Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

133. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 10, 1979, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• M–X Basing

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Cyrus Vance
  • David Newson Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • David Gompert Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • Lt General William Smith Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Dr. Robert Bowie Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
  • Howard Stoertz NIO for Strategic Programs

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Hamilton Jordan

• NSC

  • Dr. Victor Utgoff
  • Fritz Ermarth

• OSD

  • Harold Brown
  • Charles Duncan Deputy Secretary
  • Dr. William Perry Under Secretary for Research and Engineering
  • Walter Slocombe Principal Dep Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)

• ACDA

  • George Seignious
  • Spurgeon Keeny Deputy Director

• OSTP

  • Dr. Frank Press
  • John Marcum

• OMB

  • Dr. John White Deputy Director
  • Randy Jayne Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

Detailed Minutes

Harold Brown opened the meeting proposing to go through the material previewed the day before on 1) variations to Option 5, and 2) the question of missile size.² The first topic lead to a discussion of new basing concepts.

Bill Perry began addressing the questions that had been posed about the option variations, especially cost. To do Option 5 in silos with a 100 mobile missile component as well as 300 improved missiles would average $15B across the mobile modes—leading to a rough total force cost of $90B, compared to the $50B minimum modernization baseline force.

Dr. Perry then briefly showed some calculations on the effectiveness of different RV loadings vs. nominal soft and hard target sets. He showed that [6 lines not declassified]

Howard Stoertz commented that some work DNA is now doing suggests that Soviet silos may be harder than DOD is assuming. Harold Brown responded that the CEPs being discussed would put the silos inside the nuclear fireballs.

Dr. Perry then turned to an argument in favor of development of the Trident II SLBM. He said it would be a good idea whatever we did about ICBMs because its higher RV loading would permit a reduced number of boats and consequently reduced procurement and operating costs of $13B. This is because the Trident boat is already configured to receive larger D–5 missiles and at least 12 Tridents will be under contract before construction of a new class SSBN could begin.

Harold Brown observed that the Trident II issue is really a question of when you do it. Dr. Perry noted that depending on the D–5 missile decision we would plan a force of 12, 15, or 18 Trident boats and then develop a new and smaller follow-on submarine.

Dr. Perry then turned to describing the open trench basing concept involving 5000 miles of trench [1 line not declassified]

[2 lines not declassified] no one really knows how hard they are.

Cy Vance asked how long it took to move between shelters. Dr. Perry answered that it would take about 3 minutes to get to the first neighboring shelter and about 2 minutes for each succeeding shelter down the line. Thus, in 30 minutes of ICBM flight time, location uncertainties of about 30 shelters could be obtained. The missile would launch from outside the shelter. Roofs over the trench and shelters would enhance denial of location information but could be opened for verification. The concept could be operated either with roofs opened most of the time and closed for movement or with roofs closed most of the time and open for inspection.

Currently, the main security issue being raised about this system Perry said was the possibility of missile location reparting by implanted close-in sensors. One way to look at the system is as a grid of shelters separated by a mile in all directions and connected by trenches along one dimension. Tactical warning could allow the missile to move once to a new shelter before elements of the track were destroyed. The attacker might seek to pin down the missile force in its initial location by blocking tracks and then seek to find and strike the real missiles. However, this scenario is not very plausible, because given the warning and destruction of the precursor SLBM attack the US would probably be assumed ready to use its force before losing it.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the heavy missile was being used in this concept? Perry noted that this basing concept does not prescribe any particular missile size. As noted before, however, it would cost $1B more up front to go with the smaller missile because more of them would be required.

John White asked whether this concept might not cost a lot more than MPS because of the excavation, track laying, etc.

Bill Perry answered that his analysis was rough but suggested a range of $2–5B in extra costs, with his best guess being $3B. Harold Brown noted that DOD’s feeling for cost was based on a lot of study and field experiments on the underground trench. The AF, it was noted, had done extensive work on trench design that was directly applicable to this concept.

Spurgeon Keeny asked why the rail connections had to be trenches. Could they not be on the surface? He was told that this would be possible though it might raise additional security concerns.

Frank Press commented that this idea looks much better than MPS on verification, worse on security, worse on environment, and better on survivability. He observed that environmental impact would be severe because of large land areas excluded from public access.

Harold Brown noted that this would depend on where the system was located. It could be located in military reservations such as bombing ranges from which the public was excluded anyway. Dr. Perry noted that DOD had about 38,000 square miles of suitable land, the AF about 14,000. Randy Jayne asked whether high water tables—in some locations—had been taken into account. Dr. Perry said the AF had studied such matters extensively with respect to MPS and trenches. Gen Jones noted that laying the track above ground would reduce environmental impact if that proved to be the major problem. Harold Brown said that continuous fences along the trench would be required to keep the public away from nuclear devices.

Frank Press continued his comments observing that while a launcher on its side might be easier to verify than a vertical launcher, Soviet deployment of this concept would worry us. We would be concerned about extra missiles lurking in or stored for introduction into the system. Harold Brown asked whether this basing concept created a problem in this respect or merely called attention to the threat of extra Soviet missiles, a threat that already exists?

Frank Press continued by noting that like MPS, the open trench concept gives the Soviets an incentive to fractionate. If they did so, they could confront us once again with a vulnerable system. Harold Brown asked why this should be? We could build more trenches to affect their RVs. The question was what kind of a race we were interested in. He noted that no matter what we do, the Soviets could build more RVs anyway.

David Aaron observed that the Soviets could but don’t have to seek to make our basic concept vulnerable through fractionation. He questioned their incentive to try to overcome this system where they will see that their efforts can be readily thwarted.

Harold Brown asked whether Frank Press’ objection did not imply that all shelters should have missiles in them instead of only 1 in 20 being full. Frank Press said his point was merely that the survivability of the open trench like MPS was sensitive to a variable fully in the enemy’s hands, mainly RV levels. Harold Brown responded that we could have more aimpoints, more missiles, and more RVs if Soviet RV levels went up.

Gen Jones noted that Option 5 results in our producing some 18,000 weapons. He wondered if this would cause the Soviets to go for more survivability or instead simply force further growth in their RV levels.

Harold Brown noted that the multiple aimpoint systems of any kind separate survivability from force size.

Stan Turner commented that MAP systems encouraged fractionation on the Soviet side. Option 5 would drive the Soviets to mobility which [whereas?] Option 2 would drive them to fractionation. Harold Brown responded by noted that fractionation (or EMT increases) can be applied against submarines and aircraft as well as multiple shelters. Our primary concern should be a survivable force—preventing fractionation (or EMT increases) is a subordinate aim.

David Aaron said if the Soviets want to try to imperil our forces they can. If we go with an option along the lines of 2 we can roll effectively, with Option 5 we cannot.

Stan Turner said Option 2 means a spiraling arms race in weapons, whereas Option 5 means a race in mobility. [Adm. Turner is arguing that Option 2 would cause the Soviets to proliferate RV’s in an attempt to maintain the threat to our ICBM’s. Option 5 would present so large a threat to fixed Soviet silos that they would be forced to go mobile] Harold Brown noted that, assuming Soviet dedication to counter-military capabilities, Option 5 could lead to heightened competition in ASW/barrage technology. Stan Turner argued, but said that Soviet prospects in ASW are much less certain than Soviet ability to fractionate multiple aimpoints. Harold Brown said that the Soviets cannot necessarily fractionate enough to defeat MPS or open trench. The Soviets already have many more RVs than we think they need for target coverage. The multiple shelter concept proceeds on the assumption that aimpoints can be proliferated more easily than RVs. Stan Turner noted that the Soviets have shown a willingness to spend great amounts in trying to reduce the effectiveness of our forces. Harold Brown said that if you concede to the Soviets the ability and willingness to beat all survivability approaches, life becomes very hard for us. They can work very hard on ASW. Frank Press opened that the Soviets could not achieve much in ASW in the 1980’s or even in 1990’s. Harold Brown said he was concerned about the 1990’s but less so about the 1980’s. John White asked if MPS and open trench reacted differently to fractionation. Harold Brown said no. Dr. Perry noted that the Soviets could increase fractionation levels by a factor of 4 by putting [less than one line not declassified] But then they would need much better CEPs and we could put our shelters closer together.

David Aaron noted 3 Soviet reasons to fractionation—1) they may want to keep us vulnerable, 2) match our RV numbers, or 3) increase their absolute numbers of RV’s surviving a counterforce nuclear exchange.

Harold Brown observed that increasing the numbers of RV’s on silo based missiles is not a cost effective way to add surviving RV’s given very severe threats to the silos.

Cy Vance asked what constraints or cooperative measure we would want in order to verify a Soviet “open trench” system. Harold Brown said we would want them to open the system for observation some of the time.

Frank Press noted that we might be worried about hidden missiles deployed in such a system. We face the threat of secret silos and hidden missiles now. Further, for the Soviet offroad mobile is an attractive option because of their large land areas—and this system poses even larger problems of verification. Stan Turner said we would want three things to verify open trench on the Soviet side—a choke point where missiles were to be introduced into the deployment area, quick inspection, and production controls. Harold Brown said all connected trenches would have to be inspectable at once.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what kind of production controls would be desired? Stan Turner observed that something like the MPS special assembly facilities near the point of system introduction might do.

Harold Brown asked how do we control a system like the SS–20, or the evolution of the SS–20 into a SS–16? [less than one line not declassified] Harold Brown said this trench system is easier to verify than those Soviet systems. David Aaron said we don’t now impose controls on missile numbers. Building secret silos would seem easier than covertly introducing illegal missiles into a trench system. Harold Brown said its fairly easy to imagine the construction of some extra missile silos.

Stan Turner said with multiple aimpoint systems, you have an invitation for excess missiles. Harold Brown replied that the breakout problem exists now.

Frank Press said security against close-in sensors would be a real problem for the open trench. Harold Brown asked how could a sensor transmit without betraying itself. Frank Press said Vietnam gave us a lot of experience with such sensors. The open trench system would require decoys. Harold Brown said why decoys be needed if the missile could move every 15 minutes. Frank Press asked if that was the plan. Harold Brown said it was if necessary. Frank Press said secret sensors could betray determined location just before an attack. Harold Brown said that would give us warning. Frank Press asked how we would know the sensors had transmitted? Davey Jones said simulators to beat sensors would figure in this concept. The simulators would be distinguishable to NTM’s.

Harold Brown said the systems could operate like Metro. Something would always be moving somewhere. A given missile could move 15 minutes, stop 15 minutes, or any combination. The enemy’s intelligence cycle time could not be fast enough to beat such a system.

Frank Press said the tracks are soft. SLBMs could pin down the missile, and sensors could then see an ICBM attack to destroy our missiles. Harold Brown doubted the practicality of such a scenario. Frank Press said the scenario was no less delirious than many in the strategic business. Harold Brown noted that a [less than one line not declassified] roof would protect the trench from ejecta. Harold Brown said that open trench concept had not been studied nearly as fully as had MPS, but that he had heard no new arguments against it. He asked if Frank Press’ critique in effect said MPS was better than open trench. Frank Press said perhaps yes for survivability, but no for verification.

Hamilton Jordan asked whether trench length could be reduced to reduce environmental impact. Harold Brown said about 5,000 miles of trench would be needed, but that it could be cut up almost any way you want. Hamilton Jordan said, “that is a lot of trench.” Harold Brown said military bases could accommodate it. Frank Press asked whether public access would in fact be disrupted except for places where public access is not now permitted such as bombing ranges. Hamilton Jordan asked: isn’t total mileage the key variable in public impact. Harold Brown said environmental impact can be reduced by laying track above ground.

Gen Jones commented broadly on the basing issue and then spoke to the question of missile size: He said the Chiefs definitely want a survivable ICBM, the AF prefers MPS but would “be cooperative” with something like the open trench if MPS is rejected. He noted that verification difficulties would be very serious in SALT III no matter what our basic concept because of system mobility.

Personally Gen Jones said he leans toward the trench. Regarding missile commonality and size, he said we must understand that building a 110,000 lb. missile will mean designing it for the Trident. It will be called the D–5, or Trident II; M-X will be regarded as cancelled. We may attain a $3–4B saving from commonality, but the Chiefs regard this cost saving as very dubious. The Chiefs believe that the common missile will be another TFX. It will involve a delay of 6 months to a year, when we’ve already delayed too much. It will yield a missile with less capability than permitted by SALT. Thus, we shall have a perception problem involving cancellation of M–X and delay of a new missile. Ergo, the fully common missile is not a good idea. The Chiefs believe that if commonality seems as important, a 150,000 lb. partly common missile is the way to go—two stages in common, a third stage to achieve an M–X capable of carrying 10 MK–12As, and a best effort on common components. The Chiefs would also propose going forward with a Trident II, but later than envisioned in Option 5.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how many RVs the 150,000 lb. missile would carry in the absence of a fractionation level. Harold Brown said as many as 20 MK–4s could be carried, but with that many RV releases there was a problem of reliability and accuracy. Gen Jones said a 190,000 lb. M–X would use all our head room under SALT and match the SS–19 in throw weight—a 150,000 lb. missile would have only 700 lbs. less throw weight capability. The SS–19 has 7900 lbs—a 150,000 lb. missile would have 7200 lbs.

Stan Turner asked whether the 150,000 lb. missile could be mated with an aircraft. Harold Brown said yes. Stan Turner asked about putting it on a truck. Harold Brown answered only two stages would be used in effect. The truck would be deploying the D–5.

George Seignious said that if one looked in the long term to negotiations beyond 1985, it appeared there could be a race between RVs and aimpoints, and arms control might end up trying to limit both weapons and aimpoints. Stan Turner said the Soviets pursued forces that gave them warfighting and reserve strategic capabilities.

Harold Brown said we could afford to, and some time ago did concede to the Soviets over all strategic equality, but we could not accommodate their quest for warfighting advantages. If they wanted to strive for those advantages, we would simply have to move to deny them.

David Aaron said if we can effectively restore force survivability in the face of Soviet threats, then we may have a chance to negotiate the forces downward. But we will never get them to agree to limitations if we allow them to make their counter force achievements stick.

Harold Brown said we don’t want to be in the situation we have faced during SALT II when we wanted the Soviets to reduce their missile threat to Minuteman, but had no leverage to achieve that goal.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 117, Security Analysis Chron: #1–25, 5/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is ibid.
2. See footnote 2, Document 132.