359. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
Operation Condor
You raised a number of questions about Siracusa’s reactions (Tab 2) to the instructions to him on Condor (Tab 3). My comments on his cable follow.
[2 lines not declassified] The CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] does not believe Siracusa’s representations would unduly endanger him in light of widespread talk about Condor and the assassination aspect among officers of the security services of the southern cone. [3½ lines not declassified]
If we take this tack, the question is: should Siracusa also make representations? I believe he should. Our approach as originally conceived is couched in terms of a continuing exchange of information on the ground in Montevideo. A proposal of that kind from Siracusa would offer the most constructive and effective method of handling the problem. Dealing only with the Ambassador here would foreclose establishing that kind of relationship.
We agree with Siracusa that, if he does it in Montevideo, he should talk both to the military and to Blanco.
A parallel approach here, as Siracusa suggests, is acceptable to me and would help to preserve his position with the government there. But it is not my sense that this démarche is being made for domestic U.S. political considerations. What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.
[Page 958]We agree with Siracusa that he should add that the Condor targets have their own lists of Uruguayan Government officials targeted for assassination. It is precisely for that reason we propose to engage the Government of Uruguay in an exchange of views on the security situation so that we can demonstrate our appreciation of the problems they face.
Options:
We have three options in the Uruguayan case. We could do it:
—by Siracusa to General Vadora and to Blanco, supported by a démarche to the Ambassador here [less than 1 line not declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified]
Recommendation:
That you authorize the attached telegram to Siracusa instructing him to talk to both Blanco and Vadora, informing him of a parallel approach by me here and referring to a communication he will receive [less than 1 line not declassified] on additional protection for the source. (Tab 1) Phil Habib has concurred in the attached suggested telegram.
ALTERNATIVELY, that we ask Siracusa to have the message conveyed [less than 1 line not declassified] if in his judgment that can be done.
ALTERNATIVELY, that I make the démarche here, with no action to be taken in Montevideo for the time being.
Attachments:
Tab 1—Telegram to Siracusa
Tab 2—Montevideo 3123
Tab 3—State 209192
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Summary: Shlaudeman discussed the questions raised by Siracusa regarding the Condor démarche and recommended that Siracusa approach both Blanco and Vadora, while a parallel approach was made by Shlaudeman to the Uruguayan Ambassador in Washington.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860084–1945. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman; cleared by O’Donohue. The proposed cable from Shlaudeman to Siracusa is attached but not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860084–1948) No decision is recorded on the memorandum, but in telegram Secto 27128 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Lusaka, September 16, Kissinger “declined to approve message to Montevideo and has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760350–0102) Tab 2 is Document 358; Tab 3 is Document 241.
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