130. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting1
SUBJECT
- M–X Basing
PARTICIPANTS
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State
- Warren Christopher Deputy Secretary
- David Gompert Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs
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JCS
- General David Jones
- Lt General William Smith Assistant to the Chairman
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DCI
- Admiral Stansfield Turner
- Howard Stoertz NIO for Strategic Policy
-
OMB
- Dr. John White Deputy Director
- Randy Jayne Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
-
White House
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
- David Aaron
-
OSD
- Harold Brown
- Charles Duncan Deputy Secretary
- Dr. William Perry Under Secretary, Research and Engineering
- Walter Slocombe Principal Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)
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ACDA
- George Seignious
- Spurgeon Keeny Deputy Director
- Dr. Barry Blechman Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau
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OSTP
- Dr. Frank Press
- John Marcum Staff Member
-
NSC
- Dr. Victor Utgoff
Summary of Conclusions
Secretary Brown opened the meeting with a brief summary of some of the issues underlying the basing question. Bill Perry then described the context within which the question must be resolved, by reviewing the latest intelligence estimates on Soviet strategic modernization programs, their impact on Minuteman survivability, and finally, the strategic modernization programs we currently have underway. (S)
[Page 604]Dr. Perry then presented five possible modernization programs for our ICBM force: (1) a baseline option with minimal modernization; (2) an option adding MPS/M–X to the baseline for $32B in procurement and operating costs thru FY 2000; (3) an option adding small missiles on trucks to the baseline for $26B; (4) an option adding 100 M–X in STOL aircraft plus 100 M–X in silos for $35B, and finally (5) an option putting Trident II missiles in submarines and 400 silos, and increasing the baseline cruise missile carrier purchase by 100 at a total cost of $37B. Dr. Perry then showed that Option 5 is the most cost effective in terms of surviving EMT or RVs per dollar, Option 2 comes in second, Option 4 comes in third, and Option 3 is tied with Option 1 for last place because its trucks can be destroyed on their bases in a day-to-day alert situation. In discussing the options, the following points were made. (S)
Option 2 is the JCS strong and unanimous choice, though they suggest adding a Trident II deployment program to it once MPS/M–X has been developed. They argue that MPS can be expanded to deal with increased threats, or defended by BMD, and can be verified with the sort of cooperative measures that will be required if deep cuts are to be achieved in SALT III. The JCS noted that the fractionation limits it contains are the most valuable element of SALT II and that with unlimited throw weight fractionation, MPS would have problems. (S)
OSD noted that Option 2 has a big SALT plus in that by making the percentage survival of our missiles independent of the number we own, it could make reductions easier; that the governors and legislatures of the two states where it would be deployed support it—though outside opposition might build a case on environmental concerns anyway; that losing its security would make MPS a disaster; that MPS has good endurance though perhaps not against bombers; and that while the breakout problem is not unique to MPS, this system draws attention to the problem. (S)
State questioned whether MPS could survive in the absence of SALT and was told we could expand MPS more cheaply than the Soviets could raise their RV numbers. OSTP argued that a race where the Soviets build RVs and we build holes would be ludicrous, and that the panel they have looking at the basing issue is concerned about the possibility of catastrophic breakdowns in deception. ACDA asked whether the large number of aim points presented by MPS would reduce Soviet incentives to agree to fractionation limits in SALT III. CIA suggested that a variant of MPS using the Trident II missile should be examined—this change would allow us to go to a different mobile option if necessary. Further, proceeding with Trident II would allow us to move our hard-target capability to sea. (S)
Mr. Aaron commented that we should test the MPS system against larger threats than those possible under SALT II since it will expire [Page 605] before the first MPS system is deployed; that while cooperative measures will be an improvement, MPS makes it essential that we get such measures, and thus we may end up using our bargaining leverage to achieve rules on paper rather than real reductions; that a security breakdown could occur for MPS without our knowing it, and that cooperative measures could increase such concerns. OSD responded that SSBN locations might also become known without our realizing it, and that the cooperative measures developed for MPS could concentrate on the missile production process rather than sampling existing missile locations. (S)
Option 3 got little attention beyond the original comment that it could be destroyed on its bases if attacked while in a day-to-day alert posture. Mr. Aaron noted that such a system might appeal to the Soviet mentality. OSD commented that it would probably work to our overall net advantage if the Soviets were to adopt a mobile system—the cost to deploy and operate such systems is 2–3 times as great per EMT or RV deployed as a silo-based system, and the reduced payload the Soviets might have to adopt would probably offset the uncertainties involved in determining the capabilities of such a system. The JCS noted that, without cooperative measures, a truck mobile system would pose larger verification problems than MPS. (S)
Option 4 got even less attention—OSTP asked what might happen if it made use of a common missile and was told that some savings might result. (S)
The JCS argued that while Option 5 puts the Soviets at risk, which they must be if we are, it is simply a postponement of the ICBM vulnerability problem. They also argued that adoption of Option 5 would have a bad effect on SALT II ratification because it will raise some very contentious issues, such as the advisability of putting new missiles in silos, an idea that is strongly opposed on the Hill. Finally, they noted that the background material presented for Option 5 underestimates the severity of the problems associated with it. (S)
Dr. Brzezinski noted that there is considerable political value in deploying the largest missile allowed under SALT II and suggested that a variant of Option 5 that deploys M–X in silos be examined. Mr. Aaron noted that while Option 5 may not solve the ICBM vulnerability problem, it could eliminate the asymmetry in strike options that is developing, and that while the silo deployment portion of Option 5 might decrease crisis stability to some extent, neither side could expect more than limited success if it attempted a disarming first strike. (S)
OSD commented that the missile proposed under Option 5 for silo deployment can be called an M–X if necessary, and that the Trident II design they had in mind would have as much hard-target capability as the SS–19. They further noted that the silo deployment portion of [Page 606] Option 5 would result in some reduced crisis stability, and that, for another $5–10B a mobile deployment option could be included under Option 5. State commented that the material presented suggested that Option 5 might be best, and finally, OSTP asked that an examination be made of the possibility of adding a mobile deployment to Option 5. (S)
Several additional points were made concerning SALT and the stability of the strategic balance. Specifically, (1) Mr. Aaron asked if the improvements in hard-target capabilities proposed in the various options would reduce Soviet incentives to agree to reasonable limits in SALT III. He also noted that one of the problems with MPS is that the shelters are not distinguishable from launchers, and asked if a variant of MPS that gets around this problem could be found; (2) CIA noted that while the backup papers2 for the meeting were very good, they did not make clear which options lead to more stable strategic balances; (3) JCS commented that going ahead with MPS would put the Soviets under the greatest pressure, and that we could adjust the relative emphasis that we give to this strategic system to suit the situation. (S)
Finally, Mr. Aaron suggested that for the next meeting a paper be prepared that takes a more careful look at the question of cooperative measures, and compares the various risks inherent in proceeding with versions of Options 2 and 5. (S)