Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

170. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House and the Department of State¹

Jerusalem, December 11, 1977, 0101Z

Secto 12059. White House for President and Dr. Brzezinski Only. Department for the Acting Secretary Only. Subject: Message to the President—Meeting With Sadat.

1. We met this morning for about 3 hours with President Sadat and other senior advisors, including Vice President Mubarak, Prime Minister Salim, General Gamasy and others.² At the outset, President Sadat and I spent almost two hours in a private conversation. The reason for this is the fact that only Vice President Mubarak is privy to Sadat’s thinking, and Sadat does not want to inform the others at this time. During our tete-a-tete we covered the following matters.

2. I opened our meeting by delivering to him your letter³ and conveying your admiration and warmest best wishes. He was most appreciative and sent his highest regards to you. He repeated that the inspiration for his dramatic initiative had been his conversations with you and your request that bold action be taken to break through the procedural tangle which was delaying the convening of the Geneva Conference.

3. He then turned to substance, saying that he had made a fundamental and dramatic move when he went to Jerusalem and that there was now a crying need for an appropriate response. He said that response should take the form of a declaration by Begin: (1) That Israel is willing in principle to withdraw from the Arab lands occupied in 1967, with minor rectifications with respect to the West Bank; and (2) that Israel is ready in principle to resolve the Palestinian question in all of its aspects. He said that although it would not be necessary, he would like President Carter to join in the declaration, which could be made at a meeting in Cairo at which there would be present Prime Minister Begin, President Carter, President Sadat, Secretary General Waldheim and perhaps others.

4. He then added that you might wish to invite Brezhnev to Cairo. He said that he was sure that Brezhnev would not come, but that if you thought it would be a good idea, it would be fine with him. He said that he believed this would present the declaration in the most dramatic and effective context and would accomplish his purpose of demonstrating to the Arab world that he had achieved the goal which all of the Arab world sought. He added that he would hope that the declaration would make some reference to his initiative.

5. He stressed to me several times the importance to him that Begin make this declaration, and the need for the United States to put its weight behind persuading Begin to do so. He said that he hoped the declaration could be made promptly, i.e., within a week or two, as this would strengthen his position in the Arab world.

6. He then digressed to say that Assad had been touring various Arab capitals attacking Sadat and telling the various leaders with whom he was meeting that Assad was prepared to make available nuclear bases to the Soviets in the Middle East, and made other threatening statements. Sadat said that such statements had frightened one or two of the Mid-East leaders, particularly King Khalid. He said that Prince Fahd had sent a message to him yesterday urging me to put pressure on King Khalid when I came to Riyadh to support Sadat. He urged that we underscore our desire for reaching a peaceful, comprehensive solution and state that we intended to stay with the matter until that objective was achieved.

7. Sadat then digressed again to talk about his proposal for the West Bank. He said that he believed the West Bank should be put under UN oversight for a transition period of five years, at the end of which there would be self-determination. I asked him what he meant by self-determination in light of the fact that he had stated on several occasions that any Palestinian entity should be linked with Jordan. He responded initially that was still his position, and that self-determination merely meant a plebiscite on the question of federation or confederation with Jordan. After further reflection, he said that the West Bankers should also be given the option of independence. He said that this, however, was not a real option, as he believed that the PLO was losing ground and that within one year after the transition period started, the PLO would no longer be a factor to be feared. He said that the PLO had hurt its position by its recent actions, and that Sadat’s own actions had further weakened their influence.

8. In response to my question, he indicated, however, that the PLO would have to be dealt with in connection with the Cairo meetings, should they ultimately decide to participate, and certainly in any Geneva Conference. I asked him how this could best be done and whether or not the arrangements which we had talked to Fahmy about were still in the picture. He replied affirmatively, saying that he was still in touch with Arafat and that Arafat would be coming to Cairo within the next two days. He said that Palestinian representation would be taken care of by the designation of a few Palestinians who would be either non-PLO or non-well-known PLO, and who had been cleared in advance with the Israelis.

9. Returning to the subject of an Israeli declaration, he said that after such a declaration he would wish to raise participation in the Cairo meetings to the Foreign Minister level. He would then want to move away from secret meetings and have the Foreign Ministers working “in the daylight.” I told him that that coincided with our thinking.

10. Sadat went on to say that once the declaration is made he will call on all the other invitees to join the Cairo meeting. I asked him whether he would also call an Arab summit. He said he had not made up his mind on that point, but that he would send the declara-tion to heads of the other Arab nations through an Arab League representative.

11. I asked Sadat what he believed should be done if it was impossible to persuade the Israelis to make the declaration he had requested. He said that if the declaration cannot be made as requested, it is better that no declaration be made, he said that a weak declaration would hurt him, whereas he could live with no declaration, even though that would, in his judgment, set back severely the peace process.

12. I then asked him what he expected to come out of the initial Cairo meeting and how he proposed that we should deal with the public affairs aspects of the meetings. He replied that the meetings should open with the normal speeches about peace and the desire of all the parties for a comprehensive solution. He said that we should stress that 242 is the basis for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and therefore for this informal preparatory meeting. In terms of public statements, Sadat said we should emphasize the fact that Geneva cannot convene without further preparation. He said we should stress the necessity of resolving the remaining procedural questions and the other necessary preparatory steps in looking forward toward a comprehensive settlement in Geneva. He further stated that we should emphasize that the Cairo meeting is open and that there is no fixed time schedule for its completion. I said that although we would not be stressing it at the outset, I assumed we would be working on basic principles to convene a Geneva Conference and the preparation of an agenda and other guidelines.

13. I indicated to him that I thought that the Conference might ultimately produce: (A) a set of principles; (B) resolution of the remaining procedural problems; (C) a skeletal draft of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty; (D) perhaps a draft on arrangements for the Palestinian area, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza; and (E) a draft agenda.

14. With respect to Gaza, he said that he wanted you to know that he is in touch with the leading figures in Gaza who will be coming to see him soon, and that they are backing him wholeheartedly. He added that he was prepared to give additional land to Gaza in order to provide adequate port facilities and additional territory.

15. I then asked what message he would like us to convey to President Assad. He said that we should indicate to Assad that Sadat was not seeking a partial agreement and is committed to reaching a comprehensive settlement. Sadat said that I should also tell Assad that Sadat is prepared to go to Geneva, or any other place, to complete the peace process, and that Cairo is merely a method of clearing away the procedural problems which remain and taking other steps to pave the way for an ultimate Geneva Conference. In response to my question, he said that he wholeheartedly supported our urging Assad to return to the peace process.

16. With respect to Saudi Arabia, he repeated the suggestion that I press King Khalid hard to support Sadat and the peace process taking place in Cairo. He suggested further that I stress that Sadat was not seeking a bilateral settlement, and is committed to a comprehensive settlement.

17. With respect to King Hussein, Sadat reported on the latter’s visit to Cairo, which has just ended. He said that they had reached general agreement on all items and that Hussein was backing Sadat’s peace efforts. He said further that Hussein would join the Cairo meeting at the appropriate time—which Sadat said would be following the Israeli declaration. Sadat said they had also talked about the West Bank and that the two were in agreement that the West Bank must be linked to Jordan. He said that he was confident that during the transition period Hussein’s influence would increase steadily and there was no question but that the West Bank would eventually be linked to Jordan, rather than become an independent state.

18. Sadat then told me that he planned to continue secret meetings between Dayan and Touhami for the time being. He said that quite frankly he would prefer to deal with Weizman, whom he particularly liked, but that he realized that Dayan was important because of the unique position that he held in the Israeli picture. Sadat said that he believed that there would be no problem in reaching an agreement on Sinai, and this was merely a question of sitting down with Weizman and his experts to complete the necessary work on security measures. Sadat said he did not foresee any real problems in bringing this to fruition. He repeated again, however, his strong preference for a comprehensive settlement.

19. Sadat then expanded on what he had meant by saying that once the Israeli declaration was made and the Cairo meeting was held, all those who wanted Geneva should go to Geneva to complete their respective negotiations. He said that as far as he was concerned he didn’t need to go to Geneva because there was no problem in working out his bilateral agreement, but that he would do so because of the great importance which you attached to Geneva. He then repeated his great admiration for you and for the part that you had played in bringing this new momentum to the peace process. He also mentioned again that if you should come to Cairo at the time of the declaration, he would like to ask the United States to become a party to the 1888 Constantinople Convention which provides for freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal,⁴ as he had previously suggested at the time of my August meeting with him.

20. I also discussed the question of F–5’s. Sadat said he would prefer to deal with this in January by putting it in a package with F–16’s for Israel and perhaps F–15’s for Saudi Arabia.

21. In sum, we had a good talk. The most urgent thing that came out of the meeting was his proposal for a two-part declaration by Begin. I am passing this on to Begin as requested and will communicate the results later.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–1437. Secret; Flash; Exdis (Handle as Nodis); Cherokee.
2. A reference to the meeting on December 10; see Document 167.
3. The letter has not been found.
4. The United States was not an signatory of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which guaranteed the right of free passage for all ships through the Suez Canal in peace and war.