204. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

  • President Jimmy Carter
  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
  • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
  • Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
  • Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
  • Jerry Rafshoon, Assistant to the President for Communications
  • Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
  • Ed Sanders, Senior Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State
  • Richard Viets, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Israel
  • Mr. William Quandt, NSC Staff Member
  • Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
  • Yigael Yadin, Deputy Prime Minister
  • Moshe Dayan, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Ezer Weizman, Minister of Defense
  • Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture
  • Eliezer Shostak, Minister of Health
  • Yitzak Zamir, Attorney General
  • Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
  • Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor, Minister of Foreign Affairs Office
  • Harry Hurwitz, Prime Minister’s Information Officer
  • Ayre Naor, Cabinet Secretary
  • Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
  • Dan Pattir, Press Spokesman
  • Yehuda Avner, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
  • Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, Chef de Cabinet, Prime Minister’s Office
  • General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister

Prime Minister Begin: I welcome you to the Cabinet Room. It is a great honor to have you visit this room. We have taken many democratic decisions here. It is the custom that the host preside, but since I [Page 703] am only a Prime Minister, we will elect the President as chairman of our meeting. This is unanimously adopted.

President Carter: Now I see how you prevail!

Prime Minister Begin: The word prevail is dangerous!

President Carter: I hope that we can keep the discussions here confidential. Some of what I say about my meetings with Sadat should not be revealed. I am honored and gratified to be in Jerusalem on the free soil of Israel. My own deep feelings mirror those of the American people, including non-Jews. We feel a friendship toward Israel, we see mutual security interests, and we see a deep historical relationship with one another that fills my heart. When I was riding in from Tel Aviv last night, it was pointed out to me that Jerusalem was the city of peace, but that it had suffered in thirty-six wars. I would like to end my public service with actions that helped insure that there will be no more wars over Jerusalem. We have come a long way together against great odds. When we have reached the final moments of negotiations, you have never disappointed me. You have always helped to bring the negotiations toward a success.

I have just come from Egypt where I have seen an outpouring of feelings by the Egyptian people for peace. I know that the Israeli negotiators in Egypt found this same welcome and the broad desire for an end to war. I would like to conclude the negotiations and settle all of the terms of the peace treaty today. President Sadat is eager to conclude the negotiations. I share that desire. It is very likely that if we are not successful it will be difficult to bring the talks to a conclusion in the near future. There are Arab pressures on Egypt. Saudi Arabia may cut off all aid to Egypt, which amounts to about $1.6 billion yearly.2 There is a threat of boycott. Sadat accepts this possibility. Some of his ministers are reluctant, but he is not. We have resolved most of the difficult issues. There are many that you consider to be more important than I do. I recognize that what we see as semantics may take on a difference for you. You are more directly involved. In our talks with the prime [Page 704] minister in Washington,3 we clearly saw the difficulties. If there were not difficulties, we would have solved these problems long ago. But I hope to have a complete treaty text. On Articles 6–2 and 6–5, there is substantial agreement. There are some minor problems. On the target date there has been some controversy. We also need to clear up the letter.

President Sadat has told me that if the negotiations are successful based on what he needs to protect Egyptian interests, he would come to Jerusalem to sign the final documents, and he would invite Prime Minister Begin to Cairo to sign them. This could be done in the next couple of days, after assessing the remaining issues, the Egyptian positions are sufficiently forthcoming for Israel to accept. We are prepared to spend the time that is needed to reach an agreement on the remaining issues. I told Sadat that I would give him a report this afternoon. I need not trouble you with describing the strategic advantages of the treaty. A treaty would improve the prospects for better relations between us on economic and military matters. It would help two of our best friends not to continue to be in a state of war.

Prime Minister Begin: As you remember in our private talks, we can proceed by talking about either procedure or substance. I told the President that we had taken decisions in the Cabinet to hold debate in the Cabinet on our proposals for autonomy in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, before the signing of a treaty. We also had a commitment to the Knesset to have a debate before any signing. This stands. This is not an insurmountable problem, but we need some time to hold a debate in our Cabinet. We can discuss this. I suggest first we hear from you on all of the Egyptian proposals on all of the outstanding issues. We agreed in Washington to certain formulations on Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, and on the target date. The Cabinet approved of these proposals by a majority vote. We also need to discuss the question of oil. Sadat has made some proposals. Then I will reply.

President Carter: There are three basic questions on substance. They involve the West Bank and Gaza letter and Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5. Secretary Vance has worked with Egypt most directly on these questions. We feel that there should be a slight modification on Article 6. It should be acceptable to you. If these changes are made, it should be possible to reach agreement. You can look at the letter. The procedure for handling the other Camp David Framework is important. There is a question of whether Gaza and the West Bank should be kept together, or separated, as well as the degree of Egyptian presence in Gaza, and whether there could be a small number of Egyptians to help prepare for [Page 705] the elections there. Let’s take up Article 6 first, then the letter, then oil, then the question of ambassadors.

Secretary Vance: The Egyptians have made slight suggestions for change in Article 6, paragraph 2. (Secretary Vance passes out a copy4 of the new proposal).

President Carter: The Egyptians found the word “derogate” difficult to accept. We have tried to find a synonym that would be acceptable to you.

Secretary Vance: The Egyptians have suggested using the phrase “is not inconsistent with” instead of “does not derogate from”. They have suggested that the same change be made in Article 6, paragraph 5. In paragraph 2, they also want to have, after the reference to the Camp David Accords, the phrase “which express the determination of the parties to reach a just, durable and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict”.

Prime Minister Begin: May I respond? Let me begin with Article 6, paragraph 5. We agreed in Washington to the text “does not derogate from”. If there is no difference, then there is nothing wrong with that phrase. If there is a difference, then we will stay by what we agreed. Then the United States and Israel will agree, and Egypt will disagree. If the United States changes its position, that is okay, but it will be a deviation. The Cabinet would have rejected these proposals if the words “does not derogate” had not appeared.

Sadat is entitled to make counterproposals. The United States can change its mind. But we are free men and we can approve or reject. We will reject. Let me explain why. Why does Sadat play with words? Why does Sadat pay attention? I would like to hear what is the difference. In our view, the two phrases are worlds apart. Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, are the heart and soul of the peace treaty. Without this article, it would be a sham. What is the great difference? If we used the phrase “does not derogate,” it means that Article 6, paragraph 5 stands, the heart and soul of the treaty. If we replace that phrase, then the first part of the note prevails. It would mean that the first sentence is the key, and it would put this treaty after other treaties. It would be the worst version, even worse than that offered at Camp David. We would knowingly sign a sham document. It would lose its meaning. The assertion is that other agreements between Iraq and Egypt that call for the liberation of Palestine would prevail over this treaty. It is not a matter of theory or legal form, but a matter of life. Syria may attack Israel, and Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia may join. The Baghdad Conference5 [Page 706] countries object to all of this. They are against Sadat. Now there is a very serious problem on Israel’s northeastern front. They have 5,600 tanks there, and 6,000 guns. Israel has more than 3,000 tanks. That means they have a two to one ratio. We can defend ourselves only through counter-attack. We cannot withdraw to Haifa or Tel Aviv. If we reach the gates of Damascus, and this is possible, Syria may invoke its agreements with Egypt. Egypt would then be obliged to come to Syria’s aid. If these words “are not inconsistent with” are crucial instead of “do not derogate”, it means that Egypt will start a war while having a peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, we cannot accept.

President Carter: Egypt is not trying to attack Israel, nor is the United States. The top sentence was added at the request of Egypt. They are not trying to preserve those parts of the 1960 and 1967 treaties6 which are inconsistent with this treaty. We can make it clear in the note that Article 6, paragraph 5, does prevail. We could add the phrase “are not considered to be inconsistent with”.

Prime Minister Begin: Respectfully, I differ. That doesn’t change one iota of the meaning. We stand on the agreement we made in Washington. We do not accept this proposal from Egypt. Egypt cannot threaten war now. We would have five divisions across the Suez soon. But when the Baghdad states attack us, Egypt will have to join. I will read to you from the controlled Egyptian press. On February 20, 1979, one of Sadat’s close advisers wrote a letter to Khomeini in which he violently attacks Israel. He says the peace treaty will cease to exist. On January 26, 1979, another writer talked of Israel becoming a second Taiwan, an artificial entity established by force on others’ lands. Anis Mansour wrote in the magazine, “October”, that the Jewish people lie and are deceitful. Another author wrote of Israel not being a state and said that Israel was run by the Mafia.

President Carter: What is the purpose of your reading this to me?

Prime Minister Begin: This is the atmosphere in which the peace talks are conducted.

President Carter: I have never detected any of this in my talks with Sadat.

[Page 707]

Prime Minister Begin: You asked us to have confidence in Egypt. But it is a very bitter pill for us to read these attacks on the Jewish people. I ask your ambassador to call this to their attention. This is the atmosphere in the official Egyptian press. Now I am asked in two days to sign a peace agreement with Egypt. I place this complaint before you. As we read these passages, we must be careful. Now we will turn to paragraph 2 of Article 6.

President Carter: Do you have a counterproposal?

Prime Minister Begin: No, sir. We stand by our previous position. We may think and we may discuss later and will consult. The previous draft of Article 6–2 was adopted by the U.S. delegation. The Cabinet approved it. The additional words on the comprehensive peace are not completely unacceptable. We will consider them. But I have an amendment to make. It should be stated that the treaty between Egypt and Israel is the first step toward a comprehensive peace. It makes it clear that it is not a condition of the Egyptian-Israel treaty to have a comprehensive peace. We are not talking about a separate peace treaty. I will suggest that we accept these words with this amendment. But the main problem is the use of the words “not inconsistent”. We stand by “does not derogate from”. This would mean that the first part would prevail, not the second, if we accepted the Egyptian change. This is my first response. After the break, I’ll consult with my colleagues and we’ll decide on any amendment to your addition to Article 6–2. We have the same opinion on the language “does not derogate from”. May I hear your further proposals?

President Carter: Would you consider “does not contradict”?

Prime Minister Begin: It’s the same. Let us consult. Remember the talks we had in Washington. We’ll break our brains. We stand by “does not derogate from”.

President Carter: What does “derogate” mean to you?

Prime Minister Begin: We state something in the first part that is very dangerous for Israel. But then we say it does not derogate from the terms of the treaty and that brings back the original meaning. So it does not do any harm to the treaty. It is a wonderful expression, it is strong and proper.

President Carter: Is there some way of saying the same thing?

Secretary Vance: Let’s turn to the draft7 on the West Bank and Gaza.

President Carter: This deals with the self-governing authority. It is the result of months of tedious negotiations. This is the best that we can do.

[Page 708]

Secretary Vance: I will read the letter. (The Secretary reads the text of the draft letter).

Prime Minister Begin: We’ll have to break with consultations to discuss this. There are improvements compared to the drafts submitted at Camp David. There is a return to the Camp David language, but there are problems. I will start with page 3. You have changed the word can to will. I remember that we agreed on can. And you accepted the phrase “as expeditiously as possible”.

Mr. Rosenne: The Prime Minister suggested the change “as expeditiously as possible”.

Prime Minister Begin: I said so. I sent this to the Cabinet. Then there is the phrase “possibly first in Gaza”. This is put in the sentence on setting up the self-government one month after elections. I never heard such a proposal. I cannot agree. (The Prime Minister misunderstands, and corrects himself when he notes that the establishment of the self-government one month after elections is part of the Camp David Agreement.)

Here is the idea of starting with Gaza. I use the words Judea and Samaria. We exchanged letters8 on this. We can’t use the phrase West Bank. This is a serious matter. It is a distortion of geographical and historical facts. The West Bank refers to all of the area west of the river, not just the area annexed by King Abdullah. If we sign a letter, either in parenthesis or as a footnote to the Israeli version, we must refer to Judea and Samaria.

President Carter: No problem.

Prime Minister Begin: The idea of implementing the self-governing authority first in Gaza is a deviation from Camp David. If we both agree, it would be okay. What is the idea? I’ll say openly that Secretary Vance asked me if autonomy could first be established in Gaza. I replied that if we have the commitment from President Sadat that he will not then interfere in Judea and Samaria, then we will consider this possibility, with the authority of the Cabinet. We cannot agree that we will go first in Gaza leaving Judea and Samaria, and then later negotiate Judea and Samaria separately with Egypt. That would be completely paradoxical. We agreed to negotiate with Egypt alone in order to show our good faith. No one wants to be truer to the Camp David Accords. Why did we agree? We could have waited for Jordan. Autonomy was our idea, and it is one of the most beautiful ideas ever proposed by Zionism and Judaism. Egypt has no right to Gaza. Gaza is a foreign [Page 709] country to the Egyptians. They unlawfully occupied it. It was invaded by Farouk.9

President Carter: They don’t claim Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: I agree. We stand for that. But they were there for nineteen years. So we must take that into account. We will negotiate Gaza, and Judea and Samaria, also if Jordan does not join. But if Sadat suggests Gaza first, I would not reject it, provided he leaves Judea and Samaria. Sadat cannot give us peace in the east. Only Jordan can do that. Only Jordan can work with us to introduce autonomy in Judea and Samaria.

We must also write the words administrative council after self-governing authority. We are not Bolsheviks. They dismissed the democratic elected assembly in 1917. This was the end of the only democratic assembly in February. We don’t want to disperse a legislative council. If it is an administrative council and it declares a Palestinian state, we shall arrest them. We need iron-clad guarantees. The words administrative council should be added. We will negotiate with Egypt on Gaza, if they give us a clear commitment that Egypt will not then be a party to the negotiations on Judea and Samaria.

President Carter: That is a deviation from Camp David.

Prime Minister Begin: A deviation begins with the idea of Gaza first. If Sadat departs by taking out Gaza, then we can change it. Let us go by Camp David. If there is a deviation, we may consider it, but only on this condition. I speak on behalf of the Government of Israel. Even if we get together with Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, or we separate Gaza, then we don’t deal with Egypt on the autonomy for Judea and Samaria. I reserve my right to consult with my colleagues on this.

Secretary Vance: Under Camp David, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan have responsibility for negotiating the establishment of the self-governing authority in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This letter precedes to do just that. But if the implementation of the agreement on the West Bank proves to be difficult, then the letter suggests that the implementation might take place first in Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: Yes, but then Egypt cannot be a partner to the autonomy in Judea and Samaria. Together is all right, but if they are separated, Egypt has no more to do with Judea and Samaria.

Secretary Vance: Let me clarify. There will be negotiations for one year after ratification. There are three tasks: agreement on the modalities on elections; agreement on the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority; agreement on other related matters. Agreement would have to be reached on three topics. Then there would be [Page 710] the question of implementation. Maybe it would not be possible to implement the agreement in West Bank, so we might start in Gaza.

Prime Minister Begin: I am sorry, I have to differ. If we deviate from Camp David, and we agree to deal with Gaza first, then that is the end of Egypt’s negotiations with Israel on autonomy in Judea and Samaria. Egypt can give us nothing on the eastern front. We can’t change our mind on this. Our foreign minister likes the idea, provided that Egypt drops Judea and Samaria. We’ll call on the Jordanians and the Palestinian Arabs to negotiate. Autonomy is our idea, but not with Egypt. I suggest that we return to the original language.

Secretary Vance: You will have done so in the letter. The only question is the implementation, not the negotiation.

Minister Weizman: If we finish in Gaza, and if Jordan does not come in, will Egypt act for Jordan in the West Bank? We prefer to talk to the Palestinian Arabs.

President Carter: Let me preside.

Secretary Vance: The modalities, and the powers and the responsibilities for both areas will have been negotiated together.

President Carter: Then the question of holding elections arises.

Secretary Vance: Later, the West Bank Palestinians may say okay we’ll join, but we need some adjustments for the West Bank. They would want to just add to what had already been negotiated.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Let me repeat what I said to you and Prime Minister Khalil. It would take more than just one change to adjust what had been agreed for Gaza to the West Bank. Now we are talking about one unit of the autonomy. There will be representatives from Gaza, and from Judea and Samaria. There would be one council.

If Gaza goes first, then you have to make a change. Gaza would have the full power to run the self-governing authority in Gaza; while in Judea and Samaria, it would not be done that way. We would have to agree that there would be two units first. The self-autonomy in Gaza alone is possible. I told Khalil and Secretary Vance that I don’t exclude it. People in Gaza are not Jordanian citizens. They have no close ties to Jordan, but Hussein may retaliate against the Gazans. We can’t be sure that they will like the idea.

If we do go Gaza first, then we have to look at the second part. Some West Bank representatives go to the Parliament and are members. Khalil was surprised to learn this. They sit there as part of the Jordanian parliament. At Camp David, we agreed on Jordanian participation in the police force. I said this was no problem since all of the inhabitants in Judea and Samaria are Jordanians. King Hussein won’t send people from Trans-Jordan. He will choose locals. It doesn’t matter to us which side of the river Jordanian citizens come from. In Jerusalem [Page 711] and Hebron, you can find ex-ministers of the Jordanian Government. If Hussein comes in, he will work with the Jordanians and the Palestinians. They are already there, people like Anwar Nuseibeh. If you replace Jordan with Egypt, Khalil will say that he wants to send Egyptians, and we will say no sir. We agreed that in Gaza, after the autonomy, there would be some Egyptian liaison. They would not necessarily be in Gaza. We only agreed to Jordan and the police force, and to joint Israeli-Jordanian patrols. The Egyptians can’t do this. We have a special relationship with Jordan. It is bad to divide Judea and Samaria from Jordan. They are the same families. I would object to introducing Egypt to replace Jordan. At Camp David, we assumed that King Hussein would like Sadat to represent him. This seemed a good possibility. Now we assume that Jordan will oppose the negotiations. We have to wait until Jordan is willing to negotiate. The Palestinians won’t just accept what Egypt has accepted.

President Carter: What Foreign Minister Dayan said is accurate. If Jordan delays coming into the negotiations, Egypt would represent the Arab peoples after consulting with the Jordanians and Palestinians. This is what Sadat wrote me in a letter.10 I thought that Israel had agreed. Last November, the question of the autonomy seemed to be a major obstacle. Sadat called me11 to try to break the deadlock. He said that he was ready to go ahead in Gaza alone. He is not trying to put off Gaza, nor is he trying to claim Gaza. He was trying to break a deadlock. It is not possible for Egypt to help in Gaza without some kind of liaision.

I am anxious to hear Israeli suggestions on how to resolve this problem. Sadat doesn’t want to have Egyptian police on the Jordan River, but he does want to work out the modalities for the self-governing authority. There are doubts in the Arab world and some feel that Israel wants to delay the establishment of the self-governing authority. I share these doubts. If actions can be taken by Israel to keep the Jordanians and the Palestinians from participating, then you can keep the area forever. Mr. Sharon talks about one million settlers. This makes it impossible for the West Bank Palestinians to join the talks. I can’t see how much you really want the autonomy to work. But my word of honor is at stake. We agreed to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

[Page 712]

Prime Minister Begin: We said also the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. We also have rights. It is written this way.

President Carter: What do you suggest? If Jordan does not participate, and the Palestinians are reluctant, how can we carry out the autonomy?

Foreign Minister Dayan: I would personally distinguish three phases. We should invite all of the parties first. If they don’t come, then we could negotiate on Gaza alone. We talk about the powers and responsibilities just for Gaza. They could take a different form, and the areas would not have to be unified.

President Carter: Do you agree that the basic goal is to prescribe a self-governing authority for the West Bank and Gaza both?

Foreign Minister Dayan: There should be three stages. The general invitation, then if there is agreement on Gaza first, a specific negotiation for Gaza only and not the rest of the area. Then the invitation should stay open for Jordan and the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria to come in. It should be an open invitation. But the negotiations should not be done by Egypt, just by the people in the area and Jordan. So we would leave the door open. They would have to have their own negotiations on different issues.

Secretary Vance: I agree on the general invitation. There should be negotiations on the powers and the modalities, and the invitation should remain open. But the negotiation of the powers and responsibilities would be largely common to both, and the modalities would be similar.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Khalil said why shouldn’t the West Bank residents have both Jordanian citizenship and Palestinian citizenship.

Deputy Prime Minister Yadin: Let’s forget about who wants what. Let’s look practically at the question. I was hurt when you said that you shared the views of those who think we are reluctant about the autonomy. There is a debate here in Israel. I was politically offended. We want to implement the autonomy on our terms. Now things are being turned upside down as if Sadat suggested autonomy. We should be practical. We should deal with the modalities in the whole area, and then implementation could come in Gaza first. But that might be counterproductive. If Jordan doesn’t join, why should we agree to what Sadat negotiates? Who gave Sadat power to negotiate for the West Bank? If Sadat can deliver the goods in Gaza, or Shawa, that is okay. But elsewhere Egypt can’t deliver. If we were to go Gaza first, we should forget the rest. Let them come when they are ready.

President Carter: At Camp David we agreed that Jordan and Egypt would negotiate on the West Bank and Gaza combined. We also agreed that Egypt would participate on behalf of the other Arabs. It would vio[Page 713]late Camp David if Israel, the United States, and the Palestinians were to exclude Egypt from these discussions.

Prime Minister Begin: Let’s follow the Camp David agreements. We can’t help suspicious minds. What we can do if Jordan does not join is to negotiate with Egypt alone. But Israel never said that Egypt will replace the Arabs or Jordan. We can’t do more. We could agree on one year of negotiations. We can hold the elections as expeditiously as possible. We can take one month to set up the self-governing authority. I have read about people who suspect Israel and the Jewish people. But that belongs to a different period. This autonomy is the focus of our debate. The parliamentary opposition is against it, and so are many of my friends. But we stand by our plan. I believe that one of the best ideas of Judaism and Zionism is the autonomy. We don’t want to interfere, but we need security. Minister Sharon has spoken of one million Jews in Judea and Samaria. There is nothing wrong for the Arab inhabitants in this. The number of Jews in Judea and Samaria is not a problem. We have the idea of living together. We only want security and no Palestinian state. I have a suggestion.

President Carter: Before we change the subject . . .

Prime Minister Begin: Minister Sharon will wait. He can obey.

Minister Sharon: Only for a little while.

President Carter: Egypt will have a liaison relationship in Gaza. (The President reads from the draft letter.)

Prime Minister Begin: We should delete that whole sentence. There should be no Egyptians in Gaza. They won’t be there. We will never agree to Egypt doing this. There is no provision for liaison officers in the words of Camp David. Each state will have liaision officers with the police. I suggest deleting the whole paragraph. There can be no Egyptians in Gaza.

Minister Sharon: I believe we could have moved forward more quickly if you understood our plans for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This is my personal opinion. We decided to have a debate on autonomy in the Cabinet and we will do it. I’ll emphasize that I believe in the idea of autonomy. We can live with it. But when we speak of autonomy, we don’t mean the establishment of second Palestinian state. There is already one Palestinian state. Israel should emphasize that Jordan is a Palestinian state. There are 1.5 million people in Jordan. 1.2 million are Palestinian. They are exactly the same Arabs as in Judea and Samaria. They are the same Palestinian Arabs who lived in the pre-1967 borders of Israel. They are represented in the Jordanian Parliament. Thirty of the 60 members of the Parliament are Palestinians from Judea and Samaria. Fifteen out of 30 members in the Senate are Jordanian citizens from Judea and Samaria. Jordan is a Palestinian state. The Hashemite [Page 714] Kingdom is the only non-Palestinian element in Jordan. I am not recommending anything. Jordan is a Palestinian state.

You are trying to convince us to establish a second Palestinian state. We’ll go far, but we will never agree to a second Palestinian state. You should make that clear now. We should make clear what we plan to do. There is no way to prevent Jewish settlers from settling in Judea and Samaria. We can’t prevent this while Israel has one-half million Palestinian Arabs in its pre-1967 borders. No geographical line can divide the Jewish people from the Arab population. We have to live here together. When I use the figure of one million Jewish settlers in twenty or thirty years, I can assure that they will live there. In Jerusalem, in greater Jerusalem, there is a crucial problem to have one million Jews. They will live there and elsewhere. We were very careful to settle Jews. We fill all of the empty houses. We don’t settle them in areas of heavy population. We settle in empty areas or where there is only a small Arab population. This is our homeland. But our approach is not religious. It is only based on security. We are settling people there. This is part of our national security concept. It is a vital means for protecting our population. It is easier to proceed if things are clear.

We have the problem of water. One-third of Israel’s water comes from the aquafer in Judea and Samaria. This is a matter of life and death for Israel. We have problems of internal security, of Arab terrorism. If the day comes of true peace, with no terrorism, Israel will be the first to stop our activities in the inhabited Arab areas. We only put settlements in the most vital areas. There is plenty of land for one to two million Jews. We won’t restrict the Arab population, but we won’t restrict the Jews living there. This is a matter of life. My generation has seen war. We have seen many terrible things. Remember we can only make a mistake once. We want to exist. We are striving for peace, but you can’t frighten us by war. We want peace, but we will go on for ten wars to preserve our security and independence.

Minister Burg: One should be enough.

Prime Minister Begin: We should adjourn now. We are having lunch downstairs together. We can then come back, or take a break. We have one other problem with the letter which has to with the counting of time from the establishment of the administrative council in Gaza. This cannot be accepted. The transitional period can only begin when the autonomy is established in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. This is an important remark for the record.

President Carter: The liaision relationship must be established. Egypt must be able to use its beneficial influence to work with the Palestinians. I thought that Dayan and Khalil had resolved this. We need to bring this to a head. We’ll try to use the language of Camp David.

[Page 715]

(The meeting breaks for lunch at 1:30 p.m. At 3:08 p.m. the meeting resumes.)

President Carter: Secretary Vance will respond to some of the technical problems. Then I’ll summarize. Then I would like to meet with my people for an hour or so and then we can meet again at five o’clock.

Secretary Vance: On Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, we have discussed these problems and have some suggestions. We should deal with this first.

President Carter: I talked to Sadat at length. He didn’t understand your concern on the 1960 and 1966 treaties until recently. But he wants a new word for derogate.

Secretary Vance: On the letter, there is no problem in the first one and one-half pages. There are problems concerning liaision in Gaza. It is important that there be a method to bring Gaza along.

Prime Minister Begin: The first page is okay with us. Please add the words administrative council after self-governing authority. Also the Israeli version of the letter should say Judea and Samaria in a footnote when the West Bank and Gaza are referred to.

Secretary Vance: We can use a footnote in the Israeli version. There is a problem on when the transitional period begins.

Prime Minister Begin: The problem starts on page two. Here is the Gaza first idea, and here starts the problem.

Secretary Vance: On page three at the top, there was apparently some misunderstanding of what the Cabinet approved.

President Carter: We proposed the language.

Ambassador Evron: You remarked that the term “as expeditiously as possible” should be used.

Secretary Vance: We said that we would look at it.

Mr. Avner: As expeditiously as possible was discussed.

Secretary Vance: I said “or something like that”. We will look at this. I gave Foreign Minister Dayan a draft memorandum of agreement.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Why say anything about the transitional period?

Secretary Vance: When does it start?

Prime Minister Begin: When the self-government is established in both areas as is written in Camp David.

Secretary Vance: If you leave it that way, and it is established only in Gaza, it nonetheless would be operating.

Prime Minister Begin: It is not written.

Foreign Minister Dayan: Suppose that the autonomy begins in Judea and Samaria two months later. Then it makes no difference. But if it [Page 716] starts four years later, then there is a problem. Why should we mention it at all?

President Carter: We understand. Let’s try to work it out.

Secretary Vance: I gave a memorandum of agreement to Dayan. It covers all the points you want covered.

Prime Minister Begin: I have read it and will have to consult with my colleagues. At the end of page two, it says the United States will not supply arms for “unlawful” armed attack. There cannot be such a thing as “lawful” attack on Israel.

President Carter: We’ll be the judge of that, Mr. Prime Minister. We will leave out the word “unlawful”. We are trying to be accommodating.

Prime Minister Begin: On the first page, we want no reference to the possibility of a violation of the agreement by Israel. It says either party. This should not be in a bilateral agreement. You can say the same thing to Egypt if you want. But Israel cannot sign a document that says Israel might violate the agreement. It is a good document, Mr. Secretary.

President Carter: Let me summarize before the recess. If Israel and Egypt want a peace treaty in the context of a comprehensive peace, it is important to conclude the treaty during this visit. There is a limit on my time. I have SALT negotiations and other matters to attend to. If we fail to reach an agreement, it will be difficult to revive the momentum. We hope to resolve all of the differences today. We are trying, representing Egypt within the limits of our ability, to resolve the wording on Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5. Sadat has no aversion to saying that this treaty takes precedence over the commitments to destroy Israel. But the word derogate is one that they object to. In my opinion, the word is okay. We hope you can find a synonym to say the same thing. I have no objection to derogate, but they have a problem with it. The Egyptians are not pushing for Gaza first. They put this idea forward to break a deadlock. If both of you see it as necessary, you can proceed in Gaza alone. In Gaza, I see the sensitivity about liaison for Egypt and Gaza. But I don’t want the agreement between Egypt and Israel to be just a piece of paper marked by distrust. I have seen the euphoria of Camp David and of the Jerusalem visits. If we have the treaty signed, Israel will have to treat Egypt with the same respect that you show the United States and vice versa. We have to have a sense of working for common goals. We’ll do our best. There is a question of oil. I can assure that if the other matters are resolved, we can find a solution to this. The same is true on ambassadors. But in Sadat’s mind, it is tied to the early withdrawal to the interim line. On that basis, I went to Sadat and he gave me his commitment. He has not reversed. I want an Israeli commitment to a faster withdrawal, in return for which I can get the exchange of ambassadors after one month of the interim withdrawal. The memorandum of agreement is very important.

There will be new relations and advantages for [Page 717] Israel and Egypt after peace. Egypt makes up about forty percent of the Arab world. If Egypt is a friend and ally, guided and corrected by us when there is a departure from what has been promised, within the limits of our influence, the agreement should work. If Sadat is weakened, we will do everything we can within the limits of our power to insure Egyptian compliance with the agreement. You have my personal commitment. We stand behind all of these documents. Israel still feels threatened by terrorism and the Arab build-up over the next 10 to 30 years. The Arab world is capable of persuading some countries because of oil. The United States can withstand such blackmail. Egypt is a partner of Israel. We place a restraint on the PLO, and on the radical Arabs as threats to Israel. We plan to go to the Saudi leaders to caution them against overt acts against Egypt. Saudi Arabia fears the Soviet Union and we help protect them. We stand with you as equal partners. What we do for you is more than balanced by what Israel does for the United States. A democratic and stable Israel is a tremendous strategic asset to the United States, but this is especially true if Israel is at peace with Egypt as a friend. We can work more closely with both countries then. There will be difficult days ahead. You have different views on autonomy for the Palestinians. We have never put pressure on Israel to sign an agreement that is contrary to your interests.

The treaty could open a new day for Israel that would bring advantages and permanent peace. You would have diplomatic relations with your largest Arab neighbor. I asked you to be forthcoming and generous. My belief is that Sadat has been very generous and forthcoming in the last two days. He has asked us to use all of our influence to bring an agreement now. Sadat is waiting to hear from us. I am willing, if you agree, to work all night to conclude the agreement. The remaining differences are minor compared to the differences we faced a year ago.

(The session ends at 3:35 p.m.)

(The meeting resumes at 5:00 p.m.)

Prime Minister Begin: I have good news. We have found a synonym for the notes to Article 6. We propose “does not affect in any way”.

President Carter: That is much worse than it was. It means it has no significance at all.

Secretary Vance: Let me try “contravene”.

Prime Minister Begin: We’ll have to think again. I don’t reject. I have to think about it. We shall consider. In Article 6–2, I made a provisional amendment about the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as a first step. I have decided to give up the amendment and to delete my addition to that amendment. I would rather stick to what was agreed in Washington. We will drop the word derogate. We want to expedite things. We will have a Cabinet session tonight and take all the decisions. In a session [Page 718] with the Cabinet tomorrow, you’ll get a complete reply. On the bilateral letter, I’ll take it to the Cabinet tonight. We think the pledge of economic and military assistance is perhaps too general.

President Carter: Secretary Brown can talk to Weizman.

Prime Minister Begin: We’ll include the questions of ambassadors and oil. You will have a Cabinet reply on all issues. After the session of the Cabinet, we will have agreement on some issues, and maybe it will be some issues on which the United States will have to [go] back to Cairo. Secretary Vance could go to Cairo if you must leave. Then you can bring the reply of Egypt. If there is agreement, we’ll tell you. We will have an agreed communique. Before signature, we will have to deal expeditiously with the question of autonomy in the Cabinet. We will have to bring it to the Knesset. This will take eight to ten days. That means next week there could be approval before we were ready to sign. Tomorrow morning we will give you a full answer between eight and nine o’clock. Then Secretary Vance can go to Cairo with our proposals. Then next week between Monday12 and Wednesday,13 we will possibly get Knesset approval. If we do not get approval, then the government will resign.

President Carter: Secretary Vance knows the Egyptian position intimately. Instead of your Cabinet meeting now, I suggest that you let Secretary Vance consult with you as you evolve your language. Secretary Vance will not shuttle between Cairo and Jerusalem. Let him work with you before your Cabinet decision.

Prime Minister Begin: Dayan can meet with Secretary Vance.

Foreign Minister Dayan: On Article 6, that can be clarified before the Cabinet meeting. Rosenne, Zamir and I will meet with the Secretary and his group. We can find agreed language. That is not so easy on the joint letter. There are matters of substance there. In a short hour we cannot solve this. It is not just a question of words. There are matters of substance. Maybe during the Cabinet meeting we can be in touch, but not before the Cabinet meeting.

Prime Minister Begin: I am very tired. We need time. I asked for an adjournment. The two foreign ministers will sit together. On Article 6, we need Cabinet agreement. We can’t convene again for these matters. I am totally tired. I have reached my limit.

President Carter: Let Secretary Vance and Dayan work through the banquet.

[Page 719]

Foreign Minister Dayan: There is no point in discussing it with me.

Prime Minister Begin: You will have the full powers of Dr. Khalil. Let the two foreign ministers meet.

President Carter: I think if we conclude this visit without a public expression of agreement, there is serious risk of not reaching success. I understand that you cannot sign the treaty without Knesset approval. We need to sign some kind of declaration or letter. We need at least an ad referendum agreement. But if this slips, and I leave, it will [be] hard to rekindle the forces for success. I hate to let this opportunity go by for discussing the basic issues. I could stay over until Tuesday, but no later. I don’t know if you want a joint ceremony with Sadat.

Prime Minister Begin: If we reach agreement, why not? But not before the Knesset has discussed the matter. If after Secretary Vance goes to Cairo he comes back with an agreement, good. If there is no agreement, the sky doesn’t fall. We will continue. If we agree, Cairo can accept, and we will have a common declaration by the three governments. We can have a common communique. We can inform the world that we have reached agreement on all outstanding issues. We can say that there are no problems with the peace treaty. Then the Israeli Government will bring to the Knesset the treaty for a vote next week.

President Carter: Would you sign together?

Prime Minister Begin: We can make a declaration without a meeting. I suggest I don’t go to Cairo for this, or that he come here. Only when we sign the peace treaty, should we do that. We should be patient. If we reach agreement, I will make this a matter of confidence for the Knesset and I will fight for it. But we shouldn’t need to do this to issue a one sentence statement. You can issue the communique in Washington if we agree.

Minister Burg: I understand what the President is saying. The President is suggesting that we should take this up in the Cabinet tonight.

Prime Minister Begin: I agree.

President Carter: Let me add a word of caution. If we leave the Middle East without Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat appearing together, as demonstration to the Israeli and Egyptian people, we may miss an opportunity. I don’t care about the communique. I want the public agreement. If not, you’ll never go to Egypt, and he’ll never come here. My belief is that my presence has a stabilizing effect. I want to see some friendship between you. If there is a communique, and then a Knesset debate, there will be controversy in public. You will say that Sadat has promised oil, and he is willing to do it, but if you say that, he may be embarrassed. There will be problems on the debate on autonomy. The whole agreement could come apart.

[Page 720]

Minister Weizman: Let’s discuss it in the Cabinet.14

President Carter: It’s not just a symbolic matter. I want to leave here with a solid expression of friendship between the two governments.

Prime Minister Begin: This group of ministers cannot now decide this issue of a meeting with Sadat. We will take this to the Cabinet and give you a reply tomorrow.

Foreign Minister Dayan: If the Cabinet approves tonight and Secretary Vance brings the approval of the Egyptians, then the Knesset will approve. We don’t underestimate the ceremony, but if it doesn’t work out for Tuesday, that should not be a problem.

(The meeting ends at 5:35 p.m.)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 3/1–11/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter’s handwritten notes from this meeting, as well as a list of talking points, are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 3/79.
  2. On March 6, Saud commented to West that he hoped Carter’s visit to Cairo would not result in a “separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt without adequate provisions for Palestine and withdrawal,” stating that such an action “would result in the automatic imposition of sanctions,” including Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League, the League’s headquarters being moved from Cairo, and imposition of a boycott and economic sanctions on Egypt. When asked by West what this would mean for Saudi aid to Egypt, Saud replied that Saudi Arabia “would fill all of its existing monetary commitments,” including funding for F–5 fighter aircraft for the Egyptian Air Force, “but would provide no further assistance.” (Telegram 1902 from Jidda, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790129–0638) Following West’s protest on March 11 that sanctions on Egypt would “cause deep strain in U.S.-Saudi relations,” Fahd assured West that Saudi Arabia would “not rush into anything.” (Telegram 2056 from Jidda, March 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–2417)
  3. See Documents 190 and 192.
  4. A copy of this text has not been found.
  5. See footnote 7, Document 91.
  6. Carter’s reference to a 1960 treaty is unclear, though it may likely be a mistaken reference to the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League. (See footnote 5, Document 166) The second reference is likely to Resolution 3, adopted by the Conference of Arab Heads of State at Khartoum in August 1967, under which Egypt had agreed to unite its political efforts on the international and diplomatic level with other signatories “to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 5 June [1967] aggression.” Moreover, this was to be accomplished within “the framework of the main principles to which the Arab states adhere, namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people in their country.” For the text of the Khartoum resolutions, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 590–591.
  7. Not found.
  8. Reference is to the September 22, 1978, side letter from Carter to Begin acknowledging that the “expression ‘West Bank’” would be “understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.” The letter was attached to the Camp David Accords. See Document 57.
  9. Farouk I, King of Egypt from 1936 until 1952.
  10. Presumably, a reference to the September 17, 1978, side letter from Sadat to Carter, attached to the Camp David Accords, stating that Egypt would “be prepared to assume the Arab role” in the implementation of the provisions of a comprehensive settlement related to the West Bank and Gaza “following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.” See Document 57.
  11. See Document 132.
  12. March 12.
  13. March 14.
  14. According to Vance, the Israeli Cabinet met from 11:30 p.m., March 11, until 5:30 a.m., March 12, ultimately agreeing to the Egyptian wording of the interpretive note to Article VI, as well as deciding both to omit any references to establishing autonomy first in Gaza in the treaty’s joint letter and to inform Vance that Israel would be willing to purchase from Egypt the total oil production from the wells that Israel had drilled in the Sinai. (Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 247–248) Dayan’s account of the Cabinet meeting is in Breakthrough, pp. 273–274.