Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

203. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Alexandria, March 9, 1979, 7–8 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President Carter’s Meeting with President Sadat

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Alfred Atherton, Ambassador-at-Large
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President
• Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser, Department of State
• William Quandt, NSC Staff Member
• President Anwar al-Sadat
• Muhammad Husni Mubarak, Vice President
• Mustafa Khalil, Prime Minister
• Lt. General Kamal Hasan Ali, Minister of Defense and War Production
• Hasan Kamil, Chief, Office of the President
• Butrus Butrus Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• Hamid Abd al-Latif al-Sayeh, Minister of Economy, Economic Cooperation and Foreign Trade

President Carter: My visit here and your reception of me and the reception shown by your people has been an inspiration to me and has been very reassuring. I am convinced that we cannot fail to give the people what they want. We recognize that in going to Jerusalem² you started the whole process. You knew there will be divisions in the Arab world. Other Arab leaders have condemned you and this is not unprecedented. But whatever happens in the future, my life is bound to yours, and that of the United States to Egypt. We hope for success. It would be a tragedy if we failed. Success would be great for us. Prime Minister Khalil and others have had good talks with Secretary Vance. We understand your concerns. When I go to Israel, within the bounds of propriety, I’ll represent the Government of Egypt as I often did at Camp David. Then we would agree on our views, with some flexibility, and the results showed that we prevailed, because we gave Israel little things. I’ll leave you with the commitment to honor your concerns and try to get a peaceful resolution of the differences. I would like to end my visit with a peace treaty, following which we need to prepare for a massive interaction between our two governments, not only in the military and economic relationships, but only in the private sector. We need to get American business leaders to the White House to get them to come to Egypt to work on problems of food, housing, and infrastructure. It would be good for us both. The prospects are good if Israel wants peace. If they don’t, I can’t help. I’ll represent your interests and concerns.

President Sadat: I am happy. Let me express the gratitude for your sincerity and your generosity. You have shown brotherhood to my people and have held out the promise of peace. I was with my aides and I told them that I gave two directives for the negotiations. This trip of yours, which is very daring and very courageous, should end in a smashing success. Second, we shall always feel proud and happy to keep our positions identical. This is our intention. What you saw today and yesterday is the magic of the word peace. Last Christmas, in 1978, I was in upper Egypt and I visited a small remote village. I saw there the same feelings that you saw today.³ You even feel this in the remote areas.

My people admire you, your principles, your morals, your assistance and your help. We have suffered from foreign domination here. The last were the Soviets, before then the British. For two thousand years Egypt has been ruled by foreign rulers until the Egyptian Revolution. That was the first time that Egyptians could take pride. It was really something to be proud. Now we are proud that the relations between Egypt and the United States have been established. In the bottom of the heart of each Egyptian is a feeling of friendship for the United States. We had 18 years of confrontation, but you saw the sentiments that they expressed today. Any American citizen can feel how much they cherish American friendship. When we started in 1973 with the peace process, my people were proud to have the United States as friends. I got hundreds of letters from ordinary American citizens.

I want you to know that we shall always be friends. I will always be proud of your friendship and brotherhood whatever happens. To make this trip a success is a success for all who value morals. I would like to show you more of my country.

President Carter: I’d like to come back.

President Sadat: You know our position. You have spent your time on this problem in a marvelous way. We shall never be able to meet your generosity. I just hope that God will help in your mission. You can count on us as peace loving friends in happiness and in sorrow.

President Carter: I hopefully pray that in spite of difficulties that I’ll never disappoint you. You are the most admired person in my country. That is a justified feeling. The situation in the Middle East has greatly changed since I first met you. We have just a few more hours together. When I get to Israel on Sunday,⁴ I’ll start the substantive talks. I’ll try to conclude the talks as quickly as possible. It shouldn’t take long. The differences that remain are relatively minor compared to the past. Begin and Dayan have behaved well in the last few days. They have not made any claims of victory, they have been cautious, and there is an attitude of hope. Even in New York,⁵ Begin struck a very moderate tone. This is possibly a good omen. I know that Begin is strong, courageous, and honest. He has made difficult sacrifices in Israel. He has gone further in his actions than his predecessors. He has suffered at home. He can get his own party to support him. I’ve tried to understand Israel politics. The Israeli people are as anxious for peace as those in Egypt. This may also be true in Syria. The leaders are not in step with the people there. I hopefully expect that after a few months of difficulty, the attitudes of the people in Jordan and Syria will change their leaders’ attitudes. We’ll do all that we can to prevent punitive actions against Egypt. We will use our maximum influence with Jordan and Saudi Arabia to get them to accept the accomplished fact. I’ll let them sound off for a while, but I intend to quietly lean on them. Then I will do all that I can to bring it to an end. I’d like to leave the Middle East with the peace treaty. If I go back, it will be hard to reopen the negotiations.

President Sadat: Right.

President Carter: On the prospect of the SALT talks, I need to meet and to prepare for those. My hope is that if the Israelis provide me with a good surprise, we can conclude and sign the whole thing early next week. If so, I would like to leave with good feelings between Egypt and Israel. There should not be a grudging acceptance. There will be problems in the future and they can be worked out with cooperation. Israel can exaggerate little difficulties. Within the limits of expectation, we are trying to put a good spirit into the whole process. A negative reaction in the Arab world will be minimized if they see that there is not a grudging acceptance. If they see things hanging by a thread, then Hussein may try to stir up the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. No Arab leader has done anything to restore the rights of the Palestinians, except for you. I need your advice on how to open negotiations with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. I know that some of you, such as the Vice President and Mr. el-Baz, have contacts. We’ll do what we can to bring them in in a constructive way. Israel will be reluctant to carry out Camp David with enthusiasm. When they have a choice, they’ll go for a narrow interpretation. We’ll have to urge them to be more forthcoming. This plays into the hands of the Israelis when the Palestinians don’t cooperate. We need some mechanism through which Vance can give me advice on this. Secretary Vance or the Vice President could return. We’ll try to choose a top-level negotiator to work on this problem. We want to try to make this permanent and to prove by events that it is a step toward comprehensive peace. Next would be Gaza, and possibly the West Bank, and then Jordan, and last Syria. I am available to meet with you. This is the greatest thing that I have ever worked on. You have taken the bold steps.

President Sadat: You instigated it. You remember your letter.⁶

President Carter: Secretary Brown will talk about our military relationship. We are revising our aid programs. We have planned a reorganization. You can help by having Ambassador Ghorbal advise us on private investment opportunities. We have some bureaucratic problems in carrying out projects. We need to show that things can move rapidly. I’ll try to change the bad situation in the United States and hope that you will look at your Cabinet to see if obstacles can be removed. Our business relations could improve.

Secretary Vance: We’ll do all that we can to help.

President Carter: Secretary Vance went over with me his talks with Prime Minister Khalil. I’ll do my best. I can’t shuttle, but we’ll communicate through Ambassador Eilts. My intention is to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.

President Sadat: This is a very encouraging development. A few moments ago the Mayor of Gaza sent me a letter. He is taking a positive attitude. He is saying that he is waiting and is sure that the efforts that we are making will reach agreement for the comprehensive peace in the area. He knows that you have helped the Palestinian people in their self-determination. He wants you to continue your blessed efforts.

President Carter: Once the treaty is an accomplished fact, I hope this attitude will develop.

President Sadat: Gaza I am sure of. In the West Bank, because of King Hussein and the PLO, there is a question. There are the interests of the mayors. They are businessmen. On the economic interests, I suggest a joint board headed by the Prime Minister. We should drop all of our work on this board. We can guarantee your investors what is needed. We can have feasibility studies.

On the other question, do your best to get an agreement. Vance has heard Prime Minister Khalil. From my side, you have full authority to reach an agreement. You know the situation here and there. You join us as a full partner for years to come. You have my authority to do what can be done. If Israel refuses, that is a new situation. But let us be identical.

Secretary Vance: The Prime Minister has given me a note⁷ on unilateral actions. We’ll raise this.

President Carter: Let us review the contents of the note. We’ll try.

Prime Minister Khalil: I have the greatest esteem for you, and as you know, I spent many years in the United States. I want U.S.-Egyptian relations to be close. I am a staunch defender of peace on a solid basis that can be defended.

President Carter: I’ll never forget this.

Prime Minister Khalil: I cherish your idealism.

President Carter: Your contribution at Camp David gave us an education [on] the issues that made this possible. When you came, there were bad prospects. I need a Prime Minister Khalil to run my government for me.

Minister Sayeh: If you’ll allow me, I’ll be brief. Due to certain elements, our economy is growing at about nine percent annually. After 1967, we fell to zero. Due to the open-door policy of President Sadat and due to the economic help of the United States, the economy is improving. We now have democracy and the rule of law. There are no confiscations or expropriations. Private investors have confidence, as do foreign investors. All is working well. If I may add, we are with the IMF on economic reform. The IMF always wants higher prices. With all this, these need to be done in a non-traditional way. We are one and one-half million housing units short. We now only have 80,000 new units being built. We won’t catch up. This is causing big problems. We can’t have an open or a closed door if we have a poor telephone system. We always have problems of sewage and water supply. We are beginning to work on rural electrification which is very important. The public sector is very poor and needs to be renewed, but we have 10–15 billion Egyptian people tied up in it. It needs help. We need a non-traditional approach. Your one billion dollars helps, but we need massive help. I sense that you want to use American investment. I am ready for it. Coca Cola is already moving. The boycott has ended. Peace, and the expectation of peace, will bring foreign investments. We used to depend on Arab countries for about $2 billion recently. Now we are in good shape. We pay our debts on time. The Arab sources won’t work so well in the future. They are talking of cutting back. How can we deal with this? We consider that peace is a joint venture. People need benefits. I hope that their situation will improve.

President Carter: We helped Taiwan and South Korea. These are two of the best examples.

Minister Sayeh: The Third Consultative Group will meet in June.⁸ The American side sends very high-quality people. This is very helpful. We have a club of friends and donors. But we need to move the IMF. We are talking about increasing prices. To summarize, there is the June meeting of the IMF and the link to the Consultative Group. We need more commodity credits. That is the only way to generate local currency without inflation. We need to get more aid for infrastructure.

President Carter: The IMF you’ll have to handle. The American private sector looks at the IMF as putting a stamp of approval on a country. We’ll help, but the IMF is so respected, that if the IMF says that Egypt is okay, then you have an excellent basis for an investment. If temporary adjustments are needed to get IMF approval, that would be good. We don’t want too many consultative groups on new organizations. We’ll put Egypt as a top priority. It is better not to build up excessive expectations.

If it looks as if we have everything settled here, Israel might raise their demands. We need to keep the emphasis on the problems that remain to be solved. And Egypt should be tough in her negotiating demands. We should be cautious because prospects for peace depend on whether Israel is forthcoming in meeting Egyptian demands. We should be cautious.

The same applies to economic matters. We should not build up the expectation that everything will be working well one year after peace. There will be many difficulties. We want to avoid extreme disappointments. We will do all that we can. I’ll stay cautious in my public statements. And Egypt will be one of our top priorities.

(The meeting ends at 8:00 p.m.)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 16, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 3/1–11/79. Secret. The meeting took place at the Maamura Rest House.
2. See footnote 3, Document 4.
3. Carter wrote in his memoirs that he and Sadat were met in Alexandria, having traveled by special train from Cairo on March 9, “by the largest and most enthusiastic crowds I have ever seen.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 419)
4. March 11.
5. Following his meetings with Carter in Washington, Begin visited New York March 6–7, where he gave a series of speeches to Jewish-American groups. (Edward Walsh, “Begin Urges U.S. Jews to Back New Peace Plan,” The Washington Post, March 7, 1979, p. A17; Edward Walsh, “Begin Says Treaty Now Up to Carter, Sadat,” The Washington Post, March 8, 1979, p. A26)
6. Not further identified.
7. A copy of Khalil’s note has not been found.
8. Reference is to the third scheduled meeting of the Consultative Group established by the World Bank in 1977 to address Egyptian economic and financial problems.