of the Commission would have to be involved, but someone else would also have to be involved. We would also need rapid communication.
To begin with, I think we should send our French contacts back to Tehran with the above scenario refined to reflect your views. If Bani Sadr agrees to proceed, when the commission goes to Tehran we would have to set up quick communication with the Frenchmen or, more likely, station one of our own people—with Bani Sadr’s agreement—in the Swiss Embassy in Tehran or in a place like Paris or Kuwait with quick access to the Frenchmen.
Recommendation: That you approve our exploring the possibility of reaching an understanding with the Iranian authorities on a scenario along the lines of the above.6
- Source: Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Diplomatic Strategy for Iran. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Precht. Printed from an uninitialed copy.↩
- Attached; printed as Document 164.↩
- Attached but not printed. See footnote 9, Document 144.↩
- Attached; printed as Document 137.↩
- For the “evidence of good faith,” see footnote 2, Document 165. The reference to Carter’s written message is presumably to Carter’s January 21 State of the Union message to Congress. In it, Carter wrote that the United States had “no basic quarrel” with the Iranian revolution and that the threat to Iran came not from the United States but from Soviet action in the region. He also wrote: “We are prepared to work with the government of Iran to develop a new and mutually beneficial relationship” once the hostages are freed. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 163–164)↩
- A handwritten note on the first page reads: “Note: This approach approved in principle by the President Jan 28.” As Saunders later recalled, once Carter approved, he and Vance went to New York on January 28 to brief Waldheim. (Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, p. 122)↩