136. Memorandum From Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- 3rd PRC on MX basing
Background
The 3rd PRC on MX basing is scheduled for Thursday, May 24th from 3:30–5:00. The nominal purpose of this meeting is to narrow the options down to a very small number for presentation to the President in an NSC meeting on June 6. DOD’s proposed agenda for this PRC is at Tab A.2 (S)
The Basing Decision
At this point there appear to be 3 live basing options
- —
- a modification of the trench concept Bill Perry presented in the last PRC meeting. The primary difference between the current concept and the one you heard about last time is that due to cost, excessive land use and security concerns the trench is now covered with removable concrete slabs which are covered with earth. Nonetheless, any trench can be scraped off and opened up for verification in about a day. Cost [Page 623] estimates vary for this system—OSD is saying roughly $6B more than MPS, the Air Force is saying $10–12B.
- —
- MPS with vertical shelters, or for $1–2B more, with sliding roof horizontal shelters that should ease verification concerns.
- —
- a variation of the original Option 5 that deploys Trident II in submarines, deploys a missile with some degree of commonality in STOL aircraft and silos, and accelerates the cruise missile carrier program. This option costs somewhat more than MPS but offsets much of the high cost of the airmobile deployment with the reduction in the numbers of Trident subs, that can be justified by building a large SLBM. (S)
Agency Positions and Arguments on Basing
OSD champions the first option. They appear to believe that MPS even with horizontal shelters is a non starter with the White House, and they have decided that the dash-on-warning feature of the trench option is the only way to beat the nagging doubts about whether the Soviets will be able to discover the locations of missiles deployed in an MPS system, perhaps without our knowledge. JCS prefers MPS but is willing to go along with the trench concept. (S)
The Air Force still prefers MPS and argues that building MPS with horizontal shelters should give it verification properties as good or better than those of the trench. The Air Force is also concerned that the uncertainties of the trench scheme may lead to further delays in fielding a survivable ICBM. Finally, they argue that the costs of building the trench system are $4–6B more than the OSD estimates. (S)
OMB feels that the President must make a decision on the basing mode very soon and that the trench concept is too uncertain to be choosable. They further argue that the Option 5 variant is not politically feasible in that it would not satisfy the Air Force, and choosing it would hurt SALT II ratification. OMB thus leans toward MPS. (C)
Partly on the basis of its panel’s report, OSTP feels that the trench concept has too many uncertainties to be chosen right now. They argue that we haven’t yet taken a serious look at the security and verification issues, and there is no way to evaluate shelter hardness and thus TEL speed and land requirements until DOD settles on a shelter design. They also say that the system has much poorer location security than MPS and could thus be vulnerable to a 2 phased attack in which SLBM’s are used to deprive the system of its mobility and then ICBM’s are used to destroy the missiles which would be located by covertly planted sensors. Given the problems it sees with the other options, OSTP suggests that the President announce a decision to proceed with the mostly common missile (which would keep all basing options reasonably open) and commit the trench to perhaps another month of study. (S)
[Page 624]Assessment of the Basing Arguments
OSTP and OMB have a point in arguing that there are some uncertainties regarding the trench system, but I think they are carrying their point too far in saying the system is not choosable now. As a result of their original interest in the trench concept the Air Force has a large body of study and test information to draw on in completing a design with the desired features, and I believe that reasonable answers will drop into place if the trench idea is pursued. (C)
On the other hand, with a somewhat faster shuffling of missile positions to minimize concerns about the possibility of a breakdown in security, and with horizontal shelters to ease SALT related concerns, MPS looks like a reasonable choice too. The key question would seem to be—Are we so concerned about the possibility that the Soviets can determine which shelters our missiles are in as to justify the very rapid inter-shelter mobility provided by the trench system? (C)
As far as Option 5 goes—I agree with OMB’s agreements that it is not politically feasible. In addition, some other arguments given against Option 5 seem very persuasive: 1) it does not restore the survivability of the ICBM leg of the Triad and may thus encourage the Soviets to think we will let their efforts to undermine our strategic forces succeed and, 2) it sharply increases our RV levels, which may increase Soviet interest in mobile systems, but may also cause them to resist fractionation limits in the future and simply proliferate RV’s themselves. (S)
The Missile Decision
OSD is now arguing that if the trench concept is chosen we should also proceed with the largest missile possible. This is because smaller missiles must be bought in larger numbers to reach any given level of surviving capability and each additional missile requires additional trench and a transporter, both of which are relatively expensive. (S)
OSD argues that if Option 5/air mobile is chosen we should proceed with a common missile. The largest missile won’t fit in the airplane they would use, and the mostly common missile will not offer enough improvement over the common missile to justify the extra cost and the management problems it would create. (S)
I believe these are reasonable arguments and that the mostly common missile is not a good idea for any deployment mode. In the deployment modes where it makes sense, trench and MPS, the larger missile offers perceptional, political, schedule, and management advantages that far outweigh the marginal cost saving that might be achieved with the mostly common missile. (S)
[Page 625]The Bottom Line
I think the President’s best course would be to go ahead with the MX decision in early June as now planned. I agree that there are still some significant uncertainties in the trench concept. I also believe that in the two weeks remaining until the NSC meeting to review the issue with the President the Air Force and OSD will be able to refine the trench and horizontal MPS options sufficiently to give the President 2 reasonably acceptable options to choose from. (S)
Finally, while Option 5 looks like an overall loser, I recommend that it not be dropped from the list of options to be presented to the President. Keeping Option 5 in the running and perhaps tuning it a little and saying something nice about it may have a beneficial effect on the final stages of DOD’s studies of the trench and MPS variant concepts. (S)