173. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Embassy in Syria1
6237. SecDel for Saunders. Subj: Secretary’s Discussions With Sarkis, Hoss and Boutros.
1. Following is uncleared report of Secretary’s conversations in Beirut with President Sarkis, Prime Minister Hoss and Foreign Minister Boutros Dec 13. Habib and Saunders also present.
2. Secretary said that he and President had been discussing his forthcoming visit to Syria and he had asked President his advice on what to say. President had just commented on how we should avoid trying to pressure Assad. He would like to ask now for President’s views regarding the south.
3. Sarkis said Syrians might have an interest in Palestinian withdrawal from the south but they did not have the means to enforce it. At same time he was convinced that Palestinians themselves did not want to withdraw. The situation in the area as a whole reflected on the south and made things even murkier. He did not expect any new elements in the near future. Secretary said perhaps it would be useful for him to comment on the situation as perceived by the Israelis. They were very concerned that the situation might heat up again. In particular, they believed this might occur because of increased activities by rejectionists leading to renewed fighting and firing of rockets into Israel. If that happened, the Israelis would react swiftly and very strongly. There should be no doubt about this and nothing would stop them.
4. Secretary said Israelis had told him they heard Palestinians in the south were being reinforced. Could the Lebanese confirm this? Boutros asked where reinforcements were supposed to have come from. Secretary said Israelis did not say. Boutros asked if they felt an at [Page 840] tack was likely. Secretary said they were concerned that fighting might occur. Boutros asked how the Israelis assessed the Syrian attitude and Secretary said they thought Syrians were unwilling to pressure the Palestinians.
5. Boutros said, for his own information, assuming Lebanese could resume discussions with Palestinians and could develop a new formula for withdrawal, was there any possibility that the Israelis would accept less than they had been offered before? Secretary said, no, they would want more. They had told him they wanted the Palestinians to withdraw 21 kilometers to take the entire border out of rocket range. Habib noted that they might still agree that this could be done in stages and not necessarily all at once.
6. Secretary asked President for his views on implementation of Shtaura III.2 Sarkis responded that as indicated earlier the Palestinians were not interested in implementing it and the Syrians for the time being were unable to force them to do so. With regard to Secretary’s question about reinforcements, if they came from abroad Israelis were in position to interdict them if they wished. Why didn’t they do so?
7. Parker interjected that what President was referring to were reports circulating for the last two weeks that elements of the Ayn Jalut Brigade3 had come from Egypt to Lebanon by sea.
8. Secretary said he did not see how the Israelis could prevent people infiltrating in small numbers by sea. Boutros said they could do so and Hoss noted that they had done so in the past.
9. Secretary asked if President excluded possibility of movement of Palestinians from north to south. President said that when Syrians entered Lebanon, Palestinian forces in the north had been small in number, and there was possibly more need for them in northern part of country than in the south. He did not exclude the possibility of movement from above the Litani to south, but he thought it likely to be small.
10. Secretary asked about progress being made in training of new battalions. President said three battalions were to go to the south in the context of the Shtaura Agreement. Their training had been completed but they were not in a position to go there for the time being. Lebanese possibilities were limited in the best of conditions and their forces were not now in a position to try to remove the Palestinians. General Khoury was trying to recruit from all sectors of the population, but the mixed units he was putting together were still in the minority because the na [Page 841] tional consensus had not moved forward. Movement on the consensus was blocked by the south, among other things, and formation of an army which would deal with the south was blocked by the lack of consensus. Lebanese were in a vicious circle.
11. Secretary asked if in event it proved possible to implement the third stage of Shtaura troops would be ready to move into the south. Boutros said unequivocally yes.
12. Secretary asked what was the state of rebuilding institutions in Lebanon. Were they making satisfactory progress?
13. President said the possibilities were limited as long as there was no progress on consensus. If there were consensus, progress would be much more rapid. In any event the Lebanese had moved with respect to the army and the security forces and with respect to other administrative agencies, such as electricity companies, water companies, etc. In the economy as a whole, some sectors were better off than before the war, while others were still lagging. If it had not been for the lack of consensus, the economy would have gone much further. Considering the circumstances, progress was satisfactory. (The word he used to express last thought, and which has been used with me several times in the past 24 hours by Boutros, is “irtiyah,” meaning satisfaction, gratification, pleasure, joy, delight.)
14. Secretary asked if it would be possible to make progress on national consensus before there was an overall Arab-Israeli settlement. President said it would be possible but difficult. Prime Minister Hoss said that if Lebanese could settle the problem of the south, they could detach themselves from the overall problem as far as forming Lebanese internal consensus was concerned. Habib noted that presence of Palestinians would remain problem. Boutros seconded him. Secretary said that if one could stabilize the south it would help nevertheless.
15. Sarkis said he wanted to distinguish between presence of Palestinians and presence of armed Palestinians. Armed presence now exists in the south and is an obstacle to consensus. The presence of Palestinians is a problem, but its elimination is not one of the conditions for consensus.
16. Secretary asked if it would not be advisable to stretch out our FMS military aid program over next year given the absorptive capabilities of the Lebanese army. President responded that he much preferred the present tempo. Military assistance was an important manifestation of American support which they very much needed. Hoss said a stretching out might be interpreted as a lack of support.
17. Sarkis said Lebanese needed support in all fields. He thanked Americans for their moral and political support to date, but hoped there would be more. In particular, there were a number of actions which had impact on local attitudes: return of Pan American, resump [Page 842] tion of construction of Embassy building and return of Embassy personnel, for example. Anything which reversed positive trend of American actions would have bad effect. Anything that could be done to build confidence in the Government of Lebanon would help in dealing with those who did not support the idea of a unified Lebanon.
18. Secretary asked if we could demonstrate to Congress if we went for $50 million for FMS that people were being recruited rapidly enough to justify expenditures of that magnitude in fiscal 78. Boutros responded that we could be absolutely sure of that.
19. Habib asked if Secretary had discussed with President Geneva and the Lebanese role in that Conference. Secretary said he had and he had told the President that the Palestinian and refugee questions would be dealt with from the beginning. If the Lebanese were not there, they would find themselves in a position where they would not have a voice in these vital questions.
20. Boutros said that when the Lebanese were in a political position to go to Geneva they would not delay a second. They felt they had a real interest to be there. Question was what were the conditions under which Geneva was to take place? If it were to be held tomorrow, Lebanese would not delay one day if political conditions permitted.
21. Habib said we understood the Lebanese position on Cairo but we hoped they would be able to attend Geneva from the beginning.
22. Secretary asked what he should say if he was asked whether Lebanon wanted to go to Geneva. Hoss said it would depend on what the basis of discussion was. Habib replied that the Conference would be convened to discuss Resolutions 242 and 338.
23. President said we should be frank. Lebanese wanted to go if political conditions permitted. They would have to say yes one day or another. But if they said yes prematurely, it would mean resumption of troubles in Lebanon which would not be in interest of either Lebanon or area. Lebanese would do their best to attend. It was important that both co-chairmen attend. It would mean that half of the obstacles were over.
24. Secretary asked if both co-chairmen called for resumption of Geneva and the Syrians said they would not go, could the Lebanese go? Sarkis did not have to answer that if he did not want to. Sarkis said this was very important matter. The Syrian “no” might be expressed at many levels. It might be for the Syrians and not for others. Lebanese would try to agree with Syrians that any such no was not for them. Lebanese had greater interest than anyone in Geneva. They also had a greater interest than anyone else in getting along with the Syrians. They must reconcile these two imperatives.
25. Boutros said Lebanese had to avoid initiating irreversible process which was not in the general interest. Were they wrong? Secretary said that was a question they must answer for themselves.
[Page 843]26. Boutros said it would all depend on timing. If they had consensus and an army, the situation would be much different.
27. President asked if Secretary considered it possible for the two co-chairmen to convene Geneva without Syria. Would the Soviets do that? He did not think that was a reasonable proposition. Secretary said it was very unlikely but nevertheless possible. Habib noted that holding such a conference was not our objective.
28. Boutros asked if Secretary thought there was a risk of war. Secretary said there was a risk of conflict, but he did not think the risk of war was great at the present. If everything we were doing failed that risk might rise. We hoped we could avoid that situation. Boutros asked what if there was a unilateral settlement. Secretary said he did not want to answer that question because we are hoping for an overall settlement.
29. Hoss asked if there were any possibility of Israelis reconsidering their position on Syrian forces south of the Litani. Secretary said there was not. (Boutros began waving [hands?] in distress as soon as Hoss raised question and implied to Hoss in Arabic that this was a silly question to ask.) Habib said Israelis were not going to have Syrian regular troops on their border.
30. Sarkis asked if Secretary had clear idea of difficulties GOL was going to face if problem with the south was not solved and national consensus were held up as a result. Secretary said he did see the difficulties this would present. As for solutions, he honestly did not see any outside implementing Shtaura III. Boutros interjected, “or wait for overall settlement.”
31. President asked Boutros again in Arabic “Do they see the danger of the south? Everything is connected to it.” Secretary said we understood very clearly the danger of the south and he would make sure that President Carter understood it as well. President said that without it there would be no unity.
32. Boutros asked when we thought Geneva Conference might be held, assuming Cairo negotiations went well. Secretary said that if they went well it might be possible to have Geneva by end of February. This was an optimistic view and he could take a more pessimistic one. Hoss asked what we expected to come out of Cairo. Secretary said that would depend very much on Israeli response to the Sadat visit. This would determine the speed with which Geneva could be reconvened. In this connection, he had told President there had been fundamental change in Israel in terms of public perception and realization that it is now possible to discuss peace. The atmosphere was totally different from what it was the last time he was there. People everywhere were talking about how they could move towards peace. The situation would never be the same again.
[Page 844]33. Boutros asked what if Geneva were to be held without all the parties being present. Secretary said we assumed all would attend. Boutros asked if PLO would be there. Secretary replied that Palestinians would be.
34. Boutros asked if Soviets would accept Geneva without the PLO. Habib said they had agreed with us on use of the word Palestinians, not PLO, in the joint statement. PLO appears nowhere in that document. Boutros asked if Soviets still adhered to that agreement. Secretary said they did.
35. Boutros asked what Israelis would have done if PLO had gone to Cairo. Secretary said he did not know and he did not think Israelis knew either. He thought the Israelis would have agreed to Palestinian representatives who were acceptable to both the PLO and Israel. Sadat had said Arafat had accepted such a proposal. Boutros commented that Arafat had then changed his mind. The Lebanese had had a lot of experience with that.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–0377. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Sent for information to the Department of State. Vance visited Beirut on December 13.↩
- Apparently a reference to the third phase of the Shtaura Agreement, which had yet to be implemented. For the Shtaura Agreement, see footnote 2, Document 76.↩
- The Ayn Jalut Brigade was one of three brigades that comprised the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). The Egyptians sponsored the brigade, which was originally based in Gaza before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and Israeli control of Gaza.↩