Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 3, 1977

SUBJECT

• Human Rights

Outlined below are several human rights initiatives for your consideration. This matter is especially timely because December 10–17 is Human Rights week (a specific proposal regarding that is made in item 4).

1. Creation of a Human Rights Foundation²

This proposed foundation would be modeled on the Inter-American Foundation which is a quasi-governmental organization that receives its money through Congressional appropriation, but has very loose ties with the government, and makes its own policies. This foundation would:

—funnel money to the international human rights organizations and to national human rights organizations operating in other countries (as well as those in the US) based on the value of their work;

—provide badly needed support for refugee resettlement efforts, including the retraining (language, professional standards, etc.) and placement of skilled and professional political refugees. In particular, the Foundation could finance the resettlement of such key individuals—not in the US where their talents are wasted—but in other Third World nations badly in need of these skills. Thus the classic “brain drain” would be redirected in the interest of promoting both human rights and economic development. The dimensions of this problem are formidable—reports are, for example, that 40 percent of the Argentine Physics Society has left Argentina as political refugees;

—support the work of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the multinational organizations, particularly in the UN, where they are a crucial source of impetus and of information on human rights violations;

—set up a data bank where the growing volume of information on alleged human rights violations (and improvements) can be collected, checked and analyzed. The resources of the data bank would be available to NGOs, governments and multinational institutions as well as responsible individuals;

—issue an annual study reporting on and analyzing trends in human rights conditions during the previous year. While other organizations already do this (Freedom House for example), every additional source is helpful. The lack of accurate information is still a hindrance to the programs of multinational institutions as well as to our own programs;

—serve as a central clearing house—a place for those who need help, or who have information to share, to go to;

—set up and award an annual human rights prize, with a sizeable award comparable to the Nobel, to recognize an outstanding contribution to human rights anywhere in the world.

Depending on how the legislation creating such a Foundation is written, the Foundation could have a greater or lesser degree of official status. For several reasons I believe it would be best to maximize its distance from the government. This would: provide an independent source of information from official State Department views; allow the Foundation to employ foreign nationals who could provide essential expertise in certain areas, and give the Foundation a slightly multinational (and therefore more credible) image; and protect the Foundation should any of your successors not share your commitment to human rights. The Foundation would be run by a Board of Directors including a majority of private members with some representation of the Congress and the USG, as well as some non-Americans. I visualize a relatively small staff with most of the Foundation’s program being implemented through existing organizations.

As to implementation, there are two basic approaches. Either this can be developed and presented as an Administration initiative, or we could interest a member of Congress in the idea and let him push it. The latter approach worked very successfully with the Inter-American Foundation. The idea for that Foundation was presented at an early stage to Congressman Dante Fascell, who took it over, saw to its enactment and has since zealously made sure that its appropriations come through. The disadvantage of this approach, is that you would not get credit for the idea. Hence I would recommend that it be launched as an Administration initiative.

Recommendation:

That you authorize detailed development of this proposal.

To be presented as a Presidential initiative³

Find a member of Congress to father it

2. Improve Relations with Congress

Relations between Congress and the Administration in the human rights area are at a very low ebb. It is hard to accept, given your own deep commitment to this issue, but most human rights advocates in Congress believe that, were it not for their continuing pressure and vigilance, the Administration would renege on its commitment to human rights. The situation has been complicated by the fact that the Right wing has recognized this issue as a golden opportunity to turn a “liberal” issue to its own ends. It became a common pattern this year for members to be enthusiastically proposing and voting for human rights restrictions on aid measures and IFI funding bills, only to turn around and vote against final passage of the bill. Thus we face a strange alliance of both ends of the ideological spectrum that caused us so much difficulty during this past year with the IFI appropriations and other issues.

One of the main reasons we have not been able to win Congress’ trust, is that with the best of intentions, we have found it impossible to implement some of the legislation in this area. A strict interpretation of the Harkin amendment, for example, would have us create a “hit list” of “gross and consistent violators” of human rights. Congress did not think through the damage such a list would do to our overall foreign policy. This is only one example among many where both Congress and the Administration would gain from listening to the other in a quiet and apolitical forum.

Before relations deteriorate further, we should initiate a series of working meetings—chaired by the Vice President—with the prominent Congressional human rights advocates from both Houses and both parties. A specific agenda for these meetings would be set through staff consultations, but with active Congressional participation. It would be made clear to those invited that they were not being called to the White House to hear the Administration’s position, but to think through the problems involved in implementing legislation now on the books, (as well as other problems) and to actively participate in working out mutually satisfactory resolutions. As a starting point, there should be at least one meeting devoted to bilateral assistance policies (economic and military), and one to the IFIs, with explicit discussion of what Congress really expects from the US delegations. There should also be a meeting devoted to policies toward the USSR and Eastern Europe, where we might begin to build a consensus about the Jackson-Vanik problem. Such a series of meetings is most appropriate to the White House, not only because we are trying to build trust in Administration’s policies in this area, but because ultimately, we would be asking the Members to rethink their own legislation—something that could not be done effectively at a lower level.

Recommendation:

That you ask the Vice President to chair a series of meetings as outlined above, with staff help from the NSC and the State Department.⁴

3. Targeting of Foreign Assistance to Countries that Respect Human Rights

Existing statutes prescribe certain rules which must be followed in allocating US foreign assistance (including Security Supporting Assistance, AID programs, PL–480 and others), political-military interests impose additional constraints, as does your recent decision to target US assistance to poor people, primarily in low income countries. Nevertheless, within these boundaries, there is still flexibility to channel more money and aid to countries where there is a good, or improving, human rights record. We follow this policy now in theory, but not in practice. The country-by-country and program-by-program budgeting process has simply not provided for this kind of analysis. We should be able to look at overall assistance levels (from all programs) and over a period of years be able to point to clear trends—decreases for egregious violators, increases for others.

Recommendation:

That you approve this policy change.⁵

4. Speech for Human Rights Week

December 10–17 is Human Rights Week. This is an international as well as a US designation. I recommend that you deliver a short (5–7 minutes) speech on this occasion which USIA would carry to international audiences via satellite.⁶ Most of the support for your policy comes from people, rather than governments, and this speech would be addressed directly to them. It might briefly review human rights improvements around the globe during the past year, and then turn to the setbacks and the magnitude of the problem that lies ahead. In emphasizing the global nature of these concerns, the speech should focus on events in international forums—the UN, the OAS, and Belgrade. It might indirectly allude to the fact that in 1975, Izvestia hailed the Helsinki Final Act as “a new law of international life” thereby supporting our claim that human rights concerns transcend national boundaries. You might also want to address in personal terms, the motivations and the goals that lie behind US human rights policies. These are only preliminary ideas—if you approve the speech, I will work with Fallows on a draft for your consideration.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to work with Jim Fallows in preparing a short speech draft for delivery during Human Rights Week.⁷

5. Ratification of the Genocide Treaty

The Administration’s first public human rights goal was the ratification of the Genocide Treaty which has been stuck in the Senate for nearly 30 years. We have not achieved it mostly through lack of effort. The NGOs waited for a sign from the White House, and the Administration waited for the NGOs to produce the votes. The result was inaction. Recently, my staff, working with NGO representatives and Frank Moore’s office, produced a solid vote count based on written answers of the Senators. For cloture, where 60 votes are needed, we have 54 solidly committed in favor, with 15 undecided or leaning in favor. On final passage where 66 votes are needed (or fewer if some members can be convinced to take a walk) we have 56 solidly committed, and 13 undecided or leaning in favor. We are beginning to get criticism for the lack of effort on Genocide, particularly because we have signed three more human rights treaties this year,⁸ and so there is now a total of five treaties waiting to be ratified. There has also been criticism from abroad, to the effect that the US will sign anything but then not ratify. Ratification of the Genocide Treaty must of course wait until after Panama is resolved,⁹ but it should be attempted as soon as possible thereafter.

Recommendation:

That you request the Vice President to review the feasibility of making the ratification of the Genocide Treaty a high Administration priority immediately following resolution of the Panama Canal.¹⁰

6. Issuance of a Human Rights PD

Attached at Tab A is a draft human rights PD. It formalizes our human rights policy as it now stands, including the positive targeting of foreign assistance to countries with good records on human rights. It also directs a detailed study of the problems connected with implementation of the Harkin amendment in the IFIs, and the problems and reactions we have encountered in the banks over the last several months. I believe that it would be useful to issue this document, not only for the substance it contains (some of which is not new) but also for reasons of bureaucratic morale. Lack of a guiding PD is more and more often cited in the bureaucracy as a reason for the lack of direction and initiative in implementing a human rights policy.

Recommendation:

That you sign the PD at Tab A.¹¹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Presidential Directive, 12/77–12/78. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Carter’s notation in the right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Fritz → Zbig action & comment. J.C.”
2. See Document 80.
3. The President placed a check mark next to this option and added: “Fritz explore.”
4. The President approved and initialed this recommendation.
5. The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation but noted: “Fritz assess.”
6. See attachment, Document 89.
7. The President approved and initialed this recommendation. At the beginning of his December 15 news conference, Carter highlighted Human Rights Week, noting that the administration was “working to advance a full range of human rights, economic and social, as well as civil and political.” See Document 99. For the complete text of Carter’s statement and the transcript of the news conference, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 2115–2124.
8. See Documents 47 and 79.
9. Presumable reference to the Panama Canal treaties.
10. The President approved this recommendation.
11. Attached but not printed. The President wrote in the margin next to this recommendation: “Fritz comment.”