The attached memorandum takes stock of the human rights policy, one year on.
It begins with a description of what we have done, and es
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pecially of how much the policy actually has
affected our economic or military programs. This review is useful to have,
but may be the least interesting part of the paper.
You might want to begin with our assessment of accomplishments (pp 5–6) and
of whether there have been setbacks (to human rights, on p 6, and to other
American interests, on pp 7–10). The paper then discusses the problem of
consistency: ways in which we are being less, or perhaps in some cases more,
consistent than we should aim for (pp 11–15).
—A Presidential Decision would help to clarify to the bureaucracy how the
President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments
being used. (A draft reportedly is with the President).2
—Our country strategies should try to emphasize what is most likely to be
effective in improving human rights situations, rather than what decisions
will make us look consistent.4
—We need better procedures to integrate our economic with our military
assistance decisions.
—We have hard choices to make on compliance with the legal requirements about
our role in International Financial Institutions.5
—We should look for more ways to multilateralize our human rights efforts,
both to reduce suspicions of a smug American moralism and to further enlist
the weight of world opinion in conjunction with our efforts.
—We should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our human
rights problems in this country.
—We need to do a better job of explaining, at home and abroad, the
complexities of our policy and the reasons for some apparent
inconsistencies.
The memorandum was written by my staff and we take responsibility for its
judgments. But we have solicited the opinions of many others—in HA, D, EB, H,
T, IO, the regional Bureaus, and AID. Most were eager to express what they do
and don’t like about how the policy is working and the paper tries to
reflect their opinions, with indications of important disagreements within
this building. Some still think the overall tone and thrust are wrong.
Comments range from “Pollyannaish” to “overly negative”.
We believe this memorandum might be useful at the White House, and suggest
that it be sent under cover of a Tarnoff-Brzezinski
memorandum.6
Attachment
Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy
Planning Staff (Lake) to
Secretary of State Vance
7
SUBJECT
- The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment
The human rights policy is off to a good start but, to no one’s surprise,
problems remain. In the following paragraphs we apply hindsight to the
year’s experience, with deliberate emphasis on problem areas and what
now needs to be done.
I. What Are We Actually Doing?
Human rights advocacy has become a standard, visible, and important
feature of our diplomacy. The President has repeatedly emphasized that
it is a cardinal tenet of his foreign policy—a theme you and other key
officials have elaborated in speeches. Early in the Administration we
signed the UN Covenants and the American
Convention on
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Human Rights
(but have yet to send them to the Hill for ratification).8 We have made scores
of diplomatic demarches on the specific human rights problems of
individual countries. Not least important, discussion of our human
rights concerns has been integrated into all our dealings with foreign
governments—from the President’s and your own private conversations, to
the most routine dealings of Embassy and Department desk officers with
their foreign counterparts. The very pervasiveness of such exchanges
makes them hard to quantify or even summarize. But their impact in
conveying our seriousness should not be underestimated.
We also have had some months of experience with using more concrete
instruments of American influence: bilateral aid programs; International
Financial Institutions; and security relationships. These two kinds of
actions—diplomatic exchanges and use of our material support—are closely
related. For example, we generally put a government on specific notice
that particular human rights problems would cause us to oppose loans to
it before actually abstaining or voting no. We often use the occasion of
a positive vote to make some form of human rights demarche—warning that
continued positive votes will be difficult absent improvement, or
advising that only certain apparent or promised improvements make it
possible for us to be positive.
Bilateral Aid
Our bilateral aid programs are designed to serve basic human needs, and
so intrinsically promote human rights. Consequently, only in
extraordinary circumstances have we cut or delayed programs in order to
signal objection to a repressive government:
—We are suspending new programs to the Central African Empire, partly in
response to Congressional pressure;
—We have been deferring decision on some loans to Nicaragua since
mid-September, in order to assess what appear to be human rights
improvements there;9
—After press reports of our decision to delay some assistance to Chile,
Santiago cancelled our FY 77 program and
it is not in future AID budgets;10
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—We have reduced the PL 480 allocation to
Guinea,11 and increased it to Peru, on human rights
grounds;
—We appear to have indefinitely delayed one CCC credit to Chile, and the Interagency Group on Foreign
Assistance and Human Rights is also available for advice to ExIm when
the latter requests (as it has done on Uruguay and Argentina).
But most of our bilateral effort has focused not on determining who is a
deserving recipient of aid, but rather on ensuring that it does in fact
promote human rights:
—$750,000 was earmarked in AID’s FY 78 budget for projects which promote
civil and political rights (e.g., legal aid for the poor).
—We are beginning to implement the new legislative requirement that human
rights violators which receive PL 480
Title I assistance report on how food or the proceeds from its sale is
used to “directly benefit needy people.” Reporting requirements have
been signed with Indonesia and Guinea and negotiations are underway with
Bangladesh, South Korea, Zaire and Somalia. They may begin with a few
others.
Human rights concerns may cut more deeply into AID programs—including country allocations—in the future,
beginning with the 1979 budget. This is a difficult and controversial
business since, even though AID money
can be reprogrammed to other countries, we would be reducing aid
specifically designed to benefit needy people in a particular country in
order to express disapproval of their government and try to influence
its performance on civil or political human rights.
The International Financial Institutions
The human rights policy has had greater—and more visible—impact on our
role in International Financial Institutions, especially on loans for
industrial development which seldom meet the “basic human needs”
criteria. Since the Carter
Administration took office we have abstained from voting on eleven loans
on human rights grounds (to
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Ethiopia, Benin, Argentina, the Philippines, Korea and the CAE) and voted against seven (to Chile,
Argentina and Guinea).12
We have not thus far formally opposed any loans when our opposition would
have meant their defeat. We only have veto power over the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations (FSO), and in several cases we have
indicated that we might oppose an FSO
loan if it came to a vote; in most, the applicant government has chosen
to hold it back. Some $143,252,000 worth of loans are currently being
held up because of our action—to Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and
Nicaragua.13
Few other participants in IFI deliberations have joined us in opposing
loans on human rights grounds. West European opposition to loans for the
Pinochet regime began
before ours. Venezuela recently abstained on one loan to Chile. British
and Swedish representatives in the IDB
recently put on record that they would have opposed a loan to Argentina
had they national votes; but the European regional group of which they
are a part cast its collective vote in favor.
Security Assistance and Sales
Human rights considerations have become perhaps the dominant factor in
arms transfers to Latin America. This has resulted from a combination of
factors: Congressional prohibitions (to Argentina and Uruguay); refusals
of our security assistance by Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala in
response to our reporting to Congress on their human rights situations;
the low risk of Soviet inroads if our arms flows are reduced; and,
possibly, the relatively small economic importance to us of arms sales
in the area. Most cases involving major lethal equipment to serious
violators have not been approved, at least absent progress on human
rights. However, some significant non-lethal items (e.g., C–130’s to Argentina) as well as some
spare parts, still are approved after careful review.
The great bulk of our arms transfers, however, are to East Asia and the
Middle East, and they have been only marginally affected by human rights
considerations. We have, for instance, opposed economic loans in IFI’s
to both South Korea and the Philippines and are including Korea and
Indonesia among the problem countries which must report on their use of
PL 480 Title I. But base
negotiations in the Philippines and troop withdrawal considerations in
Korea have thus far led us to continue very large security assistance
programs to both. There has been some impact on security relations with
Indonesia, where sale of
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F–5 aircraft was made contingent on the
actual freeing of some political prisoners whose release already was
scheduled.
The East Asian record will be somewhat better in 1979. Human rights
considerations have contributed to adjustments in allocations,
especially for military training, for Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. This probably is known by the recipient governments (although
they could rationalize their cuts as flowing from Congressional
reduction of the overall budget). But the general public perception is
likely to be of continued high levels of security assistance.
Similarly, in the Middle East, our desire to move Arabs and Israelis
toward a peace settlement and the importance of Mideast oil have kept
arms sales high.
Nor have the human rights considerations cut into arms transfers to black
Africa, either because the amounts sold are minimal or because of an
interest in supporting “moderate” governments (e.g., Morocco and
Zaire).
Finally, although we are working toward a policy of reviewing straight
commercial sales to police forces of items not on the munitions list, no
decision has yet been reached.
II. Human Rights Accomplishments and Setbacks
What Have We Accomplished?
The human rights policy has helped us at least as much as it has produced
changes abroad. Our post-Vietnam, post-Watergate image has been greatly
improved. To a large degree we have taken the ideological initiative
from the Soviets. This boosts our standing—and that of traditional
friends—in Europe, and helps in our relations with a number of LDC’s. The policy is especially
appealing—and encouraging—to many people living under repressive
regimes.
This underscores what many of us frequently forget—the US is a model for many countries; our
influence transcends our political, economic, and military power and is
strikingly important in ethical, cultural, and value areas; other
governments find themselves unable entirely to ignore the impact of
US policy and actions—particularly
when we join action to rhetoric.
Our championship of human rights is encouraging others to do likewise.
Activity in the UN and OAS has picked up considerably, and the
OAS and Red Cross human rights
commissions are being allowed into countries which previously excluded
them. The West Europeans are more active both in international fora and
in diplomatic dialogue with problem countries. Once-lonely private
activists now find themselves deluged with invitations to conferences.
Some who long have been working to advance human rights have taken new
hope from the
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Administration’s
policies; others doubtless are bandwagon-hopping. But they all
contribute to a growing international lobby which combines its influence
with our own.
Most important, this increased international focus already has led to
human rights improvements in several countries. Significant numbers of
political prisoners have been released, in Iran, Poland, Morocco,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Togo, Nepal, the
CAE, Guinea and Indonesia. Iran and
Thailand are opening trials of political prisoners for the first time.
Emigration from the Soviet Union, some East European states, and Syria,
has become a little easier. In some of these countries there also has
been back-sliding; moreover, we often question whether an improvement is
more than cosmetic. Nonetheless, the overall balance is decidedly
positive.
No authoritarian regime has fundamentally altered its political system,
nor are the hard-core dictatorships likely to take action which they
would perceive (in some cases rightly) as political suicide. But some
political systems are becoming somewhat freer.14 The
opposition in Brazil is increasingly active. El Salvador and Nicaragua
have lifted states of seige. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have announced
intentions to hold elections in 1978. The most notable advances in
political freedom—in India, Portugal and Spain—were independent of our
human rights advocacy; but democratic forces in all three seem to be
taking heart from our new focus.
In sum, a trend seems to have begun which could gather momentum and which
already is improving the plight of individuals—including those under
some still-authoritarian regimes. And since individuals are what the
human rights policy is primarily about, even the scattered and partial
successes registered to date are important. Moreover, even marginal
reductions in repression offer more latitude to dissidents, which in
turn contributes to an internal dynamic that may produce further
change.
It is neither possible nor very useful to specify the precise weight of
our influence in these developments. The important thing is that we are
contributing to an international consciousness-raising and a climate
conducive to human rights improvements.
Are We Jeopardizing Human Rights Anywhere?
Maybe, at least in the near-term. Worry about the “destabilizing” effect
of international attention to human rights may lead some authoritarian
regimes to tighten domestic screws. This may already have happened in
the Soviet Union and South Africa, where the governments
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fear that our human rights advocacy has or
might stimulate critics of the regime. In both, however, many of those
most affected seem to want us to continue our efforts; they apparently
believe that the near-term risk is in their own long-range interest.
There may be similar risks elsewhere. In South Korea, for instance, the
regime now seems eager to resolve differences with us. But it is
possible that human rights behavior, combined with withdrawal of our
ground combat troops and the “Koreagate” probe,15 could produce a seige mentality which would
make easing of repression less likely, or indeed even reduce tolerance
for domestic dissent.
III. Are We Damaging Other US Interests?
Not yet in any quantifiable way, although the risk always is present when
we are pursuing several interests at once.
Eastern Europe
Soviet leaders fear the human rights policy, which they see as an effort
to discredit them in world opinion and to undermine the political
systems of the Warsaw Pact states. Our early high profile contacts with
leading Soviet dissidents,16 combined with our initial SALT proposals, did badly rock the
relationship. And we cannot know just how a general unhappiness with the
human rights policy affects the atmosphere of Soviet decision-making
across the board. But it does not, in fact, seem yet to have interfered
with SALT and other arms control
negotiations, or US-Soviet dealings in
other areas, where the Soviets seem to be pursuing their specific
interests much as usual. Indeed the improvement in US-Soviet relations following the SALT breakthrough during Gromyko’s September visit to
Washington17 has survived even the human rights
beating Moscow has been taking at the Belgrade CSCE conference. The spillover might in fact work the other
way: progress on SALT may be making
Soviet leaders more willing (within limits) to stomach our human rights
position.
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Latin America
Several Latin American governments are at least as unhappy with our
promotion of human rights as the Soviets. With some like Uruguay,
Paraguay, and Nicaragua, our bilateral interests are so modest that our
prime interest is human rights. This could, of course, become a
situation in which the sum is greater than the parts: if enough such
governments become sufficiently angry over our human rights approach,
there could be a spillover effect which damaged the OAS, and our interests in it. But this is
not yet the case: to the contrary, last summer’s OAS General Assembly was notable for a
surge of human rights enthusiasm.
And in those Latin American countries where we have more at stake, no
concrete damage seems to have been done. Our severe criticism of
Argentina’s human rights record did not prevent it from agreeing to make
some nuclear non-proliferation commitments during the Secretary’s
November visit;18 and it is highly unlikely that Brazil would have
agreed to forego its reprocessing agreement with West Germany even had
we had no human rights policy.19 We cannot
know what price we might one day pay for the deterioration in our once
close military relationships with Brazil and Argentina. That obviously
depends in part on the political evolution of the countries
themselves—an evolution to which the human rights policy, if successful,
could contribute positively.
Middle East
The impact of our human rights policy on US interests in Middle Eastern countries has been modest.
Few of them are recipients of economic assistance and, as noted, we have
not put primary emphasis on human rights considerations, in view of our
other pressing interests, when deciding on arms sales or determining our
approach to the area generally. The quiet diplomacy we have undertaken
in the region has been palatable to the governments concerned, and shown
some success (e.g., in increased Jewish emigration from Syria).
Africa
The human rights policy, far from damaging our interests with African
governments, has served them. This is partly because the chief targets
of our criticism have been South Africa and Rhodesia, and that greatly
enhances our stature in the area as a whole. We have refrained from
criticism of the human rights problems of frontline states whose
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support we want in southern
Africa (e.g. Tanzania, which has more political prisoners than South
Korea). Our criticism of Uganda20 is not so
enthusiastically endorsed by other African governments, but certainly
does not hurt us with them; that criticism, moreover, has been somewhat
muted because of the American citizens who remain there.
Nor have other US interests been damaged
in South Africa itself. The human rights policy does not seem to have
reduced Pretoria’s cooperation on Rhodesia and Namibia, where it
continues to act in consonance with what it sees as its national
interests. The government’s sense of international isolation could,
however, in time affect its nuclear weapons policies.
Ethiopia’s closure of US facilities and
expulsion of American personnel probably stemmed more from the new
regime’s desire to seek a more ideologically compatible political and
military relationship with Moscow than from unhappiness with our human
rights advocacy.21 And Guinea—so
far—continues to deny overflight and refueling rights to Soviet
reconnaissance aircraft, despite our opposition to loans to it and our
action on its PL 480 allocation.
In much of Africa, like much of Latin America, promotion of human rights
is our chief interest. Since a number of African leaders either have
good human rights records (Gambia, Senegal, Liberia) or are working
actively to improve them (Rwanda, the Sudan, Nigeria, Upper Volta), our
human rights policy is more often supportive of local efforts there than
in Latin America.
East Asia
The greatest risk to other US interests
from the human rights policy may be in East Asia, and especially in
Korea. It is possible that North Korea might miscalculate the degree of
deterioration in US–ROK relations; or that US-Korean tensions (including over human
rights) could make South Korea harder to deal with on a range of issues,
including nuclear ones.
Other potential victims of the human rights policy could be President
Marcos’ cooperative stance
toward re-negotiation of our base rights in the Philippines, and our
close relations with Indonesian leaders. But both governments would
balance their irritation with our human rights policies against their
own interest in preserving the security and economic relationships. So
far, they clearly are coming down in favor of the latter.
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More broadly in Asia there is confusion about US purposes and uncertainty about the validity of our
commitments to long-standing friends. The human rights policy is not
primarily responsible, but it is a contributing factor. This could in
time affect our relations even with those in the region (e.g. Japan)
whose own human rights practices we are not criticizing.
International Financial Institutions
Some believe that we also risk damaging the IFIs, by politicizing their work in violation of their
charters. This did not start with the Carter Administration. We opposed loans to Allende’s
Chile on political grounds, and long have used our influence to channel
international lending to anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless, no country
has heretofore made non-economic considerations so consistently and
overtly a factor in its attitude to IFI loans. This could come back to
haunt us if other governments decide non-economic criteria should be
applied to governments we want to support. (The discrepancy between our
alleged politicization of the IFIs,
and our departure from the ILO because
others had politicized it,22 is widely
noted.) We also are inadvertently strengthening Congressional opponents
of the institutions.
West European governments have mixed feelings about what we are doing.
The British, French, and West Germans have asked for advance notice of
our negative votes; the EC has asked for
“cooperative exploration” of how to pursue human rights concerns in the
IFIs; and Sweden has asked us to
consult with the Nordic Group.
Some of these requests for consultation may suggest interest in joining
us; others from a hope of putting a check on what some European
financial officials see as a dangerous American practice.
This survey of all the damage our human rights advocacy might have caused
to other US interests—but hasn’t—is a
useful reminder that other governments’ concrete interest in cooperation
with us is often as great as ours with them, and sometimes greater. In
the past we sometimes have made the mistake of acting as though we were
the only party with much at stake in a relationship, and so must avoid
giving offense. Obviously there is a point where national pride or
general irritation could loom larger than practical considerations for
some governments. Anticipating that point remains one of our chief
tasks. But the need of others for us—in security or economic or
diplomatic relations—usually is great enough to give us considerable
room for human rights advocacy, without serious damage to other US interests.
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Beyond the specific and quantifiable, however, there is a perhaps greater
danger that we will come to be seen as the self-appointed guardian of
the world’s morals, having shifted from an anti-Communist crusade to one
equally sanctimonious. If our human rights policy should come to be seen
as designed to further some definition of US geopolitical interests, it would not only damage our
ability to press the human rights cause, but also make us suspect on
other issues. This could be especially damaging to North-South
relations. The same human rights policy which many in the third world
admire in principle could, as it works out in practice, make us seem
insensitive to LDC economic development
needs as perceived by the LDCs themselves. So far, the human rights
policy has gone far to reverse situations where cooperation with us was
based more on need than respect. A perception of moral arrogance and/or
hypocrisy in our human rights advocacy could shift the balance once
again.
IV. Are We Being Consistent?
No. And we should not try to be completely so. There are times when
security considerations, or broader political factors, lead us to be
“softer” on some countries’ human rights performance than others.
Moreover, it often is a close call just what action is most likely to
produce improvement in a human rights situation. We sometimes, for
instance, approve a loan in recognition of a positive trend—even though
the overall situation in the country remains as bad or worse than that
in countries whose loans we oppose. One of the most difficult questions
in the human rights business is what actions on our part are most likely
to encourage a government to believe that further progress is
worthwhile, without leading it to think we believe its human rights
problem is solved. This can only be done on a case-by-case basis, and
some of our decisions will turn out to have been wrong.
That said, we do have potentially serious problems at least with the
appearance, and perhaps with the reality, of inconsistency:
Bilateral vs. IFI Loans
We often continue bilateral aid programs to countries whose IFI loans we
oppose. We understand that bilateral programs, which we control, are
designed to serve basic human needs. But it can look to others as though
we are only posturing when our votes will not make a decisive
difference, but avoiding action which actually would deny a human rights
violator any money.
Economic vs. Military Assistance
We have been far more rigorous in applying human rights criteria to
economic assistance, which is designed to help poor people, than
military assistance or sales, which are perceived by some as helping
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governments be repressive. As
noted, this is sometimes because we think our own security interests are
at stake, or because sales of military equipment contribute to such
vital objectives such as oil price stability, or help pay for oil
imports. In Korea, it is because we are engaged in a delicate maneuver
to reduce our military involvement without damaging our security
interests. But the apparent discrepancies in our application of human
rights criteria to economic as opposed to military decisions can give
the impression that we are less interested in human rights—including
economic development of the LDC’s—than
in traditional cold war criteria for “friends.”
The Weak vs. The Strong
We sometimes seem to be “punishing” countries which don’t matter very
much to our security or economic interests (Paraguay, Uruguay, the
Central African Empire, Benin, Guinea) while glossing over the human
rights record of some who do (Iran, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the
PRC, even, of late, the Soviet
Union).
The charge is not always justified. In the case of Israel, our apparent
leniency is in fact part of a general strategy to resolve, inter alia, its only serious human rights
problem—the military occupation of Arab lands. At the CSCE, we have been harder on Moscow’s
human rights failings than is generally realized. And when the charge is
true, it sometimes is for the good reason that our human rights concerns
are being kept in context with other important national interests, or
that we are concentrating on countries where we have some hope of being
effective (i.e., recipients of our aid) rather than posturing toward,
for instance, the PRC. Nonetheless, we risk the unhappy image of being
tougher on the weak than the strong.
Regional Discrimination
Our actions can also be read as focusing on Latin America as the best
theater for human rights activity, at little risk to other American
interests. As earlier noted, we have opposed or urged deferral of 22 IFI
loans to Latin America; seven to Africa; and four to East Asia. Our
military programs in Latin America have been massively affected by human
rights considerations; only marginally so in East Asia; and not at all
in the Middle East.
There are reasons for this, some better than others: we have a good deal
of leverage in Latin America; more countries there are traditional
recipients of our economic and military assistance than in, for
instance, East Asia; our security and economic stake is less than in
East Asia or the Middle East; Latin American governments are
ideologically disinclined to turn to Moscow; we expect more of it
because it is part of the West and therefore more culturally attuned to
the claims of individual
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rights; in much of the area there has been a deterioration in human
rights situations; and our past support for military regimes in the area
does identify us with their excesses. It may also be true, however, that
some human rights activists (in and out of government) are more
interested in castigating those rightist dictatorships supported by
previous US Administrations than in an
evenhanded application of the policy. Whatever our motives, we do risk
letting the human rights policy appear to be yet another incarnation of
traditional big-stick interventionism, while we shy away from more risky
problems in other parts of the world.
Sticks vs. Carrots
We are on record as being more interested in helping governments who are
trying to improve their human rights situations than in denying
assistance to offenders. In practice, however, we are doing far more of
the latter than the former.
Especially in foreign assistance—our chief concrete source of
influence—we have been mostly responding to human rights violations.
That possibly was inevitable during this first year of a new policy. We
have had to decide what position to take on loans as they came forward
in the international financial institutions; changing the internal focus
of the IFI’s so that their lending programs would do more to promote
human rights would be harder, and take a lot more time. Even in our
bilateral aid programs, which we can control, it is difficult and time
consuming (years rather than months) to develop and obtain local and
Congressional approval of new programs. Similarly, it is easier—and
makes us look better—to reduce or end military programs than to consider
how or whether some of them (and especially the training programs) can
be used to promote human rights. Thus across-the-board the “reward”
approach is lagging well behind the punitive.
Our Criteria: Rhetoric vs. Actions
Finally, we say that all three aspects of human rights (integrity of the
person; economic rights; political rights) are equally important. But
our loan decisions are in fact much tougher on governments which
practice torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other violations
of the person, than on countries where there is little political
liberty. Moreover, while we try to promote economic human rights by
supporting “basic human needs” loans even to most serious human rights
offenders, we do not give a government’s own efforts to promote economic
development or equity equal weight with its record on political
liberties when assessing its overall human rights performance. (South
Korea, most socialist states of Eastern Europe, and Vietnam might rank
quite high if we did.)
[Page 367]
We think this is the right approach in the IFIs. To accept a tradeoff of economic progress or equity
for a government’s locking up its opposition would run counter to
American principles, and could undercut public support for the human
rights policy. It would mean lowering our sights and abandoning the
principle that American resources should promote American values. But to
go beyond our present policy, and oppose international developmental
assistance to countries which do not meet our standards of political
liberty (a parliamentary democracy; a free press) would be going too far
toward imposing our standards on the rest of the world. This reflects
the point, stated in your Atlanta speech,23 that building
democracies is a longer-term proposition than putting a stop to
torture.
The present approach does, however, involve problems. Some we probably
have to resign ourselves to living with; others we can try to do
something about.
We must expect the resentment of LDC
governments over a policy which clashes with their view (and possibly
that of many of their citizens as well) of the requirements of their
present state of economic and political development. We will encounter
charges (some specious, some sincere) of moral arrogance and of
insisting, once again, that we know what is best for other people. But
we need not resign ourselves to the present lack of appreciation (or
even understanding) of what we are doing to promote economic human
rights, especially through the basic human needs focus of the AID program. We should try harder to get
this message across.
We also need to intensify our efforts to find ways of promoting political
rights. As noted above, the “punitive” approach would be inappropriate
here; and it is far harder to devise positive action than to react to
loans on the IFI agendas. Moreover, some of the possible ways of
promoting the economic pluralism that can lead to political openings
(e.g., economic assistance which would strengthen the middle class or
labor unions in a society that now is an oligarchy), could run counter
to the basic human needs approach to AID. This might give us legal problems in dealing with some
of the countries where such development might do the most good. But
promotion of political rights should not take a backseat to personal and
economic ones just because it is harder and because progress will be
slower in coming.
V. Bureaucratic Complexities
The human rights policy is not only complicated substantively; it also is
complex and difficult bureaucratically. It crucially affects our
bilateral relations with foreign governments—the bread and butter of
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State Department work—and yet
it cuts across areas of responsibility which other government
departments (e.g., Treasury or Agriculture) have thought of as their
own. Consequently, important decisions are taken in committee sessions
from which, sometimes, no one emerges entirely happy. Our case-by-case
approach—the absence of clear guidelines that certain human rights
violations will always receive certain treatment, much less a “hit list”
of the most offending countries—further complicates the process.
For all the problems involved and the resentment of those who feel that
their good advice went unheeded, we still think this is the best way to
do the human rights business. The issues do go beyond the purview of any
one bureau or department. It is a perhaps extreme example of the fact
that key foreign policy issues these days are not bilateral or even
regional, but functional. But some degree of bureaucratic resentment
probably is inevitable.
VI. How Do We Stand With Congress?
Reasonably well at present, but we face potentially serious (and
conflicting) pressures.
Those Congressmen most interested in human rights like what we say, but
remain skeptical of our actions. Our role in legislation has so far been
largely reactive, and is seen by many as damage-limiting. It is
generally believed, for instance, that we would not be applying human
rights criteria to economic assistance if Congress had not ordered us to
do so. Our record on military assistance to human rights offenders is
especially criticized.
Congressional unhappiness with perceived softness in our application of
the policy, combined with the desire of many Congressmen to seem tough
(especially on South Korea), could produce new proposals not only to
shorten our leash in the IFIs, but
also for restrictive legislation governing our participation in UN organizations or the IMF. Moves already are afloat to inject
human rights concerns into appropriations for the Witteveen Facility.24 (Such efforts would of course be supported by those
who don’t like the UN or IFIs for other reasons.) The major
coalition of human rights groups intends to focus on security assistance
to violators. Congressional unhappiness with our performance could even
impede the arms transfers we want to make to South Korea in compensation
for troop withdrawals.
Pressure from human rights activists on the Hill is a familiar problem.
We may have a new and growing one with Congressmen who fear that our
human rights advocacy will interfere with other
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American interests. The outcry over PL 480 reporting requirements could be a
sample of what is to come, especially if the human rights policy does in
fact do visible damage to other interests (e.g., if US agricultural exports are hurt, or if the
Philippine base negotiations should go sour). The fact that we were
carrying out the expressed will of Congress would not greatly lessen the
wrath of some of its members who belatedly realized what was going
on.
VII. The Lessons of Hindsight
Most of the problems noted above will be with us as long as we have an
active human rights policy. They are part of an unavoidable balancing
act. But there is room for improvement, and some hard questions need
attention.
Policy Reaffirmation
A Presidential Directive would help (the human rights PRM hasn’t had one) to clarify to the
bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the
range of instruments being used. We understand that a draft is now with
the President.
Country Strategies
We badly need country strategy papers that will integrate our human
rights interests with other American concerns, and give useful guidance
for applying all our instruments of influence. There is still an
inclination on the part of many to fight the problem and to avert any
measures which may affect countries with which they deal. Country
strategy papers which took for granted the objectives of our human
rights policies and outlined alternative means for achieving these ends,
including both incentives, sanctions, and other approaches would vastly
contribute to the process of decision making.
Senior policy officials still would have to give time-consuming attention
to, for instance, individual loan proposals, in light of the human
rights situation at a particular moment and what else was happening
(e.g., an important visit or negotiation). But we need a better context
for those decisions—general guidance as to the relative weight to be
given to our different instruments of leverage in a particular country,
and why, and a sense of how to phase in the use of those instruments
The regional bureaus have most at stake here. The tenacity of this
Administration’s commitment to an active human rights policy is now
clear; it is in the bureaus’ interest that it be sensibly implemented.
Assistant Secretaries and their Deputies (and regional experts in S/P) should consider country action
strategies a matter of high priority.
Bureaucratic Gaps
Gaps in our internal procedures would inhibit implementation of coherent
country strategies, even if we had them. We especially need
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better integration of our
economic and military assistance decisions. Good country strategies, and
a better flow of information about individual decisions between the
Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, on the one
hand, and the Arms Control Export Board, on the other, would help.
Opinion is divided as to whether there should be a more
institutionalized advisory link between the two. We think the various
ways of establishing such a link should at least be explored.
The Foreign Assistance Group also should continue to improve its
procedures for putting human rights in context of other American
interests—and be seen to do so. Regional Bureau experts have recently
been playing a larger role (in preparation of the Group’s agenda and in
introducing issues at its meetings). That trend should be encouraged,
and representatives of other Departments also urged to speak not just to
a human rights situation or the basic human needs relevance of a loan,
but to their view of our overall interests in and strategy toward a
problem country.
Effectiveness
Except for countries whose human rights violations are so serious that
legislation requires us to treat them in certain ways, we should try to
emphasize what will be effective over what will make us look consistent.
That may not prove possible. It certainly would be more time-consuming,
since it would be even less clear that a certain kind of human rights
violation, wherever it occurred, would require a certain response from
us. A more serious problem is that country desk officers might be unable
to resist the temptation to say that only quiet diplomacy could ever
work in the country with which they have to deal; or, even if we
overcame the temptation, we might be unable to convince Congress that we
had done so. In that case, we might only provoke legislation which
further restricted our flexibility. But it is worth trying to develop
country strategies which emphasize effectiveness. It would be essential
to consult with human rights activists and
critics alike on the Hill about country strategies—not just transmit to
them our finished papers—well in advance of our decisions about
particular assistance programs.
Our Role in the IFI’s
We are required by law to use our voice and vote to promote human rights
in the IFI’s, including channeling loans to countries with good human
rights records; consulting with other donors about standards for meeting
basic human needs and promoting human rights; and devising with them
mechanisms for acting together. There are various ways (or combinations
of ways) we could meet the requirement. Each has advantages and
drawbacks.
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—We could try to get other donor countries to join us in applying human
rights criteria to their votes. That would increase the risk of
politicizing the IFI’s; further complicate our relations with LDC’s who would suffer not only the onus
of our opposition, but also a denial of cash; and might alarm other
donors. But failure to do so might lead some Congressmen to believe that
we are not serious about using the IFI’s to promote human rights, and
produce further legislative restrictions on our role in them.
—We could encourage the UN and OAS Human Rights Commissions to make
independent reports to the IFI’s. This would be consistent with our
desire to multilateralize our human rights policy and to make clear that
we are applying internationally recognized standards. But the UN Human Rights Commission in particular is
likely to render judgments which we—and Congress—could not accept as
objective.
—We could try to channel IFI lending programs away from human rights
violators. This would meet the letter of the law. But since IFI programs
are a long time in the pipeline, it could impede our ability to respond
to changing human rights conditions.
—We could try to design IFI programs to meet basic human needs criteria.
This might lessen the risk that our votes would politicize the IFI’s and
would be consistent with the World Bank’s own stated intention. It might
do more to promote human rights (especially economic rights) than denial
of funds, or US opposition to loans that
are approved anyway. But it would also reduce our opportunities for
demonstrating our disapproval of countries’ human rights failings. That
might so displease some in Congress that we would face new efforts to
reduce our contributions to the IFI’s, or to require that we oppose all
loans to certain countries. It also would remove a remaining source of
support for capital intensive “growth” projects and run counter both to
our urging the IFI’s to make loans for energy development to non-oil
LDC’s, and to our argument that a
commodities’ Common Fund needs no capacity to finance measures such as
market development and infrastructure because the development banks meet
that need.
The Perception of Arrogance
We should intensify efforts to multilateralize our human rights efforts.
This would help reduce suspicions of a holier-than-thou attitude or an
ideological crusade against selected states. More important, it would
help the cause of human rights, by further enlisting the weight of world
opinion.
We either have done or are doing most of the immediately important things
to bring our human rights policy in line with international standards
(e.g., signing the UN Covenants and the
American Convention on Human Rights) and are working to improve the
capacity of
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both the UN and OAS
to deal with human rights issues. We should now be consulting with
others—at the UN, in the OAS, and with other regional leaders
(e.g., in black Africa)—about their suggestions
for effective human rights strategies in their areas, in the context of
their own cultural, economic, and political situations. We also should
intensify consultations with West Europeans and Canadians—private and
official—about what all of us can do to promote human rights.
Perhaps even more important, we should draw more attention to what we are
doing to correct our own human rights problems. The general perception
seems to be that we’ve done nothing but allude to our domestic problems
in a few speeches. The President’s program is better than that, but its
human rights impact is dulled because we seldom talk of welfare or tax
reform, or proposals for urban renewal, or for youth employment, under a
human rights heading. We should make a point of stressing that these are
part of our commitment to improve the lot of individual Americans.
In Sum . . .
Generalized conclusions on such a complex of issues are very risky, and
certain to be controversial. But this is the balance S/P draws:
—The human rights policy may be the best thing this Administration has
going for it. It has enormously improved America’s international
standing and our claim to moral leadership. It already has done quite a
lot to help individuals, in widely varying situations, and to contribute
to political dynamics that can lead to further improvements. While the
potential damage to other American interests needs to be kept in mind,
no actual harm has yet been done. That suggests to us that such damage
can in fact be avoided.
—Any serious human rights policy will be subject to conflicting
criticisms. Limiting ourselves to rhetoric and quiet diplomacy would
produce (and deserve) charges of superficiality and hypocrisy. Using
material pressure (i.e., economic and military assistance) produces
charges of moral arrogance. Softening our human rights advocacy in some
cases to protect other American interests produces accusations of double
standards. Adjusting our tactics in order to try to be effective in
different situations produces accusations of inconsistency. There is
some justice in most of these criticisms. Any policy as difficult and
complex as this inevitably has a debit side. The balance, however, is
decidedly positive, and we do not believe a major change of course is
called for.
—But we have not done a good enough job of articulating publicly what we
are doing, and why, and the possibilities and limits of what we can hope
to accomplish. Both the policy and its execution are far more complex
than we have managed to convey. Opinion shapers (in
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cluding human rights activists) here and
abroad are likely to be far more responsive to candid discussions of
difficulties, dilemmas, and inevitable inconsistencies, than to
generalized rhetoric which seems to gloss over our problems. We have
done a lot in a short time to inject new considerations into American
foreign policy—to move beyond formal relations with other governments to
a concern with how our actions affect people living under those
governments. We have done so with encouraging success, and with little
if any cost. We can expect to learn from experience and do even better
next year. But it is in the nature of the problem that our performance
will not become “perfect.” We should go on the offensive to convey that
message, and especially a sophisticated understanding of the obstacles
we confront.
