57. Editorial Note
Following his meeting with the Legal Adviser to the Israeli Camp David delegation, Aharon Barak, and Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman from 2:45 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. on September 17, 1978, during which they discussed the text of the U.S. draft letter in “another tense moment,” President Jimmy Carter walked to the cabin of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials,
[Page 205]President’s Daily Diary; Carter, Keeping Faith, pages 398–399) There, Carter presented Begin with a set of photographs taken at the summit and signed by Carter and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat with personal dedications to Begin’s grandchildren, mementoes Begin received emotionally. In an entry in his personal diary, Carter noted that the episode represented a “turning point” in Begin’s attitude toward reaching a peace agreement “from obdurate objections to an obvious desire to be successful.” Begin asked Carter to step inside his cabin, where he informed Carter “he was sorry, but there was no way he could accept the Jerusalem letter from US to Egypt. I told him we had submitted a new version of it, told him to read it over, and call me and let me know what he decided.” Begin replied that he would telephone in “about fifteen minutes” and Carter returned to the Aspen Lodge, he noted, “very dejected.” (Carter, White House Diary, page 242)
Upon returning to the Aspen Lodge, Carter recorded in his personal diary: “Sadat was there, and we went over the entire text of the Sinai and the West Bank/Gaza framework.” (Carter, White House Diary, page 242) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Sadat and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance from 3:40 to 6:10 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter noted in his diary: “Sadat made a few minor suggestions which I knew would suit the Israelis.” (Carter, White House Diary, page 242) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Begin telephoned at 3:57 p.m. and spoke briefly with Carter. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter summarized the call in his personal diary: “Begin called to let me know that they would accept the Jerusalem letter, which removed the last major obstacle with Israel! [Or so I thought].” (Carter, White House Diary, page 242)
While making arrangements to return to Washington, Barak delivered to Carter Begin’s draft of the West Bank and Sinai settlements language, which, Carter noted, “was completely unsatisfactory and in violation of what they had agreed the night before.” (Carter, White House Diary, page 242) Begin telephoned Carter at his cabin and informed the President that “he could not accept my language on the Knesset vote, because he interpreted it as a threat to the independence of the parliament.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, page 400) Following their conversation, Vice President Walter Mondale informed Carter that Begin was then meeting with Sadat at the latter’s cabin. In his personal diary, Carter described subsequent events:
“I ran out the front door, and Begin was just leaving Sadat’s cabin in a golf cart with Barak. Begin was quite happy, saying they had had a love-fest, and that Sadat had agreed to Begin’s language on the Knesset vote. I knew this was wrong, and every time I asked Barak to tell me exactly what Begin and Sadat had said, Begin would interrupt him and [Page 206] not let him reply. Finally, I asked Prime Minister Begin to please let Barak answer. What Begin had asked Sadat was: ‘Do you think the Knesset should be under pressure when they vote? Sadat said, ‘No, I don’t think the Knesset should be under pressure.’ This was the total conversation. Begin therefore assumed that he could write any language he wanted concerning negotiations versus the Knesset vote.
“I asked Barak to come with me. Begin excused him, and we went to my cabin. I checked their language very carefully and finally thought of a way to say it that was in the final letters and satisfactory to both Begin and Sadat. Susan [Clough] typed it up. I wrote a note to all our people: ‘This is the exact language to be used. Do not use any other language on or off the record.’ We firmed the issue up, literally at the very last minute. Only then did I realize that we had finally succeeded.” (Carter, White House Diary, page 243)
The note referenced by Carter, and to which he appended the handwritten message quoted above, reads: “There is one major issue on which agreement has not been reached. Egypt states that agreement to remove Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel states that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations. Within two weeks the Knesset will decide on the issue of the settlements.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 53, Middle East: Camp David President’s Working Papers, 9/10–27/78)
Following this, the three leaders and their staffs departed Camp David by helicopter for Washington. At the White House, a nationally-televised signing ceremony was held in the East Room from 10:31 p.m. to 11:04 p.m on September 17. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) The three leaders signed the final versions of the two “framework” documents, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David” and “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel.” For the texts of these two documents, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 1523–1528. Accompanying the two framework documents were nine letters: a) a September 17 letter from Begin to Carter informing the President of his intention to submit the question of Israeli settlements in the Sinai to the Knesset; b) a September 17 letter from Carter to Sadat transmitting to the latter Begin’s letter; c) a September 17 letter from Sadat to Carter affirming the Egyptian position on Israel’s Sinai settlements; d) a September 22 letter from Carter to Begin acknowledging letter (a) and attaching letter (c); e) a September 17 letter from Sadat to Carter affirming the Egyptian position on the status of Jerusalem; f) a September 17 letter from Begin to Carter affirming the Israeli position on the status of Jerusalem; g) a September 22 letter from Carter to Sadat acknowledging letter (e) and informing Sadat that he intended to transmit it to [Page 207] Begin; h) a September 17 letter from Sadat to Carter informing him that Egypt “will be prepared to assume the Arab role” with regard to the Framework for Peace’s provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza; and i) a September 22 letter from Carter to Begin acknowledging Begin’s understanding of “Palestinians” or “Palestinian people” in the Framework text to mean “Palestinian Arabs” and Begin’s understanding of “West Bank” to mean “Judea and Samaria.” The texts of these letters were published on September 22 and are printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 1566–1568. Following the signing ceremony, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel resigned from the Egyptian cabinet in protest of the Camp David Agreements and was replaced by Minister of State Boutros Boutros-Ghali on an interim basis. An additional side letter, from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman, in which the United States pledged to consult with the Israelis on assistance the former could give in connection with the relocation of Israel’s Sinai airbases in Eitam and Etzion to new locations in the Negev desert area of Israel, was agreed on September 28. The Department transmitted the text of this letter in telegram 247570 to Tel Aviv, September 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780396–1338)
On September 18, President Carter addressed a Joint Session of Congress on the outcome of the Camp David Summit and the agreements reached. The text of this speech is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 1533–1537.
On September 28, the Israeli Knesset concluded its debate on the Camp David Agreements, approving them by a vote of 84–19. The Israeli Commerce and Industry Minister Yigael Hurvitz resigned from the Israeli cabinet in protest. For Begin’s statement to the Knesset following the debate, see Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1977–1979, pages 549–554.