Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

361. Telegram 3451 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State¹

Montevideo, September 15, 1976, 1944Z.

3451. Subj.: Meeting with President Aparicio Mendez. Ref.: Montevideo 3388.

Summary: In an hour long discussion President Aparicio Mendez said the GOU’s ultimate purpose is to restore full democracy to Uruguay but that this result should not be expected immediately and particularly not so long as subversion is not brought under control in neighboring states. While rejecting international verification of human rights, he said the government is working toward eliminating abuses which have existed and intends to place Uruguay “above criticism”. The new law of “danger”, largely but not wholly to replace the medidas prontas de seguridad, should go to the council of state next week, he said. They are also considering a procedure for “benign” treatment of prisoners, particularly women, which should accelerate releases. A white paper on subversion, security and human rights is also under consideration. He made an eloquent appeal for the US to give Uruguay the consideration due a traditional friend in adversity, when considering our attitude on human rights, such as under the Harkins amendment. End summary.

1. President Aparicio Mendez received me at 5:00 p.m. September 14 for a discussion which lasted one hour. Having been briefed by FonMinister Blanco (reftel), the discussion, after initial courtesies in which I expressed my best wishes for success in his heavy, new responsibilities, quickly entered at his initiative into the subject of human rights and internal political developments.

2. The President said he wanted to make clear at the outset that his personal task as he sees it, and in fact the objective of the current “civilian-military” government, is the restoration of democracy in Uruguay; but he said the process would necessarily be a difficult and a long one and he would not venture to predict exactly how long it would take. Nevertheless, it would certainly be about three years at least, he said, before the first manifestations of new political activity (probably the elections of mayors) would occur. Prior to this he said, there would be some party activity in developing new leadership following the measure (Constitutional Decree No. 4) which deprived former leaders of the right of active participation in politics.

3. Regarding his own role President Mendez said that he knows he is subject to considerable criticism and misunderstanding. But he believes that he has undertaken his responsibilities at personal sacrifice in view of his age (72 years) and his state of health, which includes a problem of high blood pressure, and he says he would not do this except to serve his country as he believes he can. He knows he is considered by some simply to be the instrument of the military but he said emphatically that this is not so. The military, he said, are dedicated, serious people who very easily could have taken over the entire government had they wanted to because they obviously had the power; but they have resisted doing this feeling that the civilian-military structure which exists is more effective and will give better results. It would be a mistake, he said, to believe that the government operates on other than a process of debate in effort to achieve consensus. In this, he said, the civilian participants—the President, civilian members of the cabinet and council of state—have an important and responsible role. Prompt restoration of a fully open Uruguayan society, with all its former characteristics, he said, should not be expected immediately and certainly not until subversion is ended in South America, particularly Argentina and Brazil. Full restoration of liberty, he said, prior to that eventuality would only invite a quick return of subversive aggression here, on its former scale or worse, and this would subject the nation again to what it suffered during the Tupamaro period. This, he said, will not be allowed to happen. But he emphasized again that within these limitations, and with the restructuring and new forms which will be devised, the clear and ultimate aim of the government of Uruguay is democratic restoration.

4. Turning to human rights, I made some prefatory remarks along the lines I had taken with the FonMinister regarding the Koch amendment and the Harkins amendment. Before commenting on this, the President produced a very large folder containing, he said, a long list of confidential documents which had never been shown to anyone before and which were now being copied so that they could be provided for the confidential information of my government. He said this represented an effort to let us see from the inside the kinds of problems which the government has faced regarding subversion and which it still faces. Perusing the list he mentioned several documents concerning the “antecedents” of Wilson Ferreira Aldunate—pausing to observe that he thought it important the USG “understand the nature of this man”. He, himself, he said “had been deceived” by Wilson Ferreira and, although he did not elaborate, he indicated that those documents referring to Wilson Ferreira would show his subversive connections and actions. He then mentioned other documents concerning subversive activity which would be included. When I told him that while this was interesting and we would be glad to receive whatever the government wished to give us, what seemed to me of more immediate importance was my desire that he understand the implications of the Harkins amendment and my hope to hear from him what we might expect in terms of developments on human rights in Uruguay, and especially the significance of those portions of his inaugural address which related to this subject. He said he agreed and that he did not wish to place undue importance on Wilson Ferreira. In fact, he said, discussing this only yesterday, it had been agreed that the government’s best course would be to ignore him as they did not wish to contribute to his “pretended martyrdom.”

5. I then had opportunity to explain to the President the status and implications of the Koch amendment proposal and of the Harkins amendment. With regard to this he said he had just learned that the Senate did not include a measure parallel to the Koch amendment in its version of the act. While he considered this a favorable indication he nevertheless understood that a final decision would be made in conference committee. Regarding the Harkins amendment he said he would be thoroughly frank and realistic by admitting that some of the human rights violations described therein had occurred in Uruguay. But he said he was certain that the USG, which he believes has friendly disposition toward Uruguay, could not consider its possible application except in light of the total background of subversion in this country and its brutality which has forced a reaction in self-defense which itself had produced some abuses. He expressed confidence that the understanding and sympathy due a friend would enter into US judgment and here he deviated to remark on historical and constitutional similarities, and differences, between the US and Uruguay. He talked at some length about the great thinkers and documents of early American history and the “coincidence of giants” which produced a constitution which could endure as has ours. Uruguay, he said, also had giant figures in its earliest years (around 1830), and its first constitution embodied most of the great principles of our own and had been a document worthy of respect. But the vicissitudes of subsequent Uruguayan history had produced other documents which were the creations not of giants but of political figures; and they were intended, he said, to serve politicians more than broad national purpose. This basic flaw had brought the country eventually to distortion of this democratic practice, its penetration by alien ideas, the deception of its youth and eventually the tragedy of the Tupamaros experience; and they to the necessary reaction to it. He said he hopes and was confident that the US would bear all of this in mind in determining its attitude and relations with Uruguay.

6. I returned the conversation more to specifics by pointing out that I was not sure how much latitude there would be because of the precise language of the law. I said that my country has a deep sense of moral obligation regarding human rights and that I recognized that Uruguay did as well as it was one of the proponents of basic human rights measures at the UN. We had, I assured him, been viewing this problem in Uruguay with the sympathy and with understanding due a friend, but also with concern. Now, I said, the focus of attention on Uruguay produced by the campaigns directed against it in the last few months, together with congressional interest and the text of our law, had brought about a situation in which decisions must soon be made under the Harkins amendment because of the nearly $85 million in IDB loan projects for Uruguay which will come before the board in the next few months. The problem, I said, is that even if one can successfully discount much of the exaggeration from accusation against Uruguay on human rights there still remains, as the President himself said, a residue of basic truth including precisely the kinds of violations specified in the act. Therefore, I said, what remains to be considered is what constitutes a consistent pattern of such violations and as to this, I said, I would hazard no guess except to say that an adverse decision on these grounds could be entirely possible. For this reason, I said, I had expressed to FonMinister Blanco a keen interest in the meaning of the President’s reference in his inaugural speech to a new law of “danger” to be applied with “due process”, to his statement that Uruguayan practice would have to be made “above criticism”, and to the meaning of the recently announced intention to publicize the names of persons released from prison.

7. Responding, the President said that the final touches in the new law had been made only yesterday and he expected that it would go to the council of state next week. I then asked whether this was intended to replace the medidas prontas de seguridad and eventually what would be its significance and the manner of its application under due process. He replied that it could not wholly replace medidas prontas but, as he had stated in his speech, the medidas prontas would in future be applied only infrequently, if at all. He said the medidas prontas must be maintained because they provided the legal and constitutional means of setting aside the guarantee of habeas corpus, which has been necessary and which would continue to be necessary. Under the medidas prontas, he said, a judge might order the liberation of a prisoner but if he is considered to be one who truly endangered the state he could then be held indefinitely at the order of the executive. Under the new law which would apply to most detainees, he said, such people would no longer be held at the order of the executive but would be definitely sentenced by a judge and remanded to those prisons especially prepared for persons charged under security laws. These, he said, were model prisons which accorded this class of prisoner far better treatment than Uruguay was able to provide the common criminals. He said he thought this had been amply demonstrated during the prison visits which Ambassadors had recently made. At this point he noted that the total number of prisoners held under security laws was just about 2,000. He also said that trial and sentences under the new law would prevent anyone from being held in military curateles or prisons other than those especially prepared for security prisoners. When I asked him if it was intended that such people in future be given open trials, saying that by this I meant public trials with presence of witnesses and the press, he answered in the negative. But he went on to explain that Uruguay has never followed this kind of trial practice—that it has never had open trial in that sense because of the differences in our juridical systems. But trials in the future would be open, he said, in the sense that prisoners would have prompt access to legal advice and the trial records would be available. He also confirmed that it was intended, following the precedent now established, periodically to publicize the names of persons released from prison.

8. When I suggested the possibility of inviting international verification the President’s response was no more encouraging than FonMinister Blanco’s had been (reftel). I emphasized Secretary Kissinger’s support for this procedure and said we thought it could alleviate the problems of discussions such as we were having by taking the problem of human rights out of the bilateral sphere. It could also do more, I said, toward clarifying the true picture of the situation in a country than any other means. The President said Uruguay, at least at the moment, did not have such faith in this procedure. He said he feared that international bodies from which such commission come have themselves been so influenced by the forces against which Uruguay is fighting that they could not be considered to be truly objective.

9. I then suggested that it might be well for Uruguay, in order to put its own case before the world, to issue some kind of white paper which would put into focus the whole problem of subversion here and problem now existing as the government sees it. I noted that Ambassador Ryan had a few months ago made a similar suggestion to the FonMinister. The President stated that precisely this subject was discussed just yesterday and that it would be under active consideration. He then went on to say that they also had discussed a new “act of benign treatment” (Acta de benignidad). This, he said, would underwrite a “benign” attitude and treatment toward a broad spectrum of security cases, with a specific intent of releasing people from prison, particularly women. In cases thought worthy of benign treatment, but still considered dangerous, prisoners could be released if they had some other country which would accept them. But even this, he said, produces its own kinds of dilemma. There are cases, he said, involving, “cretines utiles”, (useful fools) who had been deceived, and entrapped into security violations by those exploiting their good intentions and emotions. For example, he said, there are some nuns who the government would like to release from prison. But it fears to do so, he said, because of its honest concern that they would be murdered by the same subversive elements which exploited them if they left the protection of prison. This was a “Shakespearean dilemma”, he said “to be, or not to be”; but a best effort would be made to deal with it.

10. Summarizing at the end of his very frank and forthright discussion the President repeated again that the government of Uruguay has as its ultimate intent the restoration of democracy but that he must emphasize in all honesty the process had to be a slow one. It also believes that it continues to be the object of a serious subversive threat against which it must defend itself; and until the situation is greatly improved especially in neighboring countries, so that a relaxation of the guard here would not simply invite the return of subversives to renew their attacks, sweeping changes are not to be expected. Nevertheless, the President said, within the requirements of security every effort would be made to correct such violations as have occurred so as to improve the situation and, as he had said, place Uruguay “above criticism”. He ended by again appealing for US sympathy and for its understanding, as a traditional friend of Uruguay, of the reality of the problem with which the government is trying to deal. When I expressed my regret to the President that my very first interview with him had to be devoted to such a delicate and sensitive subject, he said I should feel completely at ease because the government recognized its importance, believed me to be a sincere friend, and welcomed the opportunity to give me its point of view prior to my returning to Washington for consultation.

Siracusa

1. Summary: Siracusa recounted his September 14 discussion with President Aparicio Mendez, who took office on September 1, regarding subversion, democracy, human rights, and prisoner releases.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760348–0690. Confidential. Telegram 3388 from the Embassy in Uruguay is Document 360.