Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

192. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 4, 1979, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Vice President Walter Mondale
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
• Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
• Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
• Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser, State Dept.
• William Quandt, NSC Staff
• Ed Sanders, Senior Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State
• Prime Minister Menachem Begin
• Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
• Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Yehuda Blum, Ambassador to United Nations
• Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
• Yehuda Avner, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister
• Hanan Bar-On, Minister, Israeli Embassy to the United States
• Dan Pattir, Press Spokesman
• Yehial Kadishai, Director of the Prime Minister’s Bureau

President Carter: Last night we spent two hours together.² This is the most stubborn problem that I have ever dealt with. We made little progress. There is a need for flexibility on both sides. There has been no proposal put forward by Israel that would be easier for Egypt to accept than those that are now on the table. I want to ask Secretary Vance to address three basic issues: Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 5, and the question of the target date.

Secretary Vance: We want to build on the talk we had at lunch on Friday.³ You made a helpful suggestion, Mr. Prime Minister, concerning Article 6, paragraph 5. Let me hand out suggested language on Article 6 for you to consider. We suggest a short, simple statement. We have not reviewed this with anyone else. At lunch you said that you did not insist that Article 6 meant that the treaty prevailed over other treaties. I said that this was a major step, and we should build on this. We want to try to couple this with the principles that are already in paragraph 5 as now drafted. The proposals would say that there is no assertion that this treaty prevails over other treaties, but this does not derogate from the language in paragraph 5.

Prime Minister Begin: Is the first paragraph of your draft connected to the second part of Article 6?

Secretary Vance: Yes. Let me explain. You objected to the words “comprehensive peace” and “in the context of the Camp David frameworks”. We have come up with the language which is very simple and which says that the provisions of Article 6 are not in contradiction to the Camp David agreements.

Prime Minister Begin: I shall have to study this and consult with my Cabinet. You see I have less power than Mr. Khalil.

President Carter: You had more power at Camp David. You didn’t have to refer to the Cabinet then. You signed the agreements without referring to your Cabinet.

Prime Minister Begin: (Speaks for some time with his colleagues in Hebrew). The first remark deals with the second part of your proposal that there is “no assertion that this treaty prevails over”. It should also say “and vice versa”.

Secretary Vance: I see no problem.

Prime Minister Begin: With that addition, and if the letter from Mr. Hansell is withdrawn, then I personally favor this proposal to deal with Article 6, paragraph 5. I need Cabinet agreement, and I need a majority. I cannot promise such a majority. Without “vice versa”, it would be wrong.

President Carter: We will present this to the Egyptians. They have not received a copy of it yet.

Prime Minister Begin: I’ll cable it to my Cabinet. We won’t wait until I return. I will have a Cabinet session called for tomorrow. I’ll be able to tell you from New York their decision. If they reject it, I will go back and argue it with them. But please do not tell the Egyptians of the proposal yet. If we accept, you’ll know tomorrow. If they reject, I’ll try to convince them later. Now let me come to the first paragraph in your draft. I need to study it more. I would like to ask for an adjournment. There is some difficulty here.

Secretary Vance: Let me explain.

Prime Minister Begin: As far as saying that there is no separate peace, that is a first step, we have already done this in the preamble. This still implies that Egypt’s ruler could one day say that the Camp David Agreements foresaw comprehensive peace. If there is no such peace, then they could abrogate the treaty. We need more study at this period. I’ll consult today with my colleagues.

Secretary Vance: This says that the treaty will not be construed as being in contradiction to the Camp David accords. It is a truism.

Mr. Rosenne: There is a problem here. The Vienna Convention⁴ in Article 30, paragraph 2, says that where a treaty is referred to in relationship to previous treaties, the previous treaties should be understood to prevail. Could this be put in a letter concerning the autonomy rather than as part of Article 6? It would make it easier.

President Carter: You want us to put this elsewhere?

Mr. Rosenne: We don’t want it attached to Article 6.

Secretary Vance: We would have to think about that. This says nothing in the treaty that purports to contradict Camp David.

Mr. Rosenne: But there are six references in the preamble to the Camp David frameworks. Article 6 refers to the independence of this treaty. If there is a problem of interpretation, you could say that the treaty depends for its interpretation on language in the preamble which refers to Camp David. For example, if Israel were to withdraw and Egypt were to say that the framework agreements had not been carried out. They might say that they do not have to normalize relations, but Article 6 says that the treaty is independent of any other instrument.

Prime Minister Begin: We are among friends. There is a possibility that we could leave these three lines as you suggested them, but we would like to add lines from the middle of the second paragraph. In other words, we would like to say that this first sentence does not derogate from the language of Article 6, paragraph 2, which we would then want to quote in total. This is not a final proposal.

Secretary Vance: Let’s leave this.

Prime Minister Begin: This would add symmetry. We could use the same language “does not derogate from”.

Secretary Vance: Let us consider that.

President Carter: I hope that Egypt will accept these proposals. It will be difficult. We will have to do our best.

Prime Minister Begin: May I boast. I said that if we make an intellectual effort, we will find solutions. I said that we should not be discouraged. I need the approval of my Cabinet and I need to consult with my colleagues. I’ll tell a story. In Ben Gurion’s Cabinet after independence, there was a very religious member and there was an all-out atheist. Sometimes Ben Gurion tried to get the two of them together. But in my Cabinet I have to get five generals together. They have all led armies to victories. They are used to command, not to taking commands.

President Carter: And I have to deal with a Senate. The Senate has at least five presidents or future presidents in it.

Secretary Vance: The third issue involves setting a goal for the self-governing authority. You said that the date for elections could pose problems, because it would increase the incentive for extremists to attack inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. We have tried to set a goal while meeting your concerns. We suggest saying that “Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations in one year so that the elections can be held at the earliest possible date thereafter.” They would be setting a goal just for the negotiations, not the elections.

Prime Minister Begin: You could say “as expeditiously as possible”. I will have to study this. It is a serious proposal. I can’t give you a reply now. I’ll have to send a cable to the Cabinet. It is a change.

Secretary Vance: It is a major change.

Prime Minister Begin: We will have to consider this again. I do not have a counterproposal to suggest. I have to consult with Ambassador Blum who is a jurist. (The Prime Minister then recounts an incident from his interview on Issues and Answers concerning a question of why he had appeared on the show.) Do you have any idea about how to handle the question of the exchange of ambassadors?

President Carter: I plan to talk to President Sadat this afternoon.⁵ I will try to get him or whomever he sends over here to discuss this issue. I will talk to him about it.

Prime Minister Begin: It shouldn’t be changed. We should leave annex 3 as it is. In that annex it says that the ambassadors should be exchanged “upon completion” of the interim withdrawal.

President Carter: He agreed to that, Mr. Prime Minister, because Dayan and Weizman proposed an early withdrawal. I then called Sadat and asked him to agree to an early exchange of ambassadors. He agreed with my proposal. Later your proposal was withdrawn. Sadat then called me, and he said that it was wrong for the Israelis to have withdrawn its proposal. Sadat said that he would not go back on his promise to me about the ambassadors, but he had made no commitment directly to Israel. Could Israel return to the idea of accelerated withdrawal?

(Ambassador Blum enters the room at 2:30.)

Prime Minister Begin: We cannot go back on this. We do not rule it out. We agreed to set up a mixed commission to discuss this. The government decided that this commitment cannot be made a priori. The committee must decide.

President Carter: When would the mixed committee meet?

Prime Minister Begin: After the ratification of the treaty. (Lengthy discussion in Hebrew with Ambassador Blum.)

President Carter: It might be good if you could keep this language confidential within your Cabinet.

Prime Minister Begin: I’ll do my best.

Ambassador Evron: Do you plan to call President Sadat this afternoon?

President Carter: I won’t tell him about this on the phone. I’ll just tell him that we made some progress.

Prime Minister Begin: We still have the problem of oil.

President Carter: The Egyptian position is that when other issues have been concluded, they will be forthcoming on this. I have talked to Sadat. We can guarantee your supply of oil. With our guarantee and with Sadat’s willingness to sell you oil, we can reach an agreement. If the oil must come from the Sinai wells, I am not sure that Sadat will agree.

Prime Minister Begin: We know of your 1975 commitment.⁶ It could raise psychological problems in the United States. We want other independent solutions. We have several sources. We don’t want to have to invoke the U.S. commitment, but we may have to in the future. We need oil to safeguard our lives. We only need 2.5 million tons. Egypt doesn’t need the oil.

President Carter: There may be more problems in Egypt on this than in the United States. Our country is deeply committed to Israel. We don’t expect it would cause any problems for us to supply you with oil.

Prime Minister Begin: We need an iron-clad guarantee from that source.

President Carter: We can’t guarantee that Egypt will be the source of your oil.

Prime Minister Begin: We need a serious commitment. We get 1.6 million tons now from the Alma field.

President Carter: You agreed at Camp David that you would give up those wells.

Prime Minister Begin: But if there is no guarantee, that is a change. We gave that commitment on the assumption that we would get the oil.

President Carter: I don’t remember that being raised at Camp David. (A pause during which each delegation talks within its own members.)

President Carter: (To Ambassador Blum jokingly). Are you trying to help?

Prime Minister Begin: I will talk to my colleagues.

Vice President Mondale: As I understood the Prime Minister, he said he wanted to keep the first three lines of our proposal and then would want to make an addition.

Prime Minister Begin: This is an idea. I am not sure.

President Carter: I want to close our discussion by saying that we hope these are constructive ideas. After we get your reply, we will discuss with the Egyptians these questions, plus the question of ambassadors and of oil. We can’t force them to sell you oil. If that proves to be impossible, we will guarantee you that level of oil. We prefer that it come from the Sinai wells. We are faced with a deteriorating situation in the Middle East. We are not looking for a policeman of the Middle East, Israel or anyone else. Some Arabs fear Israel more than they fear anyone else. You have said that you don’t want any more weapons for the defense of Israel. In the context of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, the treaty between our two closest friends, we could discuss increased security arrangements. I hope we can expedite the negotiations. We will contact Sadat. One other question is what we should say in public. We have no preference on what to say, or when to make a comment, but we should agree on a statement.

Prime Minister Begin: We can say that the United States delegation under the President’s chairmanship made a proposal to the Israeli delegation under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship. The Israeli delegation undertook to study the proposals and to refer them to the government for discussions. We should say that they will study them.

President Carter: Let’s have Jody Powell and Mr. Pattir work on a draft statement.

Prime Minister Begin: We will give nothing to the press.

Secretary Vance: If we mention proposals which have not been discussed with the Egyptians, they might object. Let’s use the word formulation.

Ambassador Evron: Or we could use the words suggestions.

Secretary Vance: I like the word suggestions.

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(3/79). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter held a second, private meeting with Begin in the Oval Office from 2:58 p.m. to 3:27 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation for this second meeting has been found.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President and Mrs. Carter hosted Begin and Mrs. Begin at the White House from 6:59 p.m. to 10:08 p.m., March 3. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
3. March 2.
4. Article 30, paragraph 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.” For the citation to the complete treaty text, see footnote 28, Document 190.
5. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Sadat on the telephone from 4:28 p.m. to 4:31 p.m., March 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation has been found.
6. See footnote 20, Document 190.