Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

134. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 14, 1979, 9–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Consolidated Guidance

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary

• JCS

  • General Bernard Rogers, Acting Chairman, JCS

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• OSD

  • Harold Brown
  • Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary
  • Russell Murray, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation

• OMB

  • John White, Deputy Director

• NSC

  • Victor Utgoff

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

DOD presented material² showing that even if we were to buy the forces currently programmed, we would not be able to meet the strategy given in PD–18:—1) maintain an overall balance at least as favorable as that existing in August 1977; 2) maintain essential equivalence; and 3) minimize NATO territory lost to any Warsaw Pact attack and restore prewar boundaries.³ DOD also showed that due to higher than anticipated inflation and widespread underpricing, purchasing the forces programmed for the next five years would cost $40+B more than would be available with real increases of 3 percent. In discussing this material, the following points were made:

— The strategic forces balance is worse now than in 1977, and will continue to get worse. Programs currently under discussion can begin to improve the situation by the mid-’80s, however. No matter what program decisions we make to modernize our strategic forces, in the early ’80s we are likely to be perceived as having less than essential equivalence with the Soviets. We must find ways to improve such perceptions in order to ensure that we don’t face a “Cuba-in-reverse”—from which we might not recover. Improvements in C3I systems should be emphasized.

— JCS said that Army computer studies show that NATO would not be able to stop an all-out WP attack (problems are particularly severe in the NORTHAG area), much less restore prewar boundaries. It was also noted that while NATO improvements being made by our collective efforts to increase defense spending by 3 percent are achieving modest results, much larger increases are needed if we want to be able to fulfil our NATO strategy anytime soon. Dr. Brzezinski said that while declaring this strategy before we have the capability to carry it out may seem unrealistic, the strategy is essential to maintaining Alliance cohesion.

— State does not see any particular signs that our current defense posture is inhibiting Allied support of the US. Our Allies are jittery about the Soviet buildup, but less than they would be in the absence of the improvements being made in NATO’s defense posture. Further, the Allies probably can’t do more than the 3 percent they have already promised.

— The Middle East/Persian Gulf situation presents difficult problems. The Soviets may doubt our ability to project significant military power into the area—and we clearly couldn’t if crises in NATO and the ME/PG area were to begin simultaneously. Having a permanent presence in the ME/PG area may deter situations requiring considerably larger forces. Given other countries’ stakes in continued access to the region’s oil, we should not be expected to provide the forces required to stabilize the region by ourselves, however.

— The Korean balance looks adverse from a military viewpoint, but in the larger context of developing political relationships in the Far East, this balance is not so bad as it might seem. (S)

There were several comments suggesting that some Western advantages may not be fairly reflected by the armored division equivalents measure used to assess the balance of forces in various areas. CIA commented that the Soviets probably don’t believe the military balance favors them as much as we think it does. (S)

In discussing the possibility of significant funding increases, there seemed to be general agreement that the 5 percent real increase rate that would be needed to meet the requirements of PD–18 by 1990 was not politically feasible. In support of this point, OMB noted that the recession we may face in 1981 may result in a $13–$15B deficit that year. OMB noted that in 1981, the federal tax burden will reach levels in excess of 20 percent of the GNP—which is unprecedented in peacetime. This burden will lead to increased political pressures for a tax reduction. OMB also noted that we are going to have to increase the estimated inflation rates for the next few years that DOD is using in planning its budget. Finally, considerable support was voiced for meeting the 3 percent real increase in 1981. (S)

It was also noted that while there is a general consensus that military spending should grow—such support had its limits. The Congress has cut out a number of defense programs the Administration has proposed, and most domestic programs have not been allowed to grow in real terms in the last several years. Thus, the political costs of getting additional defense funds may be high. DOD noted that this suggests that we should pay more attention to the fact that some defense programs can win Congressional support more easily than others. (S)

In view of the continuing problems in maintaining an adequate overall military balance, and the likely constraints on increased DOD funding, a suggestion was made that we take a particularly hard look at issues such as the balance between combat and combat support, the land-based vs. sea-based tactical airpower trade-off, the need to maintain significant amounts of shipping dedicated to support of opposed amphibious landings, the feasibility of increasing Allied ammunition stocks, and the potential utility of some MAP programs in important areas such as the Persian Gulf. (S)

Finally, it was generally agreed that some parts of our military strategy are more important than others, and that priorities need to be established. An NSC meeting will be held in the near future to discuss the material DOD presented in this meeting, some closely related material in the comprehensive Net Assessment, and the M–X basing decision. On the basis of the President’s reactions to that meeting, and a future NSC meeting to discuss strategic targeting and C3I issues, PD–18 may be updated to establish more clearly the relative priorities of the various elements of our overall military strategy. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 75, PRC 106, 5/15/79, DoD Consolidated Guidance. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found. An undated memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter summarizing the meeting is ibid.
2. Not further identified.
3. See Document 31.