Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

360. Telegram 3388 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State¹

Montevideo, September 11, 1976, 1202Z.

3388. Subj: Meeting with Foreign Minister.

1. Summary. In more than an hour’s discussion with FonMinister Blanco we reviewed human rights and internal political developments. Blanco said that while reaction to the Koch amendment, if passed, would be extremely negative, a negative vote by the US on IDB loans, based on the Harkins Amendment, would be infinitely worse. He said a proposed replacement of medidas prontas de seguridad by a law to be applied with “due process”, and publication of prisoner-release data should be viewed as steps toward greater openness on human rights. He admitted personal opposition to the recent act nullifying political rights of many people but maintained that developments since June, including Bordaberry’s ouster and even this act should be viewed as a part of the process aimed at eventual democratic restoration in Uruguay. He felt it important that I review these issues with President Mendez before my departure on consultation. Such a meeting has been arranged for the late afternoon of September 14. End summary.

2. I met with FonMinister Blanco on September 9 for a discussion prior to my departure for consultation in Washington. I had also requested a meeting with the new President Aparicio Mendez. I told the minister I thought it important that I have from him an interpretation of the political developments in Uruguay in the last three months as this would be a matter of interest in the Department of State. I also said that as the question of human rights has almost become the fulcrum of relations between our two countries, an up-date on this subject was also of importance; this especially in view of the recent testimony in the Congress regarding Uruguay; the progress of the Koch amendment; and, very importantly, the actuality of the Harkins amendment and its implications for several IDB loans for Uruguay which will be coming up for decision in the next few months.

3. Regarding human rights I briefed the minister on my recent discussion with Generals Vadora and Queirolo (MVD 2941) telling him how this particular discussion had come about. Blanco said he thought this had been an important and useful contact. I found this of interest in light of the fact that I have since heard from two sources that there is developing some resentment in the GOU (unspecified where) because of my “pressing too hard” on the subject of human rights.

4. I went on to state that I did not know what the outcome would be regarding the Koch amendment. I called the minister’s attention to testimony before the Fraser Committee by Ambassador Ryan and the department’s position in opposition to the Koch amendment. At the moment, I said, what happens to this amendment depends on whether a parallel proposal is introduced into the Senate version of the bill and, if not, what action would be decided upon in conference committee. As of the moment, I said, the outcome cannot be predicted but one would have to assume that the amendment could become law.

5. Regarding the Harkins amendment I gave Blanco copies of the pertinent provisions of the law, in English and in Spanish, as well as a paper listing four proposed IDB loans for Uruguay, totalling $85.4 million. These are to come before the board in the next couple of months and will require the US to take the Harkins amendment into account in deciding how to vote. After studying section 28 of Public Law 94–302, I said, as the minister was aware from Ambassador Ryan’s testimony, that the problem of defining what is a “consistent pattern of gross violation” of human rights is a difficult one and that insofar as I was aware this has not yet been defined. However, I said, section 28 lists what are considered to be “gross violations” of internationally recognized human rights, including among other things, torture, cruel or degrading treatment, prolonged detention without charges, etc. Speaking very frankly, I said that whereas I personally accept the GOU’s statement that it does not advocate or condone torture, there have been past instances at least in which torture has apparently occurred. Beyond this, I said, it is also a fact, and especially with regard to certain cases coming under security laws, that people are subjected to procedures of arrest and confinement which might be considered cruel or degrading, especially psychologically, and that prolonged detention without charges or access to legal advice or to families is in such cases fairly commonly practiced. The minister did not deny that this was so. Therefore, I said, in deciding how to vote in the light of the Harkins amendment what seems to be the controlling element is not whether these kinds of violations have happened or do happen to some degree in Uruguay but what constitutes a “consistent pattern”. How that would be decided, I said, I did not know. If to avoid making such a determination the escape of finding that the loan directly benefitted the needy was utilized, it might be considered by some, prima facie, to be a tacit though unspoken finding of a consistent pattern of gross violation. As a result of this, I said, we face a real dilemma in what could be [a] critical decision profoundly affecting relations between our two countries.

6. In the light of the above, I said, it seems to me that something dramatic, constituting a clear improvement in openness as regards human rights in Uruguay, seems to me to be urgently needed in order perhaps to avoid developments which can critically affect our relations. In regard to this I told the minister, as I had told Generals Vadora and Queirolo, that no amount of criticism directed against those people who have mounted a human rights campaign against Uruguay, or even of unproved denial of charges, was likely to be effective. I said again that in my opinion Uruguay was consistently losing ground on this issue and that the only way to change the trend would be to correct whatever is wrong regarding the human rights situation and to re-establish openness and due process in such a way as to prove that past abuses will not reoccur and that the present situation is acceptable or rapidly becoming so.

7. Regarding the above, I said that I had been intrigued and encouraged by two recent developments. These were President Mendez’ reference in his inaugural speech to the replacement of medidas prontas de seguridad with a new law on a “State of Danger”, to be applied with “due process”, with his statement that the objective was to deprive criticism of Uruguay (on human rights grounds) “of any vestige of truth”; and finally, with the publication this week of a statement detailing the number of people who have been processed and released since 1972. I said I hoped all this pointed to a new trend toward openness, and that if so I hoped that the trend could receive a dramatic and positive acceleration. This, it seemed to me, could be the kind of thing which would help resolve the dilemma which may be fast approaching regarding decisions under the Harkins amendment. I noted how some such dramatic step would be strengthened if a move toward international verification by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission were to be invited.

8. In reply Blanco said he wanted to repeat again his opinion that the Koch amendment, if it should become law, would have a very adverse and counterproductive effect in Uruguay. Of this, he said, he had no doubt. But he went on to say that an adverse US vote under the Harkins amendment would be infinitely worse and not just because of the economic penalty [it] would impose. This is because, he said, the Koch amendment at least could be looked upon as an adverse act of the legislature imposed against the will of the executive; but, in contrast, the Harkins amendment could only be applied against Uruguay after a specific, adverse executive decision. If under it a decision were made to vote against an IDB loan for Uruguay this would constitute public and open executive branch condemnation of Uruguay. It could not help but be bitterly resented in this country. It would reflect, he said, an unfriendly lack of sympathy and understanding for what the Uruguayan Government is in all sincerity trying to do, and a callous disregard of the circumstances which brought the great adversity to this country which its current leaders are trying to correct. He feared, he said, that the reaction would be not only bitter and resentful but highly nationalistic. The end result would therefore be, he said, totally counterproductive in terms not only of US/Uruguayan relations but also in terms of what the Harkins amendment is presumably intended to bring about, namely, an improvement in human rights treatment.

9. Regarding the President’s speech and the publication of data on arrests, the minister stated that overall intent is, clearly, to move toward a greater degree of openness and due process, always consistent, however, with that degree of state security needed to underwrite the restorative political process in which the government is engaged. The idea for a new law of “State of Danger”, to replace the medidas prontas, is not a new one, he said. It has been talked about and studied for at least a couple of years but there is now a decision to go ahead with it. This will be done in the full realization that it, like the medidas prontas, will be criticized because of the emergency features it will retain; but it will nevertheless be a step in the right direction, he said, and it will lead to greater openness and due process as the President had stated. Actually, when this might be promulgated, he did not know. The publication of arrest data, he said, resulted from an initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs precisely aimed at achieving greater openness. The initial announcement had been made, he said, without explanation because it was simply to establish a pattern and any explanation would have made it appear to be a response to criticism. This, he said, the government needed to avoid for reasons which could easily be appreciated. From now on, he said, it is the intent (as we had learned from ESMACO—Montevideo 3327) periodically to publish the names of persons who have been released and the terms of their release.

10. With regard to inviting international inspection, the minister said, the problems were still difficult and he could see no clear solution at this time. I suggested that this would be the best way to prove that a new, improved situation was in process even though it might well result in some criticism of past practices. I urged again that the matter be studied and that at minimum the government might consider entering into discussion with the inter-American human rights commission on the terms and conditions under which verification visits might be made. Apart from this, I said, promptly restoring due process by giving detainees prompt access to lawyers and family and to early, public trial would be a most effective way of countering criticism on human rights grounds.

11. We then proceeded to the subject of political developments since June. In regard to this I noted that whereas President Bordaberry had been criticized abroad for his part in acts limiting democratic practice in Uruguay, the same critics have now criticized his ouster as breaking the last link of constitutionalism. I also said that the recent promulgation of Constitutional Decree No. 4, depriving a great number of people of their political rights had, insofar as I could tell, been received with some degree of shock by Uruguayans and had only added to criticism of Uruguay abroad. If these developments, I said, in fact were part of a process (as announced at the time of President Bordaberry’s ouster) of restoring more ample political and party activity, the failure to make clear how this restoration is to come about and when has made Uruguay vulnerable to the criticism that an authoritarian government is becoming more so. This criticism, I said, joins that of human rights to effect adversely the image of Uruguay abroad.

12. The minister in response said he thought it was a good thing I wanted to talk to President Mendez because it was important that I raise the same considerations with him and get his point of view. He said that he would recommend that I be received and would also brief the President carefully on the background of our discussions on human rights and particularly of this discussion today. Apart from that he said he would be very frank to tell me, as I perhaps already knew, that he had opposed and continued to be opposed to the decree depriving people of their political rights. He did not think it was necessary or effective and he recognized its adverse impact on Uruguay’s reputation as well as the negative reaction of Uruguayan citizens. Such things, he said, were not, however, the dictation of any particular individual. What is happening in Uruguay, including this, he said, represents a consensus often laboriously achieved after much debate of different points of view. This included, he said, the steps leading to President Bordaberry’s demise. With regad to this, he said, the fact is that there was no great military opposition to President Bordaberry personally and much appreciation of what he had done for the state over the years. There was also much about which the military and the former President agreed and were in harmony. There was even a strong desire by the military that President Bordaberry not only finish his constitutional term but that he remain on for a still longer period. What had made this impossible, however, was the development of the dialogue between the President and the military on the evolution of the “political process” in Uruguay in this year and in the immediate future. Here, he said, even he had parted company with the President who he had tried to influence differently since the dialogue was initiated last December, up to and including late in the afternoon of the day when the President was finally ousted. While the issue was very complex, he said, it boiled down to this: President Bordaberry and the military had agreed basically on a wide spectrum of “temporary measures” which had to be applied as part of the process of recovery and restoration of Uruguay, politically, economically and socially. But the word temporary is the key. What Bordaberry essentially was trying to do was to “institutionalize” and make permanent many of the measures which the military firmly regarded as temporary. It was on this basis that they finally broke and it is on this basis that one can legitimately view this break as positive in terms of the process toward eventual democratic restoration in Uruguay. We are beginning, he said, to see some of the elements of this and more will be forthcoming, such as eventual election of mayors and the lifting of restraints on political party organization and activity. Nevertheless, he concluded, he felt it important that I have an in-depth discussion with the President and promised to arrange it.

13. My meeting with President Mendez has now been set for Tuesday, September 14, at 5:00 p.m.

Siracusa

1. Summary: Siracusa and Blanco discussed Uruguayan politics, human rights, the Koch and Harkin amendments, and the reasons behind the ouster of Bordaberry.

   Source: National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D760343–1179. Confidential. The Harkin amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act forbade U.S. economic aid to any government that engaged “in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights.” (75 Stat. 424) MVD 2941 is Document 357.