Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973

166. Annex to an Options Paper¹

Washington, October 27, 1970.

COVERT ANNEX

(to Options Paper for NSC on Chile)

I. Covert Objectives

To prevent the Allende government from establishing an authoritarian Marxist regime, and to prevent the movement of Chile into the Communist sphere, by undertaking covert courses of action which will allow the U.S. to aid and abet forces disillusioned with Allende to recapture power politically, or, under certain circumstances, overthrow his government. At the same time to prevent Chile from influencing the rest of Latin America to follow it as a model.

II. Covert Courses of Action

A. The Allende Government:

1. Undertake political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition, especially within the U.P., which as a grouping of divergent political forces has built-in tension areas which can be exploited. Provide financial support to one or more pivotal figures with a view to insuring the development of divisive factions within the Allende coalition. Particularly through the judicious exploitation of intelligence, create friction between the Communists and the Socialists. Emphasis will also be placed on deception operations which will cause certain coalition members (such as the dissident Democratic Christians and the Radicals) to question the true intentions of the Communists and the Socialists.

2. Play upon the known tendency of Allende and certain of his advisors to react to certain forms of direct criticism. [3½ lines not declassified]

3. Undertake selected economic operations when clandestine sponsorship is appropriate. A prime aspect of such a program would be to stimulate the exodus of key technicians and professionals from Chile.

4. Support “sitting ducks” in the media field (possibly a newspaper and a radio outlet) which would snipe at the government at a sufficient level to provoke repressive action thus opening a wedge for “freedom of the press” exploitation.

B. The Chilean security forces:

1. Sponsor a program which will enable the military institution to retain its integrity and independent political power. Provide direct financial support to key military figures who can be expected to develop a meaningful following in their respective services.

2. Play up the efforts of the Cuban and Soviet intelligence services, to assume control of the Chilean investigative and security organizations for both internal and external subversion. This theme, if properly documented, should have an impact on the military.

C. Non-Marxist political forces:

1. Provide financial support to selected anti-Allende political groups and their media. Support existing and emerging leaders, using them in a program to unite divergent sectors into a popular opposition movement capable of demonstrating political strength during future municipal and federal elections.

2. Maintain updated contingency plans for clandestine support of an exile leader or group should internal developments provoke flight of any important leader or a significant sector of the population.

D. Chilean public:

Use clandestine assets and techniques to promote a climate of uncertainty in Chile, especially as diplomatic and commercial relations with the Communist world solidify. Emphasize the sterile and somber future for the private citizen in a Socialist state. Focus special attention on the political center which now seems to have accepted Allende but which will remain the key to any broad based future political action.

E. OAS and other Latin American countries:

1. Develop an international propaganda campaign to publicize encroachments on the democratic system. Replay this information into Chile [1 line not declassified] to inhibit radicalization and nationalization of American interests.

2. Use the regional press to zero in on selected targets which might cause Allende to slow down efforts at radicalization or conversely provoke him into excessive acts.

3. Provide early warning to neighboring countries of any indication that third country activists plan to use Chile as a haven or as a staging ground for subversives.

1. Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile 1970. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. This Annex, attached to “Options Paper for NSC on Chile,” was sent to Kissinger on October 28 by Chapin. In his covering memorandum, Chapin noted that CIA had just distributed it to the 40 Committee principals for their consideration at a meeting after the SRG meeting, to be held at 10:15 a.m. on October 29. The covering memorandum also contains the following handwritten note: “Not forwarded. Vaky stated to FMC [Chapin] that the Annex was not expected to come up at the SRG mtg. The Annex will probably be considered by the 40 Comm at a later date.” (Ibid.) An analytical summary of the Options Paper is Document 167.