132. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Egyptian President Sadat1
SUBJECT
- Telephone Conversation between President Carter and President Sadat, November 12, 1978
President Carter: I am going to send you a personal message2 later on today which will have the most recent documents on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and will be delivered to you by Ambassador Eilts. I think the negotiations have gone as far as we can go. As you know, I have put in literally hundreds of hours into this matter. Secretary Vance has almost abandoned his other duties. We have worked out an agreement which is fair and which is balanced. I don’t think it’s possible to get any substantial changes made in it by the Israelis or by you. I would like your assurance in backing me in my final decisions. I am going to call Prime Minister Begin3 after I talk to you. Tonight Secretary Vance will be going to New York to meet with Begin4 and to deliver to him the same draft treaty and the same documents. My belief is that the outcome of the entire negotiations for peace will depend upon your willingness and Prime Minister Begin’s willingness to accept the present draft.
President Sadat: When will I receive the documents from Ambassador Eilts?
President Carter: We will get the documents to Ambassador Eilts this afternoon, Washington time.
President Sadat: I will study it very carefully.
President Carter: I understand that. If there are a few things that you still do not like, I would like for you to accept the document as it is rather than to demand additional changes.
[Missing text?]
President Carter: Yes, of course, I have.
[Page 448]President Sadat: Very good, because it will be a bad thing for both of us here in the area if we don’t make the peace at least with Gaza.
President Carter: At least with Gaza?
President Sadat: Yes. It will be detrimental for both of us.
President Carter: The part about having a separate language on Gaza creates problems because it tends to separate Gaza from the West Bank.
President Sadat: Gaza was taken from Egypt. I am asking them to return Sinai and leave Gaza. This is difficult. Those who were in Baghdad5 must not get the upper hand.
President Carter: What specifically do you want with Gaza, Mr. President?
President Sadat: I want Gaza to go on the line that we have agreed upon in Camp David and in the timing of the withdrawal.
President Carter: We have in the document the fact that negotiations will begin in one month.
President Sadat: It is very essential to know when the first phase of the evacuation will take place. This is the most of Sinai that we will be receiving and will be celebrating. We shouldn’t do this without Gaza.
President Carter: Suppose the Israelis agree to move their military headquarters from Gaza as a unilateral step?
President Sadat: The full autonomy still remains.
President Carter: We agree that the full autonomy will be returned to Gaza and West Bank, and that elections will be held before the end of next year. But, I hate to separate Gaza from the West Bank as a separate case.
President Sadat: Gaza has been taken, as I told, with Sinai. It will not be that this is a separate agreement. We should be upset, you and me.
President Carter: I don’t quite understand why you want to separate Gaza, because this was not the agreement at Camp David.
President Sadat: I don’t agree with the West Bank and Gaza being separated. Gaza was taken from Egypt. I cannot accept Sinai and leave Gaza.
President Carter: Mr. President, I am not specifically sure what you want them to agree to on Gaza.
President Sadat: This Gaza land was taken from Egypt along with the Sinai land.
President Carter: What I have in mind on that is to have the Israelis agree, whether as a unilateral step to permit political campaigning; po [Page 449] litical meeting without restraint, as long as they are peaceful; to withdraw their military headquarters from Gaza, without any reciprocal action on the part of Egypt; to commence the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza within a month; and to agree that the elections for the autonomous self-government would be completed next year. All of those things would apply to the West Bank and Gaza, except the military government would be removed, the headquarters would be removed from Gaza without regard to anything else.
President Sadat: When will the first phase of withdrawal be, Mr. President, in Sinai? We can finish the whole thing about Gaza and the West Bank by keeping them together.
President Carter: The first phase of withdrawal has to be within nine months. Is that correct?
President Sadat: Right.
President Carter: And complete withdrawal within three years.
President Sadat: From two to three years.
President Carter: Yes, from two to three years. What I am saying is that we will have the elections actually conducted for the self-government in 1979 which would be just next year.
President Sadat: When you say from six to nine months, it will be next year.
President Carter: Mr. President, I understand that. I don’t care what you and the Israelis do, but I don’t think that this is reasonable request of you. I don’t think it is right to separate Gaza and make it a special case.
President Sadat: This I can’t do, because it is detrimental for both of us. I am trying to make it easy for them and find some point to agree on the timing and the West Bank. It is because of the West Bank. If it takes six to nine months, this will mean June 1979. This may mean separate agreements. I want Sinai and nothing after six or seven months and nothing about Gaza, except negotiations. After June this will take more than one year in the negotiations.
President Carter: I think they will agree to have elections by the end of 1979, so there would not be a delay.
President Sadat: By the end of 1979?
President Carter: That is correct.
President Sadat: Quite frankly, I have found that in seven, eight, or even nine months to accomplish the first phase of withdrawal on Sinai without anything in the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank could be at the end of the year. This is okay, but without Gaza, it is a separate agreement and this is detrimental for both of us.
President Carter: President Sadat, I don’t agree with you because the final withdrawal from the Sinai is two or three years. There would [Page 450] be a self-government set up in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank before you give the entire Sinai back. It would not be a separate agreement.
President Sadat: It would be a separate agreement without anything in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The difficulty is that Gaza is something that they have already taken from Egypt. Our European friends are behind the idea of Gaza—Callaghan, Schmidt, and all the others. This I cannot accept.
President Carter: What do you see as an alternative, Mr. President?
President Sadat: If they agree about 1979, it is okay for me. The first phase of withdrawal in Sinai can be nine or ten months, but with it let there be Gaza and the West Bank. The West Bank can be at the end of the year, but Gaza should be linked with our timetable, Mr. President.
President Carter: It would be hard for me to explain why we treat Gaza better than we treat the West Bank because the Palestinians move back and forth between the two. I thought that you and I had always agreed that we should not separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank.
President Sadat: I don’t agree with the first phase of withdrawal without at least Gaza. If it is Gaza and the West Bank, it is okay. I can wait until October for Gaza and the West Bank to come together with the first phase of withdrawal in Sinai.
President Carter: When you say Gaza and the West Bank, you are talking about the self-government elections, correct?
President Sadat: I am talking about the start of full autonomy with the first phase of withdrawal in Sinai.
President Carter: In other words, you want the first phase of withdrawal in the Sinai to be the same time as the elections for the self-government and autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza.
President Sadat: Not the elections, but the start which will mean nine months from now. In one month we can sit down and discuss and then make the election, but in nine months the first phase of withdrawal will take place at the same time the autonomy starts. We should complete it before the elections.
President Carter: The autonomy will start at the time of the elections. It is going to be a complicated matter, as you know, to arrange for the elections because its a long tedious process to get people registered to vote. As you know, women have never voted in those elections. I just believe that if you insist upon this it is going to delay the first phase of withdrawal from the Sinai even if everybody works as eagerly as possible to get the elections completed. I don’t believe that we can do it, Mr. President, before the end of 1979.
President Sadat: No, this process will not take more than one month: but I am giving nine months from the first phase of withdrawal and the start of autonomy. I can’t take the first phase of withdrawal and [Page 451] leave anything in Gaza and the West Bank. I am trying to make Gaza a compromise. Let the withdrawal from Sinai be postponed, instead of nine months let it be ten months. I am ready to accept this.
President Carter: I see. Mr. President, I am not sure what this is going to do to the negotiations. There is a limit to how much time I can spend on it.
President Sadat: I know the effort that you have given to this. Frankly, I cannot do anything detrimental for both of us. Even with the Baghdad meeting and what is happening, I am in full control. But such a step like the first phase of withdrawal without anything happening in Gaza and the West Bank, it would be detrimental. It would be a separate agreement. As I told you, Mr. President, I don’t want this first phase of withdrawal from Sinai so early. We can postpone it. I have given the Israelis the biggest concession they could want in starting the normal relations after the first phase of withdrawal while they are still occupying my country. I have been blamed all over the Arab world and even by the critics of my country. Wherever I have given you my word, I will stick to it. Let’s look to anything that will damage this.
President Carter: Not having discussed this particular point with you, what you specifically want to occur in Gaza is . . .
President Sadat: The first phase of withdrawal in Sinai will take place the same day the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank start autonomy. This will mean that before the first phase of withdrawal is completed we shall work together with the Israelis and you on this. The day withdrawal is completed the same day autonomy begins in the West Bank and Gaza or Gaza and postpone the West Bank. I don’t want to do it alone in Sinai.
President Carter: Let me ask you in the worst case suppose it takes two years to do that?
President Sadat: Two years for the elections.
President Carter: Yes.
President Sadat: In this case they don’t want peace. They want anything to wait until the next election in your country. You know the weight of this.
President Carter: Suppose you, the Israelis and I work as hard as we can and we cannot get the Palestinians to cooperate; we cannot get the Jordanians to cooperate; we have difficulty getting people to register to vote; and elections may not be held inspite of our best efforts. This is what I fear might happen. I am not predicting that it will happen and I hope it will not, but to tie the two things together may mean that there will be a great delay in the whole process even if the Israelis and you work in good faith. It is a very complicated thing to arrange for the first [Page 452] time, complete elections and the establishment of a new government where people have never voted before.
President Sadat: Mr. President, the first phase of withdrawal in Gaza is my responsibility. Gaza was taken from Egypt. I am ready to force this issue and I have given you my word that I am ready to proceed in both places, Gaza and the West Bank, if King Hussein is not going to do it.
President Carter: Let me ask you this question then, Mr. President. What will be the reaction in the Arab world if Gaza is given special treatment and the process takes place in Gaza and does not take place in the West Bank?
President Sadat: This will be a victory for both of us, because it is not a separate agreement in Sinai only. I have declared already that I [am] ready to force this on Gaza because I am responsible for Gaza. Whatever delays there are in the West Bank it will be done to their position with King Hussein.
President Carter: I understand your position and we will do the best we can.
President Sadat: Please, Mr. President.
President Carter: I will try.
President Sadat: You know I am ready to take any risk since you have known me. This time this will be detrimental for both of us.
President Carter: Let me talk about a couple more things before we hang up. It is very important that you do two things, if you can. One is to emphasize in your public statements the positive aspects of the negotiations and the peace treaties to prepare not only your own people, but the rest of the world for the benefits of peace. I think there is an inclination on the part, and I am going to tell Begin the same thing, of Israel and Egypt to point out the problems with the negotiations because that is what we are trying to discuss at this point. People tend to lose sight of all the many advantages that will accrue to Egypt, the Arab world and the Middle East, if peace can be brought between you and Israel. Let it be possible for us to defend the Middle East against the Soviets, it would make it possible for you to turn your tremendous political and military support to Sudan and the Saudis and others. I hope that you will emphasize the positive result that will be achieved if and when a peace treaty is concluded. Please do that for me.
President Sadat: Sure, Mr. President.
President Carter: The other thing is that I need to have you to be as flexible as you possibly can on these individual points. I am perfectly willing to come over there to talk to Fahd and to talk to Hussein or to have them come over here to meet with me to try to encourage them to participate in the West Bank negotiations. I need for you to do the same [Page 453] thing to try to do what is possible to encourage the Saudis and the Jordanians to support the West Bank discussions. If you can do that, I would be very grateful.
President Sadat: I shall do this and you have my word. If the Israelis agree on my point, everything will be easy for both of us. They will see the results in the end. They will see that real autonomy in Gaza will move the hold [whole] thing, Mr. President.
President Carter: I understand that. Is it possible for you to meet personally with Fahd and/or Hussein?
President Sadat: Not yet. I am punishing them for what happened in Baghdad. I am in full control. Nothing makes me waver. There are forty million Egyptians, the supreme of the Arab world, behind me. There are more than 90 percent of the Arab world behind me.
President Carter: I don’t disagree with that. I think you are absolutely right. But how soon do you think you might be able to meet the Saudis or Hussein?
President Sadat: Give me Gaza. With the first phase of withdrawal and I am responsible to continue the whole thing. With that I make my whole proposal. The West Bank is a bit hard and I know their schemes for the West Bank. It is hard, but let us do in Gaza with the Sinai. As I tell you, it will be very easy after that. There should be something on the ground so their eyes see it. But the Israelis are considering now that they have much to do with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, this makes the other camp think that this is a separate agreement.
President Carter: I will try to work on the how the Gaza Strip issues impact on the others because there is a real limit to how much more time I can put on this effort and everytime we negotiate a final draft over here with the negotiators, including Israelis and Egyptians, they go back home and we have to do it all over again because new points are raised and new disputes arise. I just hope that if you’ll let me try to work on this Gaza question that you have just raised, that you will really try to be flexible on the other points. We have negotiated a good document, and I hope that you will go over it with Ambassador Eilts and be as flexible as possible on it and back me as you did at Camp David.
President Sadat: I shall always respect you, Mr. President, but let me in all candor tell you. I must tell you the truth because we are saying together the same thing.
President Carter: Well, you know we never have let the Iraqis and the Syrians negotiate for us before, and I think that the benefits of peace, as supported by you and me, will be obvious to all. I have very good hopes that the Saudis will give us support. I think Hussein will come later on. But, I don’t think that you and I can hope to please the more radical Arabs, no matter what we do.
[Page 454](Temporary Disconnection.)
President Sadat: We are ready to treat them according to the United Nations Charter like any other people in the world—like you, like the United States. But they want preferable positions. We don’t agree to this principle. These are small points, but believe me, it is very hard. At the same time I will be ready. I shall be telling all of them. As I have agreed with you, even the normal relations part before the Israeli withdrawal, I have done all I can, Mr. President. They are already greedy. They won’t buy everything?
President Carter: Mr. President, they feel the same way about you and I think both of you are wrong. I think both sides need more peace.
President Sadat: That is my oil. They think that it is theirs.
President Carter: They want to have a chance to buy it, not take it, Mr. President.
President Sadat: We are ready, Mr. President. We are ready to sell them. And in the future the difficulty with them is that they need nothing for the future. Well, I don’t agree to this at all. You know, Mr. President, I have seen other schemes in [missing text] and so and so. Well, they don’t give me any opportunity to do this. Opportunity for agreement. No Egyptian will agree to this. Imposing their conditions on us. I am ready for full recognition, normal relations, good neighborhood, a joint committee between us and them to put the whole thing together. I am sure in six months everything will be judged. [missing text] agree to put in the treaty such things like they ask for, because this imposes conditions.
President Carter: I understand. When you go over the document with Ambassador Eilts . . . it’s one that I think is a sound document and fair and please go as far as you can, even though there are some parts in it that you may not like to accept, because there are parts in it that the Israelis do not like and I am trying to get them to accept it too—both of you in the spirit of compromise.
President Sadat: I shall do, Mr. Carter, as I have always done with you. I shall work very close and I shall tell you on every point why I don’t like.
President Carter: I understand. Make those differences as few as possible, Mr. President.
President Sadat: [missing text]
President Carter: Good luck to you.
President Sadat: [missing text]
President Carter: Thank you, sir.
President Sadat: Good-bye.
- Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat from 12:07 p.m. to 12:42 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter’s handwritten notes related to the conversation are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 1, Egypt, 11/77–11/81.↩
- See Document 136.↩
- See Document 133.↩
- See Document 134.↩
- Reference is to the Baghdad Conference. See footnote 7, Document 127.↩