Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

172. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Amman, December 12, 1977, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with King Hussein

PARTICIPANTS

• King Hussein
• Crown Prince Hassan
• Prime Minister Munir Badran
• Royal Court Minister Abdel Hamid Sharaf
• General Zayd Bin Shakir
• Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Hassan Ibrahim
• Ambassador Abdallah Salah
• Secretary Vance
• Under Secretary Philip Habib
• Ambassador Thomas Pickering
• Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
• William B. Quandt, NSC Staff

The King welcomed the Secretary of State and expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to hear the Secretary’s views. The King offered to be as helpful as possible. Secretary Vance replied that he was pleased to be in Jordan and hoped to get the King’s advice on how the United States could be helpful. He extended the best wishes of President Carter.

The Secretary began with his report of talks in recent days. In Cairo, he had been impressed by the fact that President Sadat seemed to be relaxed, confident, and sure of his support for his position in Egypt. Sadat had been pleased with his meeting with King Hussein. At the outset, he reaffirmed his commitment to a comprehensive peace settlement. He said that he was not seeking a separate settlement and would not do so. His strategy in the Cairo meetings would be to develop basic principles for an overall settlement. He would be forthcoming on the questions of peace and security, and he looks to Begin to be forthcoming on the questions of territory and the Palestinians. The Secretary had conveyed his request to Prime Minister Begin that Israel take actions leading to a settlement. Sadat wants an Israeli statement on withdrawal and on the Palestinian question. The Secretary had transmitted to Begin the precise nature of a statement on withdrawal and on the Palestinians. In effect, Sadat wants withdrawal from all of the occupied territories, with only minor modifications, and a resolution of the Palestinian question in all of its aspects. Begin seemed to understand the need to respond. The atmosphere in Jerusalem has changed. Before, it was hard to get the Israelis to discuss substance. This was not the case this time. From the beginning, the Secretary told them about President Sadat’s request. They took this seriously and seemed to understand its importance. The general impression in Israel is that Sadat’s visit has caused a profound change. Israelis can no longer say that the Arabs are not serious about peace.

The Secretary went on to say that Prime Minister Begin appears to realize that Israel faces a historic opportunity. Those close to Begin agree. He is struggling to come up with a response. One cannot predict the outcome, but the Israelis are seriously wrestling with the problem at this time. The Secretary promised to keep King Hussein closely informed.

Turning to the American views, the Secretary pledged our full support for the peace process. The United States will attend the Cairo meeting. We have made clear that our goal remains an overall, comprehensive settlement, in which all of the issues would be resolved and all of the parties would participate. We have received assurances from Sadat and Begin that they also share that view. They do not just want a bilateral agreement. The Cairo Conference was discussed with both the Israelis and the Egyptians. They are making progress on thinking about agendas and procedures. At the outset, there will be discussion of three topics: the substantive principles of a settlement; the discussion of main elements of a peace treaty; and a discussion of how one might resolve procedures for Geneva. It is the belief of both Sadat and Begin that there will be a Geneva Conference and that the work of the Cairo meetings is to prepare the way for Geneva.

The Secretary noted that President Sadat had probably said to King Hussein that he believed there should be some type of working group before Geneva. He does not want Geneva just for ratifying agreements, but he does feel the need for preliminary spade work. This will be the role of the Cairo meeting. His previous suggestion had been turned down, but the Cairo meeting is the same idea of a working group in a different form. The Secretary then said that he would be going to Beirut and Damascus tomorrow. He would appreciate the King’s thoughts on how to deal with the Syrians. If possible, President Assad should be included at Geneva. We hope to encourage him to keep the door open and not to close the road to peace.

The Secretary said that he fully understood the special position of Jordan at this time. The President appreciates King Hussein’s response to him and the recent letter.² With respect to the Palestinian question, this was discussed with President Sadat. He indicated that he envisaged the West Bank being linked to Jordan, after some transitional arrangements over a period of time, which would help to establish the basis for such links. In the end, there should be self-determination on the ultimate form of the link to Jordan. He has no further details, but he seems to envisage some UN role during the transition. The Secretary said he would like to know King Hussein’s own thinking on how the United States can be helpful on this issue.

The Secretary then described President Sadat’s thinking on the PLO. Sadat believes that the PLO has damaged its position by its recent actions. The power of the PLO is weakening and this process may well continue. It will be less of a political force in the future than it is now. Sadat expects the Palestinians to be represented at Geneva, but he does not expect them to be at Cairo. He believes that they should be represented by Palestinians who could be acceptable to the Israelis. This would finesse the question of the PLO.

The Secretary said that Sadat had also discussed the question of upgrading the level of representation at Cairo if progress is being made in the talks. This would particularly be done if the Israelis were forthcoming in making a declaration. If that were done, he would raise the level of talks to the Foreign Ministers and would accelerate the process of negotiations. Both Sadat and Begin believe that Geneva is possible within the next two months or so. They will be bending their efforts to that end.

Turning to the role of the Soviet Union, the Secretary asked Mr. Habib to review his talks there.³ The Secretary noted that we have told the Soviets that we were unhappy with their recent conduct. We believed that they were not using their influence constructively. Mr. Habib went to have a frank discussion with them and his talks lasted for eight hours with the experts on the Middle East and then for one and a half to two hours with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Mr. Habib said that he had wanted to leave certain impressions with the Soviets. First, we did not appreciate their negativism, and their attacks on President Sadat and the Cairo meetings. They made clear that they thought the United States had worked with Egypt and Israel to bring about Sadat’s visit. This suits their purpose. They see this as an effort to blow up Geneva, and to move them out of the scene. They feel that they are being ignored and left out. They made it clear that they still want Geneva. This is a means for them to restore their role. They want to be taken seriously as a world power. They claim that they are holding a brief for the Syrians and the PLO. They accuse us of reneging on the joint statement of October 1. Mr. Habib said that he had placed before them the facts. There was no validity in the charges. There is no inconsistency between the current process and the search for a comprehensive agreement. We had an argument over the way in which the Soviets could play a constructive role. Gromyko agreed that the process had been slow, but that progress was being made. We pointed out that the United States had brought about a number of changes, while the Soviets had done little to move the more radical elements towards Geneva. In the end, we left them with the idea that a process is underway with the Cairo meetings, with Secretary Vance’s trip. We will be supporting that process. When this stage is completed, the United States would again talk to the Soviets. There is a contradiction in the Soviet support of the rejectionists and their acceptance of Geneva and of Israel’s existence. The United States is not trying to exclude the Soviets. Secretary Vance added that the United States will not go out of its way to draw the Soviets in, but if there is a Geneva Conference, they should participate. We would expect them to play a responsible role. They understand our position.

The King then described some of his recent talks. He first asked the Secretary to convey to the President his feelings that the President had made a personal contribution to the development of peace in the area. The process had begun in 1973, but the personal impact made by the President was very important. The President’s sincerity and his commitment to a just and durable peace have been major factors in the recent developments. They had made an impact. It was felt that a chance for peace might not come again, and this encouraged action. King Hussein expressed his thanks for that.

The King then said that he had been caught by surprise by Sadat’s actions. First he had received a letter from President Carter concerning Geneva.⁴ The King then waited for some Arab reaction. He expected some coordination of positions. Then he received a second letter,⁵ and this led him to get in touch with the Syrians. He found them talking of an American-Israeli paper, and they compared it unfavorably to the US-Soviet joint statement. They were beginning to ask questions about why they should go to Geneva. They thought that Israel was in a strong position. A conference would bring the possibility of compromises at the expense of Arab rights. Why should they go? Why should they assume the historical responsibility of making concessions? The King had taken time to tell the Syrians that Jordan was not much involved in the process because of the Rabat decisions. But Geneva had begun in 1973, and therefore Geneva remained an important part of the search for peace. The King had said that it would be irresponsible if the Arabs did nothing. The world would not take the Arabs seriously. The situation on the ground would freeze. People have already been under occupation for ten years. If the Syrians were worried about the fragmentation of the Arab world, the King felt that it would be best to call a meeting and to develop a common position. The King was willing to sit down with all of the parties, including the PLO. They could then agree on the action that was necessary to recover the occupied territories, to regain Jerusalem, and to bring about Palestinian self-determination and a comprehensive settlement. They could agree that there would be no implementation of an agreement until there was full agreement among the parties. The King argued that a line of this sort should be developed and then defended. He argued that the Arabs drop their concern for form, and begin to deal with substance. After long discussions, he thought that the Syrians had accepted this point of view.

The King then went on to Saudi Arabia and explained the situation there. He suggested that they join him in the discussions. He then went to Egypt and there he found strong hostility to Syria, just as strong as he had felt in Syria toward Egypt. Sadat did speak of a comprehensive settlement based on withdrawal and Palestinian rights. He was concerned about the possibility of negative attitudes being expressed in Tunis.⁶ He did not favor the calling of a summit meeting. Perhaps the Foreign Ministers could prepare for Geneva. The King left Cairo with a feeling of progress. Some of Sadat’s advisers asked the King to go back to Syria in order to establish direct contact between Assad and Sadat. He had heard in Egypt much anger at Syria, but he thought that there was some possibility of progress. The Saudi Foreign Minister agreed that it was worth trying.

The King said that he had been in the process of preparing a message to President Carter when President Sadat announced his trip to Jerusalem. The King described the feelings he had during Sadat’s visit. He said that they had made quite an impression. His own feelings had gone from admiration to anger, to puzzlement. He had just been in Cairo and Sadat had said nothing. The King had felt that Sadat had something up his sleeve, however. The visit then took place, and Jordan made no statement. It was a very brave move, and hopefully, it will be constructive. The King had sent his Prime Minister to Damascus to urge the Syrians to temper their reaction. He spent many hours with them, but came back saying that the best they could hope for was an avoidance of personal attacks on Sadat, that the Syrians were very upset. Assad’s comments included many veiled threats. He saw a plot being hatched in Washington and in Cairo. He spoke of an American-Israeli-Egyptian axis. He was ready to counter this by opening his country to the Soviets. If the road between Jerusalem and Cairo could be opened, so could the road between Damascus and Baghdad. Assad expressed his belief that the Palestinians would now unify. He expected more terrorist activities.

The King said that he had been on the verge of getting in touch with Sadat when the Cairo meetings were called. This again had surprised him, to say the least. He waited, and then decided to speak out. He took a balanced position. He recognized Sadat’s courage and the fact that Egypt had given much to the Palestinian cause. He referred to the leadership of Egypt and the role that Egypt had played in the October 1973 war. He could not agree that Sadat could be accused of being a traitor. He then went to see Assad again and was in touch with the Saudi leaders and those in the Gulf. He told Sadat that he would like to stay in touch. It would be “the biggest disaster” if Sadat were pushed into a separate settlement. There is a risk that Assad’s stance would force Sadat to do what Assad most fears. Then there could be no solution. When the King saw Assad in Damascus, Assad had just returned from Tripoli. He took the same line as he had with the Prime Minister. He was feeling that he might get help from the Libyans. He spoke of two or three thousand Libyan tanks being sent to Syria if Syria wanted them. He also thought he might get other modern equipment. Algeria had expressed the same attitude. Iraq offered twelve divisions and money. The Palestinians were pulling themselves together. The King had long discussions with Assad. They agreed that Libya, Algeria, and Iraq could play no role in solving the Palestinian problem. Assad did say that he had stood firmly against a total rejectionist attitude. The Iraqis have been against peace and against Resolutions 242 and 338. Assad had opposed the rejection of those resolutions. He thought that he had played a constructive role in Tripoli.⁷ Nevertheless, he felt a bit trapped. The King said that he still believed that Assad was the most courageous and the wisest man in Syria among the present leadership. He seemed more in control of himself. He has not said much himself. His attitude is very reminiscent of the position taken after Sinai II. It is still marked with cliches. He says that he will never meet with Sadat again. He is against mediation. He was not happy about the King’s going to Cairo. He said that he would not have anything to do with Sadat’s initiative, but he does still accept Resolution 338. There is no contradiction in his attitude. The King said that he had heard this before, and that the Syrians should control their emotions and should study their actions.

The King had then gone to Cairo and had sent messages to the Saudis and the Gulf leaders on the results of his talks. He warned them of a possible attitude that would drive Egypt to feel alone and would cause Egypt to make a separate agreement. The King then described his visit to Cairo. Sadat had been touched by the visit and thought that he had broken down psychological barriers. He seemed to have support among the Egyptian people. He was wondering about what the results of the trip would be. The King had a long talk with Sadat. It was frank and open. The King described it as the best talk he had since 1970. Sadat, after 1970, had been pro-PLO. This time he was more relaxed and confident than when the King had seen him before. The King had asked him about what guarantees he had of an Israeli response. He asked what had justified the President’s optimism, apart from the impact of the visit. Sadat was frank in saying that he had no guarantees except understanding of the terms for peace, the need for a comprehensive settlement, and the return of territory. He also stressed the need for Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem. This is important to all Muslims. The King said that Sadat had never pressed him to attend the Cairo meetings. He realized it was more important for Jordan to play a role in trying to restore cohesion to the Arab world. He issued the invitations to the Cairo meeting to keep the momentum going. He was convinced that this was the only way.

The King said it is not realistic for the Arabs to think in terms of destroying Israel. They need to face up to the need for a political settlement. Sadat understood the barrier in Israeli thinking. They feel isolated. No one will talk to them. He decided on his own and he did not want to put other Arab leaders on the spot. King Hussein told Sadat that it would have been better if he had informed the others in advance. As to the future, Sadat had told the King that he is waiting for Begin’s response along the lines of a statement of willingness to exchange territory for peace, and to respect the rights of the Palestinians. Then there would be an Arab Summit, and Sadat would tell the other Arabs what is possible. They can then make their own decisions and work out the details of agreements. If this does not happen, Sadat will tell people that he has failed and he will turn over leadership to others. The King said that he believed that Sadat was sincere in saying this. Sadat is extremely serious.

In speaking of details, Sadat had wanted to discuss the West Bank and Gaza. The King had wanted to remove obstacles to Palestinian representation, but not by means of an agreement with the PLO or an agreement in advance on a link between Jordan and the Palestinian entity. The King felt that the Palestinians should decide on their own leadership and on whether they wanted links. This is why he stressed the need for self-determination. The West Bank and Gaza should be under international auspices for some time and then should be given a chance for self-determination. The King noted that Sadat is now using these same words. Sadat said that he had arrived at these conclusions after the King’s visit and after his own visit to Jerusalem. He believes now that the peoples in the occupied areas should decide for themselves. Sadat spoke of the need for Jordanian involvement, and of some international supervision for a period of five years. The King said that his own view was that three years would be more realistic, but that the people should decide in any case. After going to a summit, Sadat said that if Assad does not want to negotiate for the return of the Golan Heights, this is his privilege. That Egypt is not looking for a separate deal.

The King said that the Secretary General of the Arab League was worried about Egyptian public reaction. The public is in favor of a separate deal. This has been fueled by the attacks from other Arab states. A separate deal, according to King Hussein, could cause serious problems. There will be no peace, if it is not a total and comprehensive peace, according to the Secretary General, and the King said that he agreed with that assessment. When the King left Cairo, he felt a great challenge to do all that was possible to help. He felt that it was his sacred duty to do the impossible to get some cohesion in the area. He does not know if he can succeed.

The King said that he had been in touch with the Saudis and others, including the Moroccans, to explain his position. He had received messages from all of them, and they agree with him. He expressed his belief that the Secretary would hear from Assad the same views that the King himself had heard, but the King believed that it was possible to overcome the Syrians’ negative views. The King bases his belief on the assumption that Sadat can deliver. If he does, everything will change. Every effort should now be bent to assure success. There must be a positive response. Otherwise, Sadat will have played his last card. This will have been his greatest gamble. Sadat is sincere, but if there is no reply, he will be in deep trouble.

Secretary Vance said that he shared this view. The United States will do all that he can to bring about this response. The King then referred to the Palestinians and their future. The PLO has been weakened. Whether this continues will depend on results. The King has the impression that the Soviets have stirred things up. Jordan will be more exposed to dangers than Egypt. The King said that it was important to look at the overall picture. For example, there were continual attacks from the Soviets on Iran. The Soviets must see Iran as a stumbling block in the way of their overall designs. They want to march into this area. They have good relations with Iraq. The Iraqis now have nine divisions, are forming another, and have plans for two more. These twelve divisions will not be needed in Palestine. They are not intended for that. There are between two and three thousand Soviet tanks in Libya. One can also note the Algerian attitudes. A delegation from Mauritania has recently come to Jordan asking for support. If things break out in the Middle East, the important targets would be Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The Soviets would have lots of power then, and they already have conventional superiority in Europe. The stakes go well beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviets definitely have a plan for the Middle East. They are trying to move into the Middle East and Africa. Jordan is trying to convince its friends that they need to be strong enough to face threats and Jordan knows that the United States appreciates this position. Jordan is a shield for Saudi Arabia. The King fears that there will be an increase in terrorism, there will be attempts to undermine those who stand for reasonableness and logic and for a just peace. There may be many difficult moments. Jordan will need help, especially in the military fields. Some gaps must be filled. Jordan will do all that it can. Jordan wants assurance that it will not be easily pushed around.

The King said that Sadat had indicated that his views on the PLO had changed. He also hoped that the Lebanese would come to the Geneva Conference. It is important for Lebanon to be able to get the Syrians out of their country. There is also the need to solve the Palestinian problem there.

Secretary Vance thanked the King for his very thoughtful remarks. The King has explained why the Syrians equivocated. Concerning the overall Soviet threat to the area, the Secretary said that he shared much of the King’s perceptions. He had talked to the Shah and knew his concerns. He understands the Shah’s needs to keep a strong defense.

The Secretary said that he would be happy to take another look at Jordan’s needs and see what could be done. Ambassador Pickering can follow up on this and the Secretary will talk to the President. Mr. Habib asked if there were any changes in what Jordan needed militarily in light of the changed threat. The King said there was a need for adjusting delivery schedules. Jordan cannot meet its budgetary obligations even this year. Jordan will try to raise money from Saudi Arabia and hopes that the United States can help. Jordan does not yet have FMS guarantees for credits. Jordan is operating from Yemen, to Oman, to Mauritania, and needs help. General Bin Shakir said that Jordan had only been able to acquire an additional C–130–H after selling two C–130–As. Jordan has signed up for a lot of equipment, but deliveries for artillery will not be filled until early 1979 or early 1980. This will be too late. The Secretary said that he would try to speed things up.

The King said that Jordan was doing all that it could on economic development. The Secretary noted that we were increasing our security supporting assistance in the coming fiscal year. No final figures have been reached, but the Secretary will be discussing the Maqarin Dam situation⁸ with the President in the future. He knows of its importance to Jordan.

The Secretary returned to the question of our advanced knowledge about the trip to Jerusalem and noted that we had been surprised. Sadat had spoken of a letter from the President,⁹ but that letter merely said that the situation was getting tangled up in the debates over procedure and we should all try to break through to Geneva. Concerning the Cairo meetings, the United States knew about them the day before Sadat’s speech.¹⁰ We asked for a delay saying that consultations could take place. We think the meetings are a good idea but we would have preferred consultations first. Sadat felt the need for momentum. We will support their meetings and we will participate.

The Secretary said that we had the impression that Sadat had made an impact in his talks with the Saudi leadership, especially with King Khalid. King Hussein said that they had no information on this. They did know that King Khalid had been very upset by Sadat’s decision to go to Jerusalem. Others in the leadership were more understanding. The King had done all that he could to put this in perspective.

The Secretary then asked what the United States could do to help the situation in Lebanon. He feared that South Lebanon might flare up again soon. He noted that the Lebanese were equipping three brigades to send to the South. The King replied that the Lebanese cannot send any troops to the South until the PLO is withdrawn. The Secretary agreed and wondered what any of us could do. He noted that Sarkis cannot do anything if the Syrians disagree. The King concurred that Syria is the key. He thought that the Secretary’s visit would help and hoped that we would keep him informed after his trip there. The King said that after visiting Saudi Arabia later in the week, he would be going back to Syria. Mr. Habib noted that Israel would have little patience if the PLO carried out attacks from the South.

Mr. Atherton commented on the organizational plans for the Cairo meetings. Egypt and Israel have different views. They have argued over chairmanship, the possibility of empty places at the table, and other issues. Both parties do want it to work and they have a seriousness of purpose.

The Secretary asked the King’s view of the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement. The King thought that this was remote because of their differences, and because Assad is overstretched in Lebanon. Assad is not strong now in Syria, but if there were a change in leadership in Syria, there might be a possibility of rapprochement with Iraq, and that would be very serious. Any change in leadership in Syria would be bad. The King was not sure whether Assad was still committed to Geneva or not. The Secretary said that in Damascus we would emphasize our desire to continue our bilateral contacts and then we were prepared to continue working for a just peace, a comprehensive peace, and that we were against bilateral arrangements. We hope that when Geneva convenes, Syria will be there. It is still our belief that Geneva is possible. It could occur in the next month or two.

The Secretary then turned to the question of the Horn of Africa. We have been in close touch with the Saudis about this. The Secretary mentioned that he had recently had meetings with two special envoys from Somalia in the last month and a half. They were urging the United States to deliver arms. Up until now, no arms from the United States were being sent to either side. We are urging negotiations. The Soviets are increasing amounts of arms to Ethiopia, along with advisers. Our figure is 700 million dollars in equipment. For the moment, recent Ethiopian operations have failed, but down the road a different picture might be seen. There are problems within the Ethiopian military. There is also the problem of Eritrea. It is hard to evaluate the future. The prospect of large amounts of Soviet equipment going to Ethiopia is frightening. The OAU seems incapable of acting. We remain close to Nigeria on this problem. The Nigerian Foreign Minister has gone to Moscow where he got a very frosty reception. The Soviets said that they would continue to help Ethiopia and would not change their policies. The Secretary said that he had also discussed this with his NATO colleagues, the French, the British, and the Germans, and none is supplying major arms to Somalia. The Somalis are getting some arms from Italy which are being paid for by Saudi Arabia. We are asking ourselves what we can do. We have not reached any final conclusions. We are carefully watching the situation in South Yemen, and the possibility of a major Ethiopian drive against Somalia. This would create a new situation. The Secretary noted that Sadat is worried about these developments and he has talked to Numeri.

Mr. Sharaf returned to the questions of changes in Israeli psychology. He asked if there was any indication that Begin was considering withdrawal as part of the solution of the Palestinian problem. Or is he mainly talking about rights for Palestinians within Israel? The Secretary said there are different views on this in the Israeli government. He expects an early decision. The Likud differs from Labor on this. There are elements in the Cabinet who feel that there must be a fresh look at the question. They are in the process of debating this. The Secretary could not predict how it would come out. Begin does realize that he must come to grips with the Palestinian question. Mr. Habib said that they will not simply stick with their own position. The Secretary said that we were not sure what position they would take. Crown Prince Hassan stated that Israel’s security is ultimately linked to demographic changes. Israel cannot absorb all of the Arabs under its control into its own society. Therefore, they may be planning for an exodus of Arabs from the occupied territories. The alternative to a Palestinian state may be Palestinians migrating to the oil-rich countries. In some ways it may be easier to find a solution if this does happen. The Israelis will be less worried. If the demographic situation does not change adversely from their point of view, they may be more relaxed.

Secretary Vance said that there were two currents in Israeli thinking. Some think of a functional solution for the West Bank. Others talk about withdrawal after a transitional period. They have not reached any conclusions yet. They might turn over the administration of the West Bank to the local population and keep a few troops at selected points. Otherwise, the population would be enjoying a semi-autonomous existence, and would be governed either by the West Bankers themselves or by Jordan. The alternative would be to look to some kind of transition, ending with total withdrawal. It is not clear from what areas Israel might withdraw. They are talking about a partial withdrawal. Minister Sharaf noted these two approaches were not irreconcilable. If one can first build institutions for self-government, then there might be a transitional period, ending with self-determination. But without a Palestinian solution, Sadat and others cannot move.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 3, Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement 1977: Volume II [III]. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Hashemmiyah Palace. Vance visited Amman from December 12 to December 13.
2. Telegram 9018 from Amman, December 5, transmitted a letter from King Hussein to Carter in which King Hussein expressed his surprise at the “startling chain of actions and reactions [which] engulfed our area, starting with President Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem and Israel.” He urged Carter to “spare yourself the effects of excessive overwork” due to remarkable events of the previous month. He concluded, “The road ahead for the achievement of peace in our area and in the world is long, and we all need your good health, energies, and wisdom.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850002–2128)
3. See footnote 3, Document 167.
4. A reference to the letter transmitted in telegram 246493 to Amman, October 14. See Document 131.
5. A reference to the letter transmitted in telegram 259811 to Amman, October 30. See Document 140.
6. A reference to the Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting in November.
7. See footnote 3, Document 163.
8. The Carter administration attempted to use water development as a building block for peaceful relations among Jordan, Syria, and Israel. The Yarmouk River, which runs between Jordan and Syria, offered Jordan a chance at considerable water flow if a dam could be built at Maqarin. The project failed to materialize during the Carter administration.
9. Apparently a reference to the letter quoted in Document 134.
10. See footnote 2, Document 161.