50. Editorial Note
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Washington on September 22 and 23, 1977, to meet with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and President Jimmy Carter. Gromyko’s visit to Washington was in conjunction with his trip to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. The six meetings with Vance and/or Carter dealt primarily with SALT, but also addressed issues in the Middle East.
The first meeting, held between Gromyko and Vance on September 22 from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. focused exclusively on SALT. Vance reiterated the use of the three-part framework, which he had introduced at the Geneva meetings. (See Document 28.) The discussion revolved around negotiations dealing with specific missiles and the limitations that would be imposed. Both Gromyko and Vance stressed that there should be equality for both countries in the limitations. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977)
On September 22, from 5 to 6:30 p.m., the second meeting between Vance and Gromyko took place and dealt with territorial issues in the Middle East. Vance discussed his recent talks with Israeli and Egyptian representatives. Gromyko proposed a joint statement that addressed reconvening the Geneva Conference. Vance indicated that the Lebanese should be included, but this proved to be a point of contention between the United States and the Soviets. (Memorandum of conversation, September 22, Department of State, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS MemCons, 1977)
Later that evening, Gromyko and Vance met a third time to discuss SALT. Gromyko addressed the proposed limitations on land-based MIRVed missiles. He also assured Vance that the radius of the Backfire would not be increased. Vance assured Gromyko that he would share this information with the President. The memorandum of conversation [Page 204] is printed as Document 182 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980.
On the morning of September 23, Gromyko met with Carter and Vance. During this meeting Carter provided an overview of U.S.-Soviet relations, to which Gromyko responded. While a variety of topics were discussed, including the Middle East and Africa, the discussion dealt primarily with SALT and missile limitations. Regarding the Middle East, it was determined that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened. The discussions on Africa addressed white versus black rule. Gromyko reiterated that in order to convene a summit between Carter and Brezhnev, a major step must be on the horizon. Carter complained about Soviet press criticism of him. Additionally, he criticized the Soviet leadership for its inflexibility and unresponsiveness to several proposals made by the United States. He reiterated that the United States would remain flexible, but the Soviet Union must be so as well. For the record of the meeting on SALT, see ibid., Document 183.
On the afternoon of September 23, Gromyko and Vance held their fifth meeting. They discussed the communiqué and continued their previous discussions regarding the limitations on MIRVed and non-MIRVed missiles. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 23, 4:30–6:30 p.m.; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 9/77) For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, November 7, 1977, pages 643–644. Later that evening, they met again to discuss a variety of subjects. MBFR was discussed and its lack of progress was attributed to differences in data. Vance and Gromyko next turned to the political situation in Rhodesia. Both expressed the desire to see majority rule in Rhodesia and other nations in southern Africa, in addition to United Nations support in this regard. Gromyko then complained about U.S. press coverage, stating that the press actively insisted that the Soviets were increasing their conventional and nuclear arms, and as a result forcing the United States to increase its arms supply. Finally, their discussion turned to the Comprehensive Test Ban, specifically the date the treaty would enter into force, and peaceful explosions, as opposed to those that were weapons-related. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 23, 6:40–8:00 p.m.; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 9/77)