105. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance 1

The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment

The attached memorandum takes stock of the human rights policy, one year on. It begins with a description of what we have done, and es[Page 353]pecially of how much the policy actually has affected our economic or military programs. This review is useful to have, but may be the least interesting part of the paper.

You might want to begin with our assessment of accomplishments (pp 5–6) and of whether there have been setbacks (to human rights, on p 6, and to other American interests, on pp 7–10). The paper then discusses the problem of consistency: ways in which we are being less, or perhaps in some cases more, consistent than we should aim for (pp 11–15).

The memorandum ends with recommendations for future directions:

—A Presidential Decision would help to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used. (A draft reportedly is with the President).2

—We badly need country strategy papers3 that will integrate our human rights interests with other American concerns in each country, and give useful guidance for coherent application of all our instruments of influence.

—Our country strategies should try to emphasize what is most likely to be effective in improving human rights situations, rather than what decisions will make us look consistent.4

—We need better procedures to integrate our economic with our military assistance decisions.

—We have hard choices to make on compliance with the legal requirements about our role in International Financial Institutions.5

—We should look for more ways to multilateralize our human rights efforts, both to reduce suspicions of a smug American moralism and to further enlist the weight of world opinion in conjunction with our efforts.

—We should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our human rights problems in this country.

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—We need to do a better job of explaining, at home and abroad, the complexities of our policy and the reasons for some apparent inconsistencies.

The memorandum was written by my staff and we take responsibility for its judgments. But we have solicited the opinions of many others—in HA, D, EB, H, T, IO, the regional Bureaus, and AID. Most were eager to express what they do and don’t like about how the policy is working and the paper tries to reflect their opinions, with indications of important disagreements within this building. Some still think the overall tone and thrust are wrong. Comments range from “Pollyannaish” to “overly negative”.

We believe this memorandum might be useful at the White House, and suggest that it be sent under cover of a Tarnoff-Brzezinski memorandum.6

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance 7

SUBJECT

  • The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment

The human rights policy is off to a good start but, to no one’s surprise, problems remain. In the following paragraphs we apply hindsight to the year’s experience, with deliberate emphasis on problem areas and what now needs to be done.

I. What Are We Actually Doing?

Human rights advocacy has become a standard, visible, and important feature of our diplomacy. The President has repeatedly emphasized that it is a cardinal tenet of his foreign policy—a theme you and other key officials have elaborated in speeches. Early in the Administration we signed the UN Covenants and the American Convention on [Page 355] Human Rights (but have yet to send them to the Hill for ratification).8 We have made scores of diplomatic demarches on the specific human rights problems of individual countries. Not least important, discussion of our human rights concerns has been integrated into all our dealings with foreign governments—from the President’s and your own private conversations, to the most routine dealings of Embassy and Department desk officers with their foreign counterparts. The very pervasiveness of such exchanges makes them hard to quantify or even summarize. But their impact in conveying our seriousness should not be underestimated.

We also have had some months of experience with using more concrete instruments of American influence: bilateral aid programs; International Financial Institutions; and security relationships. These two kinds of actions—diplomatic exchanges and use of our material support—are closely related. For example, we generally put a government on specific notice that particular human rights problems would cause us to oppose loans to it before actually abstaining or voting no. We often use the occasion of a positive vote to make some form of human rights demarche—warning that continued positive votes will be difficult absent improvement, or advising that only certain apparent or promised improvements make it possible for us to be positive.

Bilateral Aid

Our bilateral aid programs are designed to serve basic human needs, and so intrinsically promote human rights. Consequently, only in extraordinary circumstances have we cut or delayed programs in order to signal objection to a repressive government:

—We are suspending new programs to the Central African Empire, partly in response to Congressional pressure;

—We have been deferring decision on some loans to Nicaragua since mid-September, in order to assess what appear to be human rights improvements there;9

—After press reports of our decision to delay some assistance to Chile, Santiago cancelled our FY 77 program and it is not in future AID budgets;10

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—We have reduced the PL 480 allocation to Guinea,11 and increased it to Peru, on human rights grounds;

—We appear to have indefinitely delayed one CCC credit to Chile, and the Interagency Group on Foreign Assistance and Human Rights is also available for advice to ExIm when the latter requests (as it has done on Uruguay and Argentina).

But most of our bilateral effort has focused not on determining who is a deserving recipient of aid, but rather on ensuring that it does in fact promote human rights:

—$750,000 was earmarked in AID’s FY 78 budget for projects which promote civil and political rights (e.g., legal aid for the poor).

—We are beginning to implement the new legislative requirement that human rights violators which receive PL 480 Title I assistance report on how food or the proceeds from its sale is used to “directly benefit needy people.” Reporting requirements have been signed with Indonesia and Guinea and negotiations are underway with Bangladesh, South Korea, Zaire and Somalia. They may begin with a few others.

Human rights concerns may cut more deeply into AID programs—including country allocations—in the future, beginning with the 1979 budget. This is a difficult and controversial business since, even though AID money can be reprogrammed to other countries, we would be reducing aid specifically designed to benefit needy people in a particular country in order to express disapproval of their government and try to influence its performance on civil or political human rights.

The International Financial Institutions

The human rights policy has had greater—and more visible—impact on our role in International Financial Institutions, especially on loans for industrial development which seldom meet the “basic human needs” criteria. Since the Carter Administration took office we have abstained from voting on eleven loans on human rights grounds (to [Page 357] Ethiopia, Benin, Argentina, the Philippines, Korea and the CAE) and voted against seven (to Chile, Argentina and Guinea).12

We have not thus far formally opposed any loans when our opposition would have meant their defeat. We only have veto power over the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations (FSO), and in several cases we have indicated that we might oppose an FSO loan if it came to a vote; in most, the applicant government has chosen to hold it back. Some $143,252,000 worth of loans are currently being held up because of our action—to Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Nicaragua.13

Few other participants in IFI deliberations have joined us in opposing loans on human rights grounds. West European opposition to loans for the Pinochet regime began before ours. Venezuela recently abstained on one loan to Chile. British and Swedish representatives in the IDB recently put on record that they would have opposed a loan to Argentina had they national votes; but the European regional group of which they are a part cast its collective vote in favor.

Security Assistance and Sales

Human rights considerations have become perhaps the dominant factor in arms transfers to Latin America. This has resulted from a combination of factors: Congressional prohibitions (to Argentina and Uruguay); refusals of our security assistance by Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala in response to our reporting to Congress on their human rights situations; the low risk of Soviet inroads if our arms flows are reduced; and, possibly, the relatively small economic importance to us of arms sales in the area. Most cases involving major lethal equipment to serious violators have not been approved, at least absent progress on human rights. However, some significant non-lethal items (e.g., C–130’s to Argentina) as well as some spare parts, still are approved after careful review.

The great bulk of our arms transfers, however, are to East Asia and the Middle East, and they have been only marginally affected by human rights considerations. We have, for instance, opposed economic loans in IFI’s to both South Korea and the Philippines and are including Korea and Indonesia among the problem countries which must report on their use of PL 480 Title I. But base negotiations in the Philippines and troop withdrawal considerations in Korea have thus far led us to continue very large security assistance programs to both. There has been some impact on security relations with Indonesia, where sale of [Page 358] F–5 aircraft was made contingent on the actual freeing of some political prisoners whose release already was scheduled.

The East Asian record will be somewhat better in 1979. Human rights considerations have contributed to adjustments in allocations, especially for military training, for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This probably is known by the recipient governments (although they could rationalize their cuts as flowing from Congressional reduction of the overall budget). But the general public perception is likely to be of continued high levels of security assistance.

Similarly, in the Middle East, our desire to move Arabs and Israelis toward a peace settlement and the importance of Mideast oil have kept arms sales high.

Nor have the human rights considerations cut into arms transfers to black Africa, either because the amounts sold are minimal or because of an interest in supporting “moderate” governments (e.g., Morocco and Zaire).

Finally, although we are working toward a policy of reviewing straight commercial sales to police forces of items not on the munitions list, no decision has yet been reached.

II. Human Rights Accomplishments and Setbacks

What Have We Accomplished?

The human rights policy has helped us at least as much as it has produced changes abroad. Our post-Vietnam, post-Watergate image has been greatly improved. To a large degree we have taken the ideological initiative from the Soviets. This boosts our standing—and that of traditional friends—in Europe, and helps in our relations with a number of LDC’s. The policy is especially appealing—and encouraging—to many people living under repressive regimes.

This underscores what many of us frequently forget—the US is a model for many countries; our influence transcends our political, economic, and military power and is strikingly important in ethical, cultural, and value areas; other governments find themselves unable entirely to ignore the impact of US policy and actions—particularly when we join action to rhetoric.

Our championship of human rights is encouraging others to do likewise. Activity in the UN and OAS has picked up considerably, and the OAS and Red Cross human rights commissions are being allowed into countries which previously excluded them. The West Europeans are more active both in international fora and in diplomatic dialogue with problem countries. Once-lonely private activists now find themselves deluged with invitations to conferences. Some who long have been working to advance human rights have taken new hope from the [Page 359] Administration’s policies; others doubtless are bandwagon-hopping. But they all contribute to a growing international lobby which combines its influence with our own.

Most important, this increased international focus already has led to human rights improvements in several countries. Significant numbers of political prisoners have been released, in Iran, Poland, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Togo, Nepal, the CAE, Guinea and Indonesia. Iran and Thailand are opening trials of political prisoners for the first time. Emigration from the Soviet Union, some East European states, and Syria, has become a little easier. In some of these countries there also has been back-sliding; moreover, we often question whether an improvement is more than cosmetic. Nonetheless, the overall balance is decidedly positive.

No authoritarian regime has fundamentally altered its political system, nor are the hard-core dictatorships likely to take action which they would perceive (in some cases rightly) as political suicide. But some political systems are becoming somewhat freer.14 The opposition in Brazil is increasingly active. El Salvador and Nicaragua have lifted states of seige. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have announced intentions to hold elections in 1978. The most notable advances in political freedom—in India, Portugal and Spain—were independent of our human rights advocacy; but democratic forces in all three seem to be taking heart from our new focus.

In sum, a trend seems to have begun which could gather momentum and which already is improving the plight of individuals—including those under some still-authoritarian regimes. And since individuals are what the human rights policy is primarily about, even the scattered and partial successes registered to date are important. Moreover, even marginal reductions in repression offer more latitude to dissidents, which in turn contributes to an internal dynamic that may produce further change.

It is neither possible nor very useful to specify the precise weight of our influence in these developments. The important thing is that we are contributing to an international consciousness-raising and a climate conducive to human rights improvements.

Are We Jeopardizing Human Rights Anywhere?

Maybe, at least in the near-term. Worry about the “destabilizing” effect of international attention to human rights may lead some authoritarian regimes to tighten domestic screws. This may already have happened in the Soviet Union and South Africa, where the governments [Page 360] fear that our human rights advocacy has or might stimulate critics of the regime. In both, however, many of those most affected seem to want us to continue our efforts; they apparently believe that the near-term risk is in their own long-range interest.

There may be similar risks elsewhere. In South Korea, for instance, the regime now seems eager to resolve differences with us. But it is possible that human rights behavior, combined with withdrawal of our ground combat troops and the “Koreagate” probe,15 could produce a seige mentality which would make easing of repression less likely, or indeed even reduce tolerance for domestic dissent.

III. Are We Damaging Other US Interests?

Not yet in any quantifiable way, although the risk always is present when we are pursuing several interests at once.

Eastern Europe

Soviet leaders fear the human rights policy, which they see as an effort to discredit them in world opinion and to undermine the political systems of the Warsaw Pact states. Our early high profile contacts with leading Soviet dissidents,16 combined with our initial SALT proposals, did badly rock the relationship. And we cannot know just how a general unhappiness with the human rights policy affects the atmosphere of Soviet decision-making across the board. But it does not, in fact, seem yet to have interfered with SALT and other arms control negotiations, or US-Soviet dealings in other areas, where the Soviets seem to be pursuing their specific interests much as usual. Indeed the improvement in US-Soviet relations following the SALT breakthrough during Gromyko’s September visit to Washington17 has survived even the human rights beating Moscow has been taking at the Belgrade CSCE conference. The spillover might in fact work the other way: progress on SALT may be making Soviet leaders more willing (within limits) to stomach our human rights position.

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Latin America

Several Latin American governments are at least as unhappy with our promotion of human rights as the Soviets. With some like Uruguay, Paraguay, and Nicaragua, our bilateral interests are so modest that our prime interest is human rights. This could, of course, become a situation in which the sum is greater than the parts: if enough such governments become sufficiently angry over our human rights approach, there could be a spillover effect which damaged the OAS, and our interests in it. But this is not yet the case: to the contrary, last summer’s OAS General Assembly was notable for a surge of human rights enthusiasm.

And in those Latin American countries where we have more at stake, no concrete damage seems to have been done. Our severe criticism of Argentina’s human rights record did not prevent it from agreeing to make some nuclear non-proliferation commitments during the Secretary’s November visit;18 and it is highly unlikely that Brazil would have agreed to forego its reprocessing agreement with West Germany even had we had no human rights policy.19 We cannot know what price we might one day pay for the deterioration in our once close military relationships with Brazil and Argentina. That obviously depends in part on the political evolution of the countries themselves—an evolution to which the human rights policy, if successful, could contribute positively.

Middle East

The impact of our human rights policy on US interests in Middle Eastern countries has been modest. Few of them are recipients of economic assistance and, as noted, we have not put primary emphasis on human rights considerations, in view of our other pressing interests, when deciding on arms sales or determining our approach to the area generally. The quiet diplomacy we have undertaken in the region has been palatable to the governments concerned, and shown some success (e.g., in increased Jewish emigration from Syria).

Africa

The human rights policy, far from damaging our interests with African governments, has served them. This is partly because the chief targets of our criticism have been South Africa and Rhodesia, and that greatly enhances our stature in the area as a whole. We have refrained from criticism of the human rights problems of frontline states whose [Page 362] support we want in southern Africa (e.g. Tanzania, which has more political prisoners than South Korea). Our criticism of Uganda20 is not so enthusiastically endorsed by other African governments, but certainly does not hurt us with them; that criticism, moreover, has been somewhat muted because of the American citizens who remain there.

Nor have other US interests been damaged in South Africa itself. The human rights policy does not seem to have reduced Pretoria’s cooperation on Rhodesia and Namibia, where it continues to act in consonance with what it sees as its national interests. The government’s sense of international isolation could, however, in time affect its nuclear weapons policies.

Ethiopia’s closure of US facilities and expulsion of American personnel probably stemmed more from the new regime’s desire to seek a more ideologically compatible political and military relationship with Moscow than from unhappiness with our human rights advocacy.21 And Guinea—so far—continues to deny overflight and refueling rights to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, despite our opposition to loans to it and our action on its PL 480 allocation.

In much of Africa, like much of Latin America, promotion of human rights is our chief interest. Since a number of African leaders either have good human rights records (Gambia, Senegal, Liberia) or are working actively to improve them (Rwanda, the Sudan, Nigeria, Upper Volta), our human rights policy is more often supportive of local efforts there than in Latin America.

East Asia

The greatest risk to other US interests from the human rights policy may be in East Asia, and especially in Korea. It is possible that North Korea might miscalculate the degree of deterioration in USROK relations; or that US-Korean tensions (including over human rights) could make South Korea harder to deal with on a range of issues, including nuclear ones.

Other potential victims of the human rights policy could be President Marcos’ cooperative stance toward re-negotiation of our base rights in the Philippines, and our close relations with Indonesian leaders. But both governments would balance their irritation with our human rights policies against their own interest in preserving the security and economic relationships. So far, they clearly are coming down in favor of the latter.

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More broadly in Asia there is confusion about US purposes and uncertainty about the validity of our commitments to long-standing friends. The human rights policy is not primarily responsible, but it is a contributing factor. This could in time affect our relations even with those in the region (e.g. Japan) whose own human rights practices we are not criticizing.

International Financial Institutions

Some believe that we also risk damaging the IFIs, by politicizing their work in violation of their charters. This did not start with the Carter Administration. We opposed loans to Allende’s Chile on political grounds, and long have used our influence to channel international lending to anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless, no country has heretofore made non-economic considerations so consistently and overtly a factor in its attitude to IFI loans. This could come back to haunt us if other governments decide non-economic criteria should be applied to governments we want to support. (The discrepancy between our alleged politicization of the IFIs, and our departure from the ILO because others had politicized it,22 is widely noted.) We also are inadvertently strengthening Congressional opponents of the institutions.

West European governments have mixed feelings about what we are doing. The British, French, and West Germans have asked for advance notice of our negative votes; the EC has asked for “cooperative exploration” of how to pursue human rights concerns in the IFIs; and Sweden has asked us to consult with the Nordic Group.

Some of these requests for consultation may suggest interest in joining us; others from a hope of putting a check on what some European financial officials see as a dangerous American practice.

This survey of all the damage our human rights advocacy might have caused to other US interests—but hasn’t—is a useful reminder that other governments’ concrete interest in cooperation with us is often as great as ours with them, and sometimes greater. In the past we sometimes have made the mistake of acting as though we were the only party with much at stake in a relationship, and so must avoid giving offense. Obviously there is a point where national pride or general irritation could loom larger than practical considerations for some governments. Anticipating that point remains one of our chief tasks. But the need of others for us—in security or economic or diplomatic relations—usually is great enough to give us considerable room for human rights advocacy, without serious damage to other US interests.

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Beyond the specific and quantifiable, however, there is a perhaps greater danger that we will come to be seen as the self-appointed guardian of the world’s morals, having shifted from an anti-Communist crusade to one equally sanctimonious. If our human rights policy should come to be seen as designed to further some definition of US geopolitical interests, it would not only damage our ability to press the human rights cause, but also make us suspect on other issues. This could be especially damaging to North-South relations. The same human rights policy which many in the third world admire in principle could, as it works out in practice, make us seem insensitive to LDC economic development needs as perceived by the LDCs themselves. So far, the human rights policy has gone far to reverse situations where cooperation with us was based more on need than respect. A perception of moral arrogance and/or hypocrisy in our human rights advocacy could shift the balance once again.

IV. Are We Being Consistent?

No. And we should not try to be completely so. There are times when security considerations, or broader political factors, lead us to be “softer” on some countries’ human rights performance than others. Moreover, it often is a close call just what action is most likely to produce improvement in a human rights situation. We sometimes, for instance, approve a loan in recognition of a positive trend—even though the overall situation in the country remains as bad or worse than that in countries whose loans we oppose. One of the most difficult questions in the human rights business is what actions on our part are most likely to encourage a government to believe that further progress is worthwhile, without leading it to think we believe its human rights problem is solved. This can only be done on a case-by-case basis, and some of our decisions will turn out to have been wrong.

That said, we do have potentially serious problems at least with the appearance, and perhaps with the reality, of inconsistency:

Bilateral vs. IFI Loans

We often continue bilateral aid programs to countries whose IFI loans we oppose. We understand that bilateral programs, which we control, are designed to serve basic human needs. But it can look to others as though we are only posturing when our votes will not make a decisive difference, but avoiding action which actually would deny a human rights violator any money.

Economic vs. Military Assistance

We have been far more rigorous in applying human rights criteria to economic assistance, which is designed to help poor people, than military assistance or sales, which are perceived by some as helping [Page 365] governments be repressive. As noted, this is sometimes because we think our own security interests are at stake, or because sales of military equipment contribute to such vital objectives such as oil price stability, or help pay for oil imports. In Korea, it is because we are engaged in a delicate maneuver to reduce our military involvement without damaging our security interests. But the apparent discrepancies in our application of human rights criteria to economic as opposed to military decisions can give the impression that we are less interested in human rights—including economic development of the LDC’s—than in traditional cold war criteria for “friends.”

The Weak vs. The Strong

We sometimes seem to be “punishing” countries which don’t matter very much to our security or economic interests (Paraguay, Uruguay, the Central African Empire, Benin, Guinea) while glossing over the human rights record of some who do (Iran, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the PRC, even, of late, the Soviet Union).

The charge is not always justified. In the case of Israel, our apparent leniency is in fact part of a general strategy to resolve, inter alia, its only serious human rights problem—the military occupation of Arab lands. At the CSCE, we have been harder on Moscow’s human rights failings than is generally realized. And when the charge is true, it sometimes is for the good reason that our human rights concerns are being kept in context with other important national interests, or that we are concentrating on countries where we have some hope of being effective (i.e., recipients of our aid) rather than posturing toward, for instance, the PRC. Nonetheless, we risk the unhappy image of being tougher on the weak than the strong.

Regional Discrimination

Our actions can also be read as focusing on Latin America as the best theater for human rights activity, at little risk to other American interests. As earlier noted, we have opposed or urged deferral of 22 IFI loans to Latin America; seven to Africa; and four to East Asia. Our military programs in Latin America have been massively affected by human rights considerations; only marginally so in East Asia; and not at all in the Middle East.

There are reasons for this, some better than others: we have a good deal of leverage in Latin America; more countries there are traditional recipients of our economic and military assistance than in, for instance, East Asia; our security and economic stake is less than in East Asia or the Middle East; Latin American governments are ideologically disinclined to turn to Moscow; we expect more of it because it is part of the West and therefore more culturally attuned to the claims of individual [Page 366] rights; in much of the area there has been a deterioration in human rights situations; and our past support for military regimes in the area does identify us with their excesses. It may also be true, however, that some human rights activists (in and out of government) are more interested in castigating those rightist dictatorships supported by previous US Administrations than in an evenhanded application of the policy. Whatever our motives, we do risk letting the human rights policy appear to be yet another incarnation of traditional big-stick interventionism, while we shy away from more risky problems in other parts of the world.

Sticks vs. Carrots

We are on record as being more interested in helping governments who are trying to improve their human rights situations than in denying assistance to offenders. In practice, however, we are doing far more of the latter than the former.

Especially in foreign assistance—our chief concrete source of influence—we have been mostly responding to human rights violations. That possibly was inevitable during this first year of a new policy. We have had to decide what position to take on loans as they came forward in the international financial institutions; changing the internal focus of the IFI’s so that their lending programs would do more to promote human rights would be harder, and take a lot more time. Even in our bilateral aid programs, which we can control, it is difficult and time consuming (years rather than months) to develop and obtain local and Congressional approval of new programs. Similarly, it is easier—and makes us look better—to reduce or end military programs than to consider how or whether some of them (and especially the training programs) can be used to promote human rights. Thus across-the-board the “reward” approach is lagging well behind the punitive.

Our Criteria: Rhetoric vs. Actions

Finally, we say that all three aspects of human rights (integrity of the person; economic rights; political rights) are equally important. But our loan decisions are in fact much tougher on governments which practice torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other violations of the person, than on countries where there is little political liberty. Moreover, while we try to promote economic human rights by supporting “basic human needs” loans even to most serious human rights offenders, we do not give a government’s own efforts to promote economic development or equity equal weight with its record on political liberties when assessing its overall human rights performance. (South Korea, most socialist states of Eastern Europe, and Vietnam might rank quite high if we did.)

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We think this is the right approach in the IFIs. To accept a tradeoff of economic progress or equity for a government’s locking up its opposition would run counter to American principles, and could undercut public support for the human rights policy. It would mean lowering our sights and abandoning the principle that American resources should promote American values. But to go beyond our present policy, and oppose international developmental assistance to countries which do not meet our standards of political liberty (a parliamentary democracy; a free press) would be going too far toward imposing our standards on the rest of the world. This reflects the point, stated in your Atlanta speech,23 that building democracies is a longer-term proposition than putting a stop to torture.

The present approach does, however, involve problems. Some we probably have to resign ourselves to living with; others we can try to do something about.

We must expect the resentment of LDC governments over a policy which clashes with their view (and possibly that of many of their citizens as well) of the requirements of their present state of economic and political development. We will encounter charges (some specious, some sincere) of moral arrogance and of insisting, once again, that we know what is best for other people. But we need not resign ourselves to the present lack of appreciation (or even understanding) of what we are doing to promote economic human rights, especially through the basic human needs focus of the AID program. We should try harder to get this message across.

We also need to intensify our efforts to find ways of promoting political rights. As noted above, the “punitive” approach would be inappropriate here; and it is far harder to devise positive action than to react to loans on the IFI agendas. Moreover, some of the possible ways of promoting the economic pluralism that can lead to political openings (e.g., economic assistance which would strengthen the middle class or labor unions in a society that now is an oligarchy), could run counter to the basic human needs approach to AID. This might give us legal problems in dealing with some of the countries where such development might do the most good. But promotion of political rights should not take a backseat to personal and economic ones just because it is harder and because progress will be slower in coming.

V. Bureaucratic Complexities

The human rights policy is not only complicated substantively; it also is complex and difficult bureaucratically. It crucially affects our bilateral relations with foreign governments—the bread and butter of [Page 368] State Department work—and yet it cuts across areas of responsibility which other government departments (e.g., Treasury or Agriculture) have thought of as their own. Consequently, important decisions are taken in committee sessions from which, sometimes, no one emerges entirely happy. Our case-by-case approach—the absence of clear guidelines that certain human rights violations will always receive certain treatment, much less a “hit list” of the most offending countries—further complicates the process.

For all the problems involved and the resentment of those who feel that their good advice went unheeded, we still think this is the best way to do the human rights business. The issues do go beyond the purview of any one bureau or department. It is a perhaps extreme example of the fact that key foreign policy issues these days are not bilateral or even regional, but functional. But some degree of bureaucratic resentment probably is inevitable.

VI. How Do We Stand With Congress?

Reasonably well at present, but we face potentially serious (and conflicting) pressures.

Those Congressmen most interested in human rights like what we say, but remain skeptical of our actions. Our role in legislation has so far been largely reactive, and is seen by many as damage-limiting. It is generally believed, for instance, that we would not be applying human rights criteria to economic assistance if Congress had not ordered us to do so. Our record on military assistance to human rights offenders is especially criticized.

Congressional unhappiness with perceived softness in our application of the policy, combined with the desire of many Congressmen to seem tough (especially on South Korea), could produce new proposals not only to shorten our leash in the IFIs, but also for restrictive legislation governing our participation in UN organizations or the IMF. Moves already are afloat to inject human rights concerns into appropriations for the Witteveen Facility.24 (Such efforts would of course be supported by those who don’t like the UN or IFIs for other reasons.) The major coalition of human rights groups intends to focus on security assistance to violators. Congressional unhappiness with our performance could even impede the arms transfers we want to make to South Korea in compensation for troop withdrawals.

Pressure from human rights activists on the Hill is a familiar problem. We may have a new and growing one with Congressmen who fear that our human rights advocacy will interfere with other [Page 369] American interests. The outcry over PL 480 reporting requirements could be a sample of what is to come, especially if the human rights policy does in fact do visible damage to other interests (e.g., if US agricultural exports are hurt, or if the Philippine base negotiations should go sour). The fact that we were carrying out the expressed will of Congress would not greatly lessen the wrath of some of its members who belatedly realized what was going on.

VII. The Lessons of Hindsight

Most of the problems noted above will be with us as long as we have an active human rights policy. They are part of an unavoidable balancing act. But there is room for improvement, and some hard questions need attention.

Policy Reaffirmation

A Presidential Directive would help (the human rights PRM hasn’t had one) to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used. We understand that a draft is now with the President.

Country Strategies

We badly need country strategy papers that will integrate our human rights interests with other American concerns, and give useful guidance for applying all our instruments of influence. There is still an inclination on the part of many to fight the problem and to avert any measures which may affect countries with which they deal. Country strategy papers which took for granted the objectives of our human rights policies and outlined alternative means for achieving these ends, including both incentives, sanctions, and other approaches would vastly contribute to the process of decision making.

Senior policy officials still would have to give time-consuming attention to, for instance, individual loan proposals, in light of the human rights situation at a particular moment and what else was happening (e.g., an important visit or negotiation). But we need a better context for those decisions—general guidance as to the relative weight to be given to our different instruments of leverage in a particular country, and why, and a sense of how to phase in the use of those instruments

The regional bureaus have most at stake here. The tenacity of this Administration’s commitment to an active human rights policy is now clear; it is in the bureaus’ interest that it be sensibly implemented. Assistant Secretaries and their Deputies (and regional experts in S/P) should consider country action strategies a matter of high priority.

Bureaucratic Gaps

Gaps in our internal procedures would inhibit implementation of coherent country strategies, even if we had them. We especially need [Page 370] better integration of our economic and military assistance decisions. Good country strategies, and a better flow of information about individual decisions between the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, on the one hand, and the Arms Control Export Board, on the other, would help. Opinion is divided as to whether there should be a more institutionalized advisory link between the two. We think the various ways of establishing such a link should at least be explored.

The Foreign Assistance Group also should continue to improve its procedures for putting human rights in context of other American interests—and be seen to do so. Regional Bureau experts have recently been playing a larger role (in preparation of the Group’s agenda and in introducing issues at its meetings). That trend should be encouraged, and representatives of other Departments also urged to speak not just to a human rights situation or the basic human needs relevance of a loan, but to their view of our overall interests in and strategy toward a problem country.

Effectiveness

Except for countries whose human rights violations are so serious that legislation requires us to treat them in certain ways, we should try to emphasize what will be effective over what will make us look consistent. That may not prove possible. It certainly would be more time-consuming, since it would be even less clear that a certain kind of human rights violation, wherever it occurred, would require a certain response from us. A more serious problem is that country desk officers might be unable to resist the temptation to say that only quiet diplomacy could ever work in the country with which they have to deal; or, even if we overcame the temptation, we might be unable to convince Congress that we had done so. In that case, we might only provoke legislation which further restricted our flexibility. But it is worth trying to develop country strategies which emphasize effectiveness. It would be essential to consult with human rights activists and critics alike on the Hill about country strategies—not just transmit to them our finished papers—well in advance of our decisions about particular assistance programs.

Our Role in the IFI’s

We are required by law to use our voice and vote to promote human rights in the IFI’s, including channeling loans to countries with good human rights records; consulting with other donors about standards for meeting basic human needs and promoting human rights; and devising with them mechanisms for acting together. There are various ways (or combinations of ways) we could meet the requirement. Each has advantages and drawbacks.

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—We could try to get other donor countries to join us in applying human rights criteria to their votes. That would increase the risk of politicizing the IFI’s; further complicate our relations with LDC’s who would suffer not only the onus of our opposition, but also a denial of cash; and might alarm other donors. But failure to do so might lead some Congressmen to believe that we are not serious about using the IFI’s to promote human rights, and produce further legislative restrictions on our role in them.

—We could encourage the UN and OAS Human Rights Commissions to make independent reports to the IFI’s. This would be consistent with our desire to multilateralize our human rights policy and to make clear that we are applying internationally recognized standards. But the UN Human Rights Commission in particular is likely to render judgments which we—and Congress—could not accept as objective.

—We could try to channel IFI lending programs away from human rights violators. This would meet the letter of the law. But since IFI programs are a long time in the pipeline, it could impede our ability to respond to changing human rights conditions.

—We could try to design IFI programs to meet basic human needs criteria. This might lessen the risk that our votes would politicize the IFI’s and would be consistent with the World Bank’s own stated intention. It might do more to promote human rights (especially economic rights) than denial of funds, or US opposition to loans that are approved anyway. But it would also reduce our opportunities for demonstrating our disapproval of countries’ human rights failings. That might so displease some in Congress that we would face new efforts to reduce our contributions to the IFI’s, or to require that we oppose all loans to certain countries. It also would remove a remaining source of support for capital intensive “growth” projects and run counter both to our urging the IFI’s to make loans for energy development to non-oil LDC’s, and to our argument that a commodities’ Common Fund needs no capacity to finance measures such as market development and infrastructure because the development banks meet that need.

The Perception of Arrogance

We should intensify efforts to multilateralize our human rights efforts. This would help reduce suspicions of a holier-than-thou attitude or an ideological crusade against selected states. More important, it would help the cause of human rights, by further enlisting the weight of world opinion.

We either have done or are doing most of the immediately important things to bring our human rights policy in line with international standards (e.g., signing the UN Covenants and the American Convention on Human Rights) and are working to improve the capacity of [Page 372] both the UN and OAS to deal with human rights issues. We should now be consulting with others—at the UN, in the OAS, and with other regional leaders (e.g., in black Africa)—about their suggestions for effective human rights strategies in their areas, in the context of their own cultural, economic, and political situations. We also should intensify consultations with West Europeans and Canadians—private and official—about what all of us can do to promote human rights.

Perhaps even more important, we should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our own human rights problems. The general perception seems to be that we’ve done nothing but allude to our domestic problems in a few speeches. The President’s program is better than that, but its human rights impact is dulled because we seldom talk of welfare or tax reform, or proposals for urban renewal, or for youth employment, under a human rights heading. We should make a point of stressing that these are part of our commitment to improve the lot of individual Americans.

In Sum . . .

Generalized conclusions on such a complex of issues are very risky, and certain to be controversial. But this is the balance S/P draws:

—The human rights policy may be the best thing this Administration has going for it. It has enormously improved America’s international standing and our claim to moral leadership. It already has done quite a lot to help individuals, in widely varying situations, and to contribute to political dynamics that can lead to further improvements. While the potential damage to other American interests needs to be kept in mind, no actual harm has yet been done. That suggests to us that such damage can in fact be avoided.

—Any serious human rights policy will be subject to conflicting criticisms. Limiting ourselves to rhetoric and quiet diplomacy would produce (and deserve) charges of superficiality and hypocrisy. Using material pressure (i.e., economic and military assistance) produces charges of moral arrogance. Softening our human rights advocacy in some cases to protect other American interests produces accusations of double standards. Adjusting our tactics in order to try to be effective in different situations produces accusations of inconsistency. There is some justice in most of these criticisms. Any policy as difficult and complex as this inevitably has a debit side. The balance, however, is decidedly positive, and we do not believe a major change of course is called for.

—But we have not done a good enough job of articulating publicly what we are doing, and why, and the possibilities and limits of what we can hope to accomplish. Both the policy and its execution are far more complex than we have managed to convey. Opinion shapers (in[Page 373]cluding human rights activists) here and abroad are likely to be far more responsive to candid discussions of difficulties, dilemmas, and inevitable inconsistencies, than to generalized rhetoric which seems to gloss over our problems. We have done a lot in a short time to inject new considerations into American foreign policy—to move beyond formal relations with other governments to a concern with how our actions affect people living under those governments. We have done so with encouraging success, and with little if any cost. We can expect to learn from experience and do even better next year. But it is in the nature of the problem that our performance will not become “perfect.” We should go on the offensive to convey that message, and especially a sophisticated understanding of the obstacles we confront.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 16, Human Rights: Foreign Policy Goals and Accomplishments: 1/78–9/79. Confidential. Sent through Christopher. Copies were sent to Habib, Cooper, Benson, and Derian. Earlier versions of both the action memorandum and the attached briefing memorandum were sent to Vance through Christopher on December 22, 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memoranda from WC to Bureaus—1978) In a December 30 memorandum to Lake, Christopher commented on the December 22 briefing memorandum, noting that he had “read and reread the memorandum S/P has prepared assessing the human rights policy, and think it is a commendable piece of work.” (Ibid.)
  2. Presumable reference to the draft PD that Brzezinski forwarded to the President under cover of a December 3, 1977, memorandum; see Document 96.
  3. An unknown hand circled the phrase “country strategy papers” and placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph.
  4. An unknown hand placed a question mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph.
  5. An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph.
  6. There is no indication as to whether Vance approved or disapproved the recommendation; however, Tarnoff transmitted a copy of Lake’s action memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 30 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780040–0102)
  7. Confidential. Drafted by Jennone Walker on January 16. Sent through Christopher. Neither Lake nor Christopher initialed the memorandum.
  8. See Documents 47 and 79.
  9. See footnote 9, Document 80.
  10. According to an October 21 study prepared in AID by Collins and entitled “A Summary of the Decisions Taken by the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Economic Assistance, May–October 1977,” the Embassy of Chile informed the Department of State in a June 27 diplomatic note that the Government of Chile intended to “decline” the $15 million in P.L. 480 Title I aid and $12.5 million in development loans and grants extended under the provisions of the FY 1977 Foreign Assistance Act. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights Interagency Group V)
  11. At its October 14, 1977, meeting, the Interagency Group reduced the proposed P.L. 480 agreement with Guinea from $7 million to $5 million. (“A Summary of the Decisions Taken by the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Economic Assistance, May–October 1977,” October 21; ibid.) According to the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s January 16, 1978, evening report: “The human rights situation in Guinea appears to have improved significantly largely in response to American and other Western pressure. Sekou Toure ordered the release of at least 62 political prisoners during December—the largest single political amnesty in Guinea’s history. Toure apparently intends to release all political prisoners by the end of 1978.” Brzezinski wrote in the margin next to this statement, “shouldn’t we react?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 1–3/78)
  12. An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the last sentence of this paragraph.
  13. An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph next to the dollar figure.
  14. An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph next to this sentence.
  15. Reference is to the October 1976 Federal investigation of South Korean businessman Tongsun Park and other South Korean individuals suspected of providing gifts and cash to U.S. members of Congress to influence legislative decisions regarding the ROK Government. See Scott Armstrong and Maxine Cheshire, “Korean Ties to Congress Are Probed,” The Washington Post, October 15, 1976, p. A–1; Maxine Cheshire and Scott Armstrong, “Seoul Gave Millions to U.S. Officials,” The Washington Post, October 24, 1976, pp. A–1 and A–10; and Nicholas M. Horrock, “Big Political Scandal Held Possible—Study Still in Early Stage,” The New York Times, October 28, 1976, pp. 1 and 12.
  16. See footnote 4, Document 7; footnotes 2 and 3, Document 18; and footnote 12, Document 38.
  17. Additional information on Gromyko’s visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VI, Soviet Union.
  18. Vance traveled to Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 20–22, 1977, to meet with President Videla.
  19. See footnote 5, Document 42.
  20. See footnote 7, Document 42.
  21. See footnote 8, Document 42.
  22. See footnote 4, Document 63.
  23. See Document 39.
  24. Named after IMF Managing Director H. Johannes Witteveen, the Facility constituted a special fund designed to provide economic assistance to oil-importing nations.