Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

138. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 25, 1979, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• M–X Basing

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher Deputy Secretary

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

• OSTP

  • Frank Press

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• OSD

  • Harold Brown
  • Charles Duncan Deputy Secretary
  • William Perry Under Secretary for Research and Engineering

• ACDA

  • George Seignious

• OMB

  • John White Deputy Director

• NSC

  • Victor Utgoff

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The bulk of this meeting was used to review the trench basing concept, which is converging on a design similar to the one originally examined over a year ago but with two important differences. First, the trench is covered, but its sectioned top can be completely removed to allow verification. Second, the transporter has larger engines to give it higher speed. This would allow it to completely randomize its position within the flight time of a Soviet ICBM, if we suspect that the security guarding our transporter locations has been broken. (S)

In discussing the environmental impact of such a system, it was pointed out that the governors of the states where the system might be deployed—Utah and Nevada—had objected to the kind of area security that an open trench system would require. With a covered trench, we could go to point security, and the public could be allowed to use much of the deployment area, though the area would be kept under surveillance using national park-type security, and would be periodically swept for covertly implanted sensors. Mr. Jordan commented that while the environmentalists would like an underground system better than one on the surface, both environmentalists and politicians would be shocked at the extent of the system, and it should be concentrated in as small an area as possible. Secretary Brown commented that the construction should be confined, at least initially, to DOD land so the public could see how little impact a completed system would have. (S)

In discussing the survivability of this trench system, Dr. Perry pointed out that this basing mode is unique in having two methods of achieving survivability—deceptive location and a dash-on-warning capability. He further noted that while the system was designed to initially include 8,000 hardened shelters, another 8,000 could be built between the original shelters for about $1B in additional costs. This would defeat greater than expected Soviet efforts to fractionate their missile throw-weight, and any amount of further fractionation could be similarly defeated. Mr. Seignious commented that this capability to cope with increased fractionation should provide minimum incentives for Soviet fractionation and thus help to preserve one of SALT II’s most valuable achievements—fractionation limits. (S)

Stan Turner questioned whether the Soviets would let us achieve the high level of survivability anticipated for this system, when they would be starting so far ahead in the warhead versus shelter race we would be running. [3 lines not declassified] Secretary Brown argued that many of the RVs in this estimate are below the 1 MT size used as a design threat for the trench system, and many are [2 lines not declassified] He also argued that we can pour concrete faster than the Soviets can build missiles, and that if the Soviets abrogate the SALT limits in an attempt to maintain a high level of threat to the system, we could conceivably defend it with an ABM system. Mr. Aaron suggested that an analysis be carried out of the relative efforts required to expand and to offset the threat to the trench concept. (S)

Finally, Dr. Press asked how the system would cope with a scenario in which the Soviets use SLBMs to deprive the transporters of their mobility, and then use ICBMs to attack shelters that have been identified as containing missile transporters by covertly implanted sensors. Secretary Brown commented that this scenario seems unrealistic, particularly given the fact that the Soviet SLBM attack would provide considerable warning of their intentions, and could be the basis for launching our missiles upon warning of the follow-up ICBM attack. He also noted that the systems dash capability responded to the concerns about catastrophic security breakdown that had been expressed by the PRC in the previous meeting on this issue. He suggested that while we could leave it out and thus save about $1B in the cost of the trench system, he would not want to see the system cancelled later for lack of such a capability. (S)

With respect to verification of the system, Bill Perry said that within several hours any trench can be opened up enough to allow the Soviets to see that it contains only a single missile transporter; uncovering the trench completely might take a day. The trench could be left open several days, and as many as 10 to 20 percent of the trenches could be open at one time—opening could be done on a regular schedule or in response to Soviet requests. The key to this verification scheme is arranging the deployment area so that missiles and transporters cannot be brought in and taken out between surveillance opportunities. In response to questions by Warren Christopher, Secretary Brown noted that we would need to ask the Soviets to open any mirror-image system perhaps once per year, and that given a reasonable Soviet design, we could deal with the amount of cloud cover encountered over the Soviet Union. (S)

George Seignious asked what we would do if the Soviets responded to our deployment with a different system. Secretary Brown commented that no US system solves this problem—the real issue is: does our action say that the Soviets can deploy something that is not verifiable? (S)

At several points in the meeting Dr. Brzezinski asked questions about the possibility of designing the system to run on the surface using a large road vehicle. This would allow it to move out of its shelter complex if sufficient warning were available and achieve even higher levels of survivability. Secretary Brown responded that without strategic warning, the system would be far tougher to kill inside its shelter complex than on the surface trying to disperse. He also argued that use of the M–X or mostly-common missile implies a transporter with a gross weight of roughly a million lbs. This would require special roads within the deployment area which would have significantly greater environmental impact than the covered trench. Finally, he noted that while the system might have greater survivability in some scenarios, its ability to move outside the designated deployment area would raise verification concerns. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted our apparent willingness to spend billions to protect this force from bolt-from-the-blue attacks, and questioned whether we wouldn’t regret being confined to our trenches if the Soviets were to respond to our mobile systems by deploying something like the SS–16. George Seignious said that getting a survivable system ourselves is more of a concern than what the Soviets do. Secretary Brown commented that we will always want to verify limits on Soviet proposals and should thus pay attention to the example we set in verification. Finally, General Jones argued that the Soviets will be able to cover very large areas with overpressure that would be lethal to a surface-mobile system, and that dispersing it in a crisis might be destabilizing in that it could send a bad signal. (S)

There are [was?] some discussion of Option 5A,² which deploys a common missile in silos, the Trident sub, and a small number of aircraft, and uses this same aircraft in an accelerated cruise missile carrier program. Stan Turner noted that this option would provide significantly more surviving capability than any of the others. Dr. Brzezinski commented that he had not made up his mind on Option 5A and wanted to see it brought forward. Secretary Brown noted that this option would be more frightening to the Soviets due to the rapid rate at which it would improve our SSBN and strategic aircraft forces. Frank Press noted Option 5A’s greater effectiveness, and the fact that it did contain the air mobile deployment option. He then added that the trench scheme being discussed is only two weeks old—and is a relatively uncertain concept that is still changing. General Jones answered that the air-mobile concept is more uncertain than the trench concept, and Secretary Brown showed a short film on trench construction and testing to illustrate the point that the current trench concept is building upon a body of knowledge that has been evolving for some time. Secretary Brown concluded the discussion of basing modes by suggesting that the MPS, covered trench and Option 5A alternatives be presented to the President for decision. (S)

In discussing the issue of missile size, Dr. Brzezinski commented that if we are not going to proceed with a ground-mobile system that might need a smaller missile, he favors building the largest missile possible under SALT II—the 190,000 lb. M–X. He argued that this missile is better defined than the various common missiles, and could be put in full-scale development almost immediately, where the others would involve significant delays. Dr. Brzezinski noted that such delays might be seen as an attempt to make it easier to cancel the deployment of the new land-based missile once SALT II ratification is behind us. George Seignious added that there appears to be strong support by the Congress for proceeding with the largest possible missile. (S)

Frank Press argued that we will have no flexibility to deploy the new missile in other basing modes if we proceed with the large M–X. Secretary Brown responded that a surface-mobile system might still be possible, or deployment in the sort of small submersibles that Frank Press’ panel had suggested. (S)

General Jones argued in favor of the large M–X, noting that the smaller missiles were less capable, and that development of a common missile could lead to common failure modes and would be a management disaster according to several experts who had managed larger missile programs before. Secretary Brown argued that these management concerns were in his view overblown, and Bill Perry showed a chart³ indicating that the capabilities of the common missile do not compare that unfavorably with those of the large M-X if its accuracy goals can be met. Secretary Christopher noted that given the tension between survivability and verification, and Congressional attitudes, he thought the trench concept with the full-sized M-X missile would be the best answer. Finally, Secretary Brown noted that interest in Option 5A implies interest in proceeding with the fully common missile. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Council Meetings, 1977–1980, Box 100, NSC Meetings, [6–12/1979]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting were not found.
2. The options paper was not found.
3. The chart was not found.