Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

174. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Damascus, December 13, 1977, 4–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign Minister Khaddam
• Abdallah Khani, Deputy Foreign Minister
• Hammoud Shoufi, Director of North American Affairs
• Abu Fares, Interpreter
• Secretary Vance
• Ambassador Richard Murphy
• Harold Saunders, Director, INR
• Under Secretary Philip Habib
• William Quandt, NSC Staff
• Issa Sabbagh, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Khaddam welcomed the Secretary to Damascus and said that he was prepared to listen to what the Secretary had to say. The Secretary said that he appreciated Khaddam’s willingness to meet with him on such short notice. The President felt strongly that in light of recent events it was vitally important for the Secretary to come to the Middle East and to speak with the Syrian leadership. The President wanted the Secretary to reaffirm our continued desire to work closely with the Syrians. He strongly feels, as does the Secretary, the importance of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Syria. He wanted to speak personally with the Minister and to hear the Syrian assessment of the situation, so that the United States could best decide how to proceed to our common objective of a durable, just, and comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The United States has an overwhelming interest in a comprehensive settlement. We believe that a partial settlement would leave crucial issues unresolved, especially concerning the Palestinian issue, and that would become a continuing source of instability. Another war and serious economic dislocations might be likely. It is our judgment that a partial settlement would divide the Arab world and this would not be in anyone’s interests. The Secretary said that he assumed from talks with the Syrians in the past that they would share this view.

The Secretary said that he wanted to give the Syrians the facts of the background to the initiatives, and to report to them on the results of his recent talks. It has been said that the United States planned the events that led to Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. This was reported in newspapers, and some said that the Syrians themselves believed it. The Secretary said that he could tell Khaddam that the United States did not know about the trip until it was publicly announced by Sadat. But it has had a profound effect, not only in Israel, but also in the United States and elsewhere. The Secretary said that he had been in Europe recently at a meeting in Brussels.²

In the United States, there has been a change in public opinion. A recent public opinion poll by Mr. Harris³ showed that for the first time, 52% of the American public believed that the Arabs want peace, whereas only 48% believe that Israel is especially anxious for peace. This is a complete reversal of the situation. The effect in Israel has also been fundamental. This shows itself in several different ways. Whether one talks to the Prime Minister or Members of his Cabinet, or the press, or ordinary people, they all say the situation has fundamentally changed and will never be the same again. They believe that the Arabs do want peace and are prepared seriously to discuss it. There has been a profound emotional impact on the Israelis. They recognize that the time has come to face up to issues that have been ignored for a long time. They feel it is up to them to respond to the initiatives that have already been taken.

The Secretary said that when he went to Cairo to meet President Sadat,⁴ Sadat asked him to convey several points to the Israelis. First, Sadat does not want a separate or partial peace with Israel. Second, he expects Israel to respond with a statement of willingness to negotiate the return of Arab lands occupied in the 1967 war, with minor modifications on the West Bank. He also expects them to state their willingness to solve the Palestinian question in all its aspects. He indicated that the Cairo Conference would prepare the way for the Geneva Conference, but ultimately the final agreements would have to be negotiated at Geneva. The Secretary said that he had reported these matters to Prime Minister Begin, first alone, and then with the Prime Minister and a few of his top Cabinet Members, including Mr. Yadin, Foreign Minister Dayan, and Defense Minister Weizman.⁵ These are the principal figures in the Cabinet. The Secretary had told them what President Sadat expected, and they all said that they understood what was being asked. They understood the need for an Israeli response. They would have to deal promptly with this in a serious fashion. The Secretary sensed a tremendous change in mood and in the way in which they received this information, compared to his earlier meetings. They know they are dealing with serious problems and they will discuss it in a positive way. They did not raise obstacles or negative road blocks. The Secretary said that he could not predict how the Israelis would respond, but they have indicated they will give a response in the near future. From the Secretary’s standpoint, he thinks there is hope for a serious discussion of issues to accomplish a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary said that he had also discussed the work at the Cairo meetings, but that he did not believe it was necessary to go into details on this. Concerning his talks in Amman,⁶ the Secretary said that he had reported to King Hussein on his views of the new situation. The King had explained his position and his deep desire to restore greater harmony and unity to the Arab world. The King had repeated his total commitment to a comprehensive settlement. The King had been particularly insistent upon the need to solve the Palestinian problem. He also reaffirmed the importance of the return of the occupied territories, and showed a special interest in Jerusalem.

The Secretary said that he had met with this morning with President Sarkis⁷ and had discussed South Lebanon. He had also raised the broader problems of the Middle East and of a comprehensive settlement. President Sarkis understood the need for a comprehensive settlement and for a fundamental resolution of the Palestinian question because of the effects that had on his own country. The Secretary had talked to him about the question of a Geneva Conference. He repeated his desire for a comprehensive settlement at Geneva. He went on to say that specific action by Lebanon, if the Co-chairmen were to call for a Geneva Conference, would depend upon the circumstances at the time. He expanded on this to say that Geneva must deal with fundamental problems such as the Palestinians and the refugees. This in brief is what the Secretary had discussed in the previous stops on his trip. He reiterated that it is important to find out Syrian thinking, and their views on what steps should be taken to reach their objectives. President Carter and Secretary Vance feel that it is important to understand the Syrian views, so that we can help promote a true peace, a comprehensive peace, and a just peace.

Foreign Minister Khaddam said that he had been interested in hearing the American views, and would like to know what the United States felt should be done. He also would like to know what President Sadat and Israel think can be done in the future.

The Secretary said he had already touched on the second point. Sadat and Begin believe that we should all go to Geneva after some constructive work has been done. They had the ultimate goal of going to Geneva, with all parties, and with all issues being dealt with in a comprehensive settlement. Concerning American views, the United States believes that it should capitalize upon the opportunities that now exist. We will participate at Cairo to see whether we can help, through those informal meetings, to prepare for Geneva. What we ultimately seek is a Geneva meeting with all the parties present to negotiate a final settlement which will encompass all of the issues. It is necessary to have a response in the near future from Israel, and we believe that they mean what they say about an early response.

Foreign Minister Khaddam thanked the Secretary for his review of the situation in the Middle East, and for his emphasis on a final, and just settlement in the Middle East. Khaddam said that he knew the United States understood Syria’s positions, but he would like to emphasize several points. The United States sees President Sadat’s visit to Israel as having positive aspects. He said that this was also the view in Europe. This is not surprising to Syria. It is natural that Israel’s friends will be pleased by this visit, and it is not surprising to hear voices praising Sadat for his courage. What is regrettable is that these same Europeans have called similar actions in the past treason. The French, in connection with DeGaulle and Petain, felt that DeGaulle was a hero because he did not deal with the enemy, and they condemned Petain because he did. Petain did nothing compared to Sadat, but he was sentenced to death as a traitor to his country. What Sadat has done is spoil everything that had been accomplished for peace. Syria cannot deal with things on the basis of their effects in the United States and Europe. What matters is the effect in the Arab world. President Nixon had to resign from office because he told a lie that was a blemish on the honor of the United States. He said that he had not known about the spying on the Democratic Party.⁸ Despite this small lie, he had to resign. This reflects well on the American people. It is a positive phenomenon, showing that the American Administration has the respect of its people.

But what Sadat has done, according to Khaddam, is not the right of any Arab ruler. The struggle has been between Israel and the Arabs, not just Israel and Egypt. No Arab ruler can take a step which adversely affects the Arab cause. President Sadat has taken upon himself the right to do this, but he will be tried and taken to account as is the case of any traitor. Neither Sadat nor anyone else can take a step alone to peace. This has to be an Arab decision. Sadat says that he does not want a partial peace. But how else can Syria describe what he has done. He should not have taken upon himself the right to go to Israel without the agreement of the other Arabs. He who visits Israel, and recognizes Jerusalem as its capital, and places a wreath on the tomb of the Israeli unknown soldier who has killed Arabs, has done something which was not his right to do. This is worse than a partial solution. Those who think that Sadat can speak for the Arabs are mistaken.

Khaddam said that Sadat should be pitied. Publicity has gone to his head. It is driving him crazy. Every day he gives new interviews. Sadat and the Syrians had agreed that there should be no unilateral actions, but he broke that agreement. Subsequently, if it was necessary for Nixon to resign for his small lie, Sadat should resign twenty times. He has given the impression that the Egyptian people are behind him. Syria disagrees. We know the Egyptian people, and the coming days will show that we are right. They will never forgive their leader for this great sin, this blemish on the honor of the Egyptian people. History is filled with examples. Before the visit, everyone was talking about Geneva. There were attempts being made to facilitate its reconvening. The United States had contacts with all the parties. So why did Sadat make his visit? If he was serious about a comprehensive peace, why did he choose this time to make the visit? The efforts were still moving forward. In Syrian opinion, Sadat had prepared this event for some time. The contacts he had had with Syria were merely a smoke screen to help prepare the way for the visit. There is no similar example in history of a leader of a country at war with another of giving everything without getting anything in return. The closest example was that of Rudolph Hess, when he went to England during the Second World War.⁹ But he was not a head of state. And that visit was fruitless. In our opinion, this visit has complicated matters and has gotten the efforts off the track. A new situation has been created in the area. A great political imbalance has been created. Consequently, we do not see that this path will lead to peace.

Khaddam emphasized that Syria does want peace, but this is not the way to it. This is the path of submission, and is an insult to Arab honor and dignity. The Syrians also think that the question of Geneva is not now valid. Anything that now takes place at Geneva will be looked at from the framework of Sadat’s visit. If Sadat thinks that he can bring peace, let him try. He has done something that he will have to pay for. The price is that Egypt must return to its natural place. Some parts of the world see this as exciting. But the press has quoted Mrs. Meir, who was asked about whether Sadat and Begin deserve the Nobel Peace Prize, and she responded that they should get the Oscar for the best actors.

Khaddam emphasized that peace must preserve the dignity of the peoples who are engaged in it. Everything that trespasses on dignity will lead nowhere. If some Americans were excited by the visit, there were millions of Arabs whose hearts were bleeding at the sight of Sadat bowing before the Israeli flag, embracing Golda Meir, and so forth. The Foreign Minister said that he had a son of 13. When his son saw the pictures of Sadat in Jerusalem, he asked his father why Syria had not arrested Sadat when Sadat was in Damascus before his visit to Israel. His son does not want war, but he does insist on a minimum of self respect, like all Syrians. In Egyptian law, Sadat could be brought to trial.

Khaddam said that he believed that the United States had had a hand in Sadat’s visit. Sadat has made statements which suggest this, particularly when he refers to the exchange of personal letters with President Carter. Possibly the Americans did not have direct knowledge, but it is rumored that Sadat has been working for American intelligence since the 1960s, so maybe the CIA engineered the whole thing (laughter). Whether the United States had a role or not, the important thing is what Sadat has done.

Secretary Vance stressed that the letters Sadat has referred to were similar to those sent to President Assad. The President had emphasized that the talks were getting bogged down on procedures, and that it was time to go to Geneva. Khaddam replied that Sadat had created a different impression by referring to hand-written messages. And if he, as Foreign Minister, did not understand fully, it should not be surprising that other people could not understand. Subsequently, there had been evidence that the United States was urging other Arabs not to criticize Sadat’s efforts. This was another factor. Also the United States agreed to go to the Cairo Conference. All of these things have left Syrians with the impression that the United States was behind this. No one can believe that Ceausescu managed to convince Sadat to make this trip.¹⁰ The Secretary said that he thought that Sadat had made his own decision.

Khaddam said that if this came out of Sadat’s head, we should wait to see how far it goes. Perhaps it would end on the scaffold. Sadat may talk about no bilateral agreement, but his visit was already part of a bilateral approach. Why was it not worth discussing this step, which has been so important, with the other Arabs? Secretary Vance said he could not argue about this. There had been no prior consultation in any case with the United States. Khaddam said that he would believe what the Secretary had said, but he wanted to give the reasons behind the impressions he had. One word of Secretary Vance’s was worth a million from Sadat. Khaddam then referred to the fact that Ismail Fahmi had not even been able to accept Sadat’s action,¹¹ and Fahmi was the most pro-American of all the Egyptians. Henry Kissinger had even told Khaddam that he had made Fahmi Foreign Minister. When the Secretary expressed doubts about that, Khaddam explained a story that Kissinger had told about his first meeting with Fahmi. In any event, if Fahmi could not digest the step that was taken by Sadat, how could others be expected to accept it? Sadat’s visit was that of an individual, and it was leading to a unilateral solution. Syria’s goal remains the achievement of peace, but not through this method which tramples on Syria’s dignity, and on Arab rights. All of these activities have frozen the way to Geneva. Peace in the region can only be between two parties—the Arabs and Israel. Now Sadat’s actions have caused the possibility of peace to fall by the wayside. The Syrians, the Jordanians, the Palestinians, the Lebanese, and the Egyptians were all agreed on Geneva. Now what will the results of Sadat’s trip be? There will now be Egypt and Israel on one side, and Syria, the Palestinians, and others against them. When Egypt returns to our side, and leaves the Israeli side, we can resume discussions. Now Sadat is with the Israelis and is serving the interests of Israel. Khaddam said that he could not understand the warm feeling for Begin. He is sure that Sadat embraced Dayan more warmly than he did Secretary Vance.

Khaddam said that this is the situation as he sees it. There is no real possibility for continuing efforts in light of Sadat’s visit to Israel and the results that have come from it. Syria considers that Sadat has gone against his people’s will. When he was here, he told President Assad that if he failed in his visit, he would resign. He would insist on getting full withdrawal and Palestinian rights. When he finished the visit, we heard his declaration that he had achieved a psychological breakthrough. That apparently is now enough of an achievement for him, and he had decided not to resign. Syria has no choice but to respect the will of its own people. It is of no use to the Arabs to gain the support of 52% of the American people if in the process they lose 100% of their own people. Even in the United States, if President Carter were to take a decision which gained him the support of the entire world, but which lost him the support of the American people, he would not take such a decision. We in Syria feel a great bitterness toward Sadat.

Secretary Vance noted the Foreign Minister had said that Geneva would not be valid because it would be seen in the framework of recent events. But the Minister had also stated that he was still interested in peace. The question then is how to achieve peace. Khaddam said that his attitude toward Geneva was caused by the view that it would be held in the shadow of Sadat’s visit and would be based on those results. There is an imbalance in the situation. When the balance goes back, this will be a different story. The balance will go back by cancelling the visit of Sadat and its results. It is not possible now to deal with Sadat. This is the 20th time that he has told lies to the Syrians and has stabbed them in the back.

The Secretary asked about the notion of imbalance. Khaddam said that in the past there had been two parties—the Arabs against the Israelis. All of the Arabs, from Mauritania to the Yemen, but especially Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Palestinians, and Lebanon. Now what has happened has taken Egypt out of that fold. The situation has become imbalanced. Among the Arabs, there is one who has moved ahead of the others and has started from the end. Now there is one head of state who sees Israel as being closer to him than his own Arab brothers. We are consistent in our attachment to the goal of peace, but we need patience. We will be patient until the balance is restored. We are not in a hurry. The sun always rises in the East and sets in the West, and we will watch patiently, but the balance will come back.

The Secretary asked if Syria’s objectives had changed. Khaddam said no. Syria’s goal is peace, and will remain peace. The disagreement with Egypt is over the path of submission that Egypt has chosen, not over the goal of peace. New developments may require recalculations, but goals do not change. Mr. Habib said that this came as a cold shower. If Syria remains committed to the goal of peace, Syria should wait to see if the results will move in the direction of peace or not. There is a process underway that cannot be evaluated on the basis of one visit. It did not begin with the Sadat visit nor with one man. We believe that Syria wants peace, otherwise the Secretary would not have come. Our purpose is to try to sustain the process. Syria should wait and see. They should not reject the process until they see where it is going. The Secretary did not come to ask the Syrians to go to Cairo or to love Sadat. He came for the same reasons as always—to help the process of peace. Peace in our interests and in Syria’s. If Syria is prepared to be patient, it can wait and watch the results. Khaddam replied cryptically by referring to an Arab proverb about knowing a letter’s content by reading the address. Mr. Habib jokingly responded with a proverb that one should follow the thief to the door. Khaddam said that they had followed this particular thief 20 times, but Syria is no longer prepared to allow Sadat to rob them blind. Mr. Habib repeated again that peace is what we are all working for. The Secretary is talking about peace, and Syria should remain patient. Khaddam responded that no one could expect Syria to accept Sadat’s initiatives. He said that the reactions to Sadat had not even begun in the area. The results will be worse than the establishment of Israel itself. The Arab world will go through many changes, and the world will be surprised by the depth of developments.

Mr. Habib asked if Syria would be joining those well known proponents of peace, Iraq and Libya. Khaddam said that one should not look at the situation from the point of view of today’s political map. The situation should be analyzed at a deeper level. Syria’s concern and apprehension have caused them to look at the situation with great seriousness. Khaddam said that he believed that Egypt was going for a bilateral peace with Israel. This is the prevailing view in the Arab world, not just among the rulers, but also among the people. This feeling will cause deep reactions. Many may not be able to withstand the consequences. Secretary Vance and Mr. Habib will recall that Syria has said previously that one should not push the Arabs beyond certain limits of reasonableness. The Arabs have their own political situation. For outsiders to look at the area in their own terms is incorrect. Some countries wanted to support Sadat, but they did not dare do so because of their peoples’ views. This does not mean that they are against peace, but they believe this is the wrong way to peace. It makes no sense to jump into the unknown and to give up rights.

The Secretary said that he did not follow this logic. If Sadat is calling for the return of the occupied territories and a solution to the Palestinian question, why is that not consistent with Syria’s objectives? Khaddam said Egypt had moved too far from reality. When the head of the Knesset received Sadat, he quoted from Isaiah to the effect that the people of the world will come to the mountain of God and take their instructions from Jerusalem. Israel is not prepared to give up anything. Sadat had already met Dayan in Morocco before this.¹² Sadat was also shown a map of what the Israelis were prepared to concede. The map says nothing about Palestinian rights or the West Bank and Gaza. The map gives Egypt most of Sinai. Syria sees the visit by itself as the culprit. Why did Sadat go to Israel at this time when a serious attempt was being made to reconvene Geneva? He knew Arab reactions and he knew that this would cause cleavages in the Arab world. Why then did he visit Israel? There were other considerations in his mind that had no bearing on peace or withdrawal or the Palestinians. If Sadat thinks he can get peace alone, he is imagining things. Sadat believes that if he brings about a resolution of the conflict with Israel, he will be able to count on American pressure on the oil countries for more money. These were the considerations in his mind apart from the achievement of peace. He knew that Syria could not accept and would disagree. But we were his partners, so why did he do this? It is not up to Sadat to make the judgments on whether Syria or the Palestinians should be part of this. That decision was not his to make. There was no consultation. He has taken decisions long ago, well before the US working paper. All of this was decided before September and October. Sadat has said that he made up his mind five months ago. So in effect, he reached this conclusion without any consideration for the other Arabs. It is critical to answer the question of why he went. President Assad discussed this with him for seven hours. Sadat had no justification. Assad said that he should not hurry. He urged that the parties go to Geneva first, and then discuss all issues. Sadat said that no, he had made up his mind and would go to Jerusalem despite Arab criticism.

Khaddam said that he assumed that the Americans through their contacts would have known about the results of such a visit. When the Syrians first heard about this they all thought that Sadat was simply proposing to go to the Knesset in order to embarrass the Israelis. Khaddam had asked Ismail Fahmi in Tunis about this, and Fahmi said that Sadat would not really go. King Hussein was also in Cairo before the visit, and he could not tell if Sadat was serious or not. If Syria, Jordan, and the PLO had no bearing on his decision, then who did? These are the parties that can make peace or war. Is it reasonable to believe that Sadat will drag us to a conference to give up our rights, and that we would thank him for this? We should wait to see the results in Egypt.

The Secretary said that he knew nothing of the map that Khaddam spoke of. Khaddam said this happened in Romania. Ceausescu is seeking a role for himself. The Secretary said that he could not read Sadat’s motives. But he thought that all those who wanted peace should wait to see the results and should keep their options open. Khaddam said that the visit had caused a sharp turn of events in the area. It leaves no choice but to wait and see. The visit had derailed the talks that were underway previously. Khaddam then asked about the Egyptian-Israeli plans at the Cairo meetings. The Secretary said that they will probably discuss several things, such as the return of occupied territories, the Palestinian question, the nature of peace, and the remaining procedural issues on the way to Geneva. Khaddam asked if the Israeli delegation would be authorized to discuss these issues. The Secretary said that he thought they eventually would discuss them, although this may come later. Khaddam asked if it was possible that the level of representation would be raised, and the Secretary replied that he thought it might be. The Secretary offered to keep the Syrians informed of the Cairo meetings if they were interested.

Khaddam asked if the purpose of the Cairo meetings was to discuss all of the substantive issues, what would the role of Geneva be? This tended to substantiate Syrian idea that everything was already cooked up in advance. The Secretary said that he thought they would try to get agreement on general principles. That will be difficult. In response to Khaddam’s question about how long the Cairo meetings would last, the Secretary said that he had no idea. He hoped that soon it would be possible to move to Geneva, but that the Syrian view of Geneva fills him with great sadness. Khaddam said that the Syrians were saddened because they had hoped for different developments. But he said that the Secretary should not be too sad because things were already beginning to move toward their natural course. If the press continues to chase Sadat, it will turn him into another Bokassa or an Idi Amin.¹³ He is making a big mistake. The Foreign Minister then told a story about the period of the Egyptian-Syrian union. The parties in Syria were dissolved and it was decided to form a single political establishment called the National Union. Nasser issued a decree naming Sadat the president of that union. This caused commotion in Syria, because it was known that Sadat was close to the Muslim brethren.¹⁴ He was not particularly religious, but he was close to the Muslim brethren. Syria sent Bitar to see Nasser and to object to Sadat’s appointment. Nasser said to Bitar that Sadat could not be placed in any executive job. He could only be asked to head the party, or the National Assembly, or the National Union. Nasser said that the problem with Sadat is that he makes mistakes and is not subject to corrections. This was in 1958. Sadat is clearly incorrigible. The situation is unfortunate. The movement toward peace involves serious efforts. In any case, Khaddam said that he was not pessimistic. Peace will one day be achieved. He then asked if the Secretary had any information on when Dayan might visit Cairo, or maybe Begin might go. The Secretary said he knew nothing about this.

Khaddam said that the Syrian people had seen the Sadat visit on television. It had been very painful to watch. Americans cannot understand the feelings in the area. Americans have not gone through the same experiences as the Arabs. Khaddam said that Kissinger must now be pleased. He is leading a campaign to get the Americans out of the negotiations and to leave the parties face-to-face. The Secretary said the United States would continue to play its part. The parties should talk to one another, and the United States will do what it can to facilitate that process. Once they are talking, the United States will help to bridge differences. This has always been our role. Khaddam said that he was not doubting the present American position, but he was commenting on what Henry Kissinger was advocating. The Secretary said that Kissinger had never said this to him. Khaddam said that Kissinger had spoiled Sadat. When Kissinger came to the area, Sadat spoke of him as “my dear Henry.” Now his tongue has gotten used to this and he speaks of “my friend Begin,” “my friend Dayan.”

At 6:00 p.m. the meeting ended and the group went to meet with President Assad.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 108, 12/7–17/77 Vance Trip to the Middle East: Meeting Minutes, 12/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Vance visited Damascus from December 13 to December 14.
2. On December 8, Vance met with NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels.
3. A reference to Louis Harris, whose company Louis Harris & Associates developed the Harris Poll in 1963 to poll Americans on various issues.
4. See Documents 167, 170, and 171.
5. See Documents 168 and 169.
6. See Document 172.
7. See Document 173.
8. A reference to the Watergate scandal of 1972.
9. In May 1941, Rudolf Hess flew to England, with no permission from the German Government, in an attempt to convince the English to sign a peace treaty with Germany. He was captured by British forces after parachuting out of his plane and detained for the rest of the war.
10. Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu served as an intermediary for the Israelis and Egyptians as Romania was the only Eastern bloc country to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel. On November 23, Carter met with Romanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu at the White House to discuss the Egyptian-Israeli situation. See Document 154.
11. See footnote 5, Document 147.
12. Presumably a reference to the Dayan-Tuhamy meeting in Morocco.
13. Jean Bedel Bokassa ruled the Central African Empire. Idi Amin was President of Uganda from 1971 to 1979. Both had reputations of brutality and oppression.
14. Muslim brethren is another name for the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 as an Islamic political group.