176. Telegram 242788/Tosec 707 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy1

242788. Tosec 707. Subject: Chile Arms Package and Human Rights.

1. In accordance with the instruction which you approved on October 7, Ambassador Popper reassured the GOC on October 9 that we would honor our commitments on Chilean arms requests. He also stated that we hoped to give the GOC a favorable response within 30 days to its urgent request for medium tanks and that we hoped to make a favorable decision within 60 days on the expeditious delivery of the TOW anti-tank system. (We conceive a minimum defense capability package for Chile to include approximately 100 M–48 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, and up to 20 TOW launchers with 400 missiles. Our best information is that the Peruvians have or will shortly have 300 Soviet medium tanks.) Expiration of the 30 days and developments in the human rights field following your decision of October 7 warrant a final weighing of the case.

2. On October 24, the International Committee of Jurists (ICJ), headquartered in Geneva, released a report supplemental to its September 5 basic review of the Chile human rights situation asserting continued violations by the Chilean Government and alleging that contrary to GOC claims, the detainee population in Chile is increasing rather than decreasing. The ICJ’s latest report is being highlighted by the U.S. media. Additionally, we have just seen the final report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) which sent a team to Chile in July–August. The GOC has been given the report and a copy has gone to the Secretary General of the OAS. At the discretion of the latter, copies probably will be given to OAS delegation heads on a “reserved” basis. The report, while recognizing some recent progress in some fields, condemns the GOC [Page 472] for consistent human rights violations, including the systematic use of torture. We must expect that it may be leaked to the public at any time, with predictably grave repercussions.

3. In view of the foregoing developments we propose the following scenario for the Chile arms package and various inter-related issues:

A. Following the Congressional elections Assistant Secretary Rogers would telephone Congressman Fascell and one or two other key Congressional leaders with whom we have already discussed arms sales to Chile to review our existing commitments and the proposed Chile arms package. He would say we believe it essential in the interest of regional peace and stability and in light of our previous commitments to go ahead with the FMS cash sale of this minimal package.

B. We would also inform Fascell, et al that while we believe there are some recent encouraging signs in the Chile human rights situation (following the IAHRC team’s visit), we share their concern over continuing abuses. We would make clear that we are aware in taking this action of the strong probability that the Congress will enact a tough amendment to the FAA restricting or prohibiting all military assistance, including FMS credit sales to the GOC, pending fundamental and continuing improvements in the human rights field. (It seems likely that a Presidential determination of significant progress in human rights will be required to resume military deliveries.)

4. The cost to our Congressional and media relations is likely to be substantial if we proceed with the above scenario. In particular, the chances for obtaining from the Congress a satisfactory security assistance bill would be reduced. Nevertheless, the risks to regional security, the cost to U.S.-Chile bilateral relations and perhaps equally important our ability to influence Chilean human rights behavior, persuade us that we should proceed to do what we have said we would do.

5. To help in some degree to ameliorate the adverse reaction when word of the Chilean arms package becomes public, we may wish to request from the Attorney General standby authority to accept a limited number of Chilean citizens currently under detention who may be released shortly in accordance with the GOC’s announced intention. Additionally, we renew our recommendation that you authorize the human rights circular in Win Lord’s memo which you have with you. The circular is unclassified and we would see that it is made public in order to reinforce our worldwide interest and concern that individual human rights be protected and to identify clearly and forcefully the U.S. with this objective.

Ingersoll
  1. Summary: The Department suggested to Kissinger that congressional leaders be called regarding military assistance to Chile, and that the United States accept some Chilean citizens under detention who would soon be released.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740317–0678. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Karkashian; cleared by Shlaudeman, Jenkins, Aldrich, Vest, and Raphel; approved by Rogers. Kissinger was attending the World Food Conference in Rome. On November 7, Kissinger informed Rogers that he approved the “Chile arms package and inter-related issues as presented in paragraph 3.” Kissinger did not want to decide on the human rights circular until he had a chance to discuss it upon his return to Washington. (Telegram 245395/Secto 525 to Quito, November 7; ibid., D740320–0679) Rogers was in Quito for a meeting of foreign ministers. In an October 1 telephone conversation, Kissinger assured Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D–MA) that the Department of State was concerned about human rights issues and told Kennedy that he believed that the Senator’s proposed amendment to restrict military assistance to Chile would have “unfortunate consequences.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts)