Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

135. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 15, 1979

SUBJECT

• U.S. Strategic Policy

During the coming months, several basic strategic issues will come to you for decision. To prepare the best possible perspective and options for your consideration, this month we will have had three PRC meetings on M–X basing and a PRC to review the Consolidated Guidance.² By the first week in June, I believe we will be ready for an NSC meeting to look at these problems and other imminent strategic decisions in a comprehensive manner. The subject of the proposed meeting will be “U.S. Strategic Arms Policy and U.S.-Soviet Relations.”

I would propose to begin such a meeting with an overview, briefly summarizing CNA–78 and the Consolidated Guidance and reviewing the different perspectives of State and Defense. I would propose that next we focus (in the context of the three basic strategic problems we face: deterrence, crisis bargaining and war management) on the five areas in which your decisions are required: M–X basing, TNF, C3I, targetting and a new strategic document. I would propose to concentrate particularly on M–X basing and TNF because it will be important to have your preliminary decisions on these two issues prior to your meeting with Schmidt and the U.S.–USSR Summit.

While we can arrange a follow-up session on C3I, targetting and a new strategic document, we need to consider the latter very carefully because both the subject and the timing of its completion will be politically sensitive. Any attempt to create a new strategic document updating PD–18 and to provide the direction to American strategic policy that NSC–68³ did in the early 1950’s will have to be considered very carefully and cautiously.⁴

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a two-hour NSC meeting on June 4 or 5 (possibly using the Cabinet time) for a discussion of U.S. strategic arms policy and U.S.-Soviet relations, with the specific purpose of your providing at the end a preliminary decision on M–X basing and TNF in anticipation of the Schmidt visit and the U.S.-Soviet Summit, deferring the other items to a later follow-on meeting.⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: 5–7/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten “C” at the upper right corner of the memorandum indicates that Carter saw it.
2. For the May 4, May 10, and May 25 PRC meetings on M–X basing, see Documents 130, 133, and 138. For the May 14 PRC meeting on the Consolidated Guidance, see Document 134.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, p. 234.
4. Carter wrote below this paragraph: “I’ll do this after you, Harold and Cy arrange for confidentiality.”
5. Carter wrote “ok” below this paragraph.