Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

562. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, November 20, 1972

SUBJECT:

• General Torrijos and Captain Villa

We have followed the scenario outlined earlier and I believe it is likely that Captain Villa will soon be released from jail in Cuba. Bob Hurwitch went to Panama, as I had proposed, and talked directly with General Torrijos, The latter agreed to do everything in his power to get the release of the two ships (Johnny Express and Lyla Express) and the three crewmen, including Villa.

On the ships, Torrijos said Cuba would insist they remain in Panamanian custody. Torrijos wanted assurances that this course would not create legal problems with us (e.g. cutting of aid, etc.). We have given those assurances, insisting that our main interest was in the men not the boats.

On the crewmen, Torrijos said Cuba would insist that Panama try the men under Panamanian law. This is merely a face-saving device for Cuba. Torrijos informed us that any sentences would be minimal (6–8 months) and that the men would be held under protective custody so their families could join them. He also agreed that amnesty before expiration of their terms (perhaps at Christmas or New Years) would be considered.

Torrijos will send an envoy to Havana, probably this week, to work out the deal. I am hopeful Villa will be out of jail, and that we can arrange for his family to visit him, in the next few weeks.

On the question of a new Canal Treaty, we told Torrijos we are serious about wanting a settlement and that the flexibility reflected in the letters to him from President Nixon and to the Foreign Minister from Ambassador Anderson is real. We said we remain unclear about his own desires regarding a settlement and urged that he encourage his negotiators to come forward with something specific. He indicated a willingness to consider this. However, in the talks with Hurwitch—as well as through other channels—Torrijos has indicated he thinks the talks over the past years have been too heavily focused on legalisms and technicalities rather than on the broad general principles that he thinks are important.

On the matter of a possible meeting with President Nixon, Torrijos understands this is totally premature and would require long and careful preparation as well as an auspicious atmosphere. He is not pressing the matter.

We have been less successful with efforts to get him to abandon the idea of holding a UN Security Council meeting in Panama next March. He insists he has no intention of hosting such a meeting in order to pressure the US in treaty negotiations. Nor does he want it to become a forum for anti-American outbursts. On the other hand, the possibility of a meeting has been widely publicized in Panama (following disclosure by The New York Times) and it would be extremely difficult for Torrijos to seem now to be bending to pressure from us for postponement or cancellation.

At the same time, it appears Torrijos has not totally ruled out cancellation if President Nixon feels strongly about it and wishes to make a direct approach to Torrijos. Torrijos has sent the following query [text not declassified]

“Does the holding of the Security Council meeting in Panama affect Nixon personally or was Hurwitch just using Nixon’s name to make his request more forceful?”

First, I am assured Hurwitch did not “use” the President’s name in this matter. Throughout, he spoke of “the US Government” or “Washington” or “we” but did not invoke the President’s name. He did, however, speak of consulting the White House before his trip and this may have been misinterpreted by the Panamanians.

Also, Hurwitch did not make any threats, as implied in the message from Noriega (who was not present at the talks). He did, however, in talking with Torrijos and later with President Lakas cite the kind of problems we can run into with Congress on this kind of thing. He mentioned the recent gathering of Third World leaders in Guyana which turned into an anti-American forum. That, in turn, generated criticism in Congress and produced adverse comments about aid and sugar quotas to Guyana. The Panamanians may have misinterpreted this as an indirect threat regarding their quotas and AID programs.

In accordance with existing guidelines, we have gone back to Torrijos [text not declassified] in answer to his direct question. Obviously, we did not want to send a direct reply from the President. We instructed the [text not declassified] to contact Noriega, tell him that the message received through him was delivered to Washington, and that he was authorized to say:

“Mr. Hurwitch was speaking for the U.S. Government when he stated that holding the UN Security Council meeting in Panama could be contrary to U.S. and Panamanian interests. Specifically, it could cause unfavorable reactions in the U.S. Congress and public opinion that would make our mutual efforts to solve common problems more difficult.

He should also add:

“No threat was intended or implied. On the contrary, in keeping with the friendly relations that exist between our two countries, the U.S. Government wished to call the attention of the Panamanian Government to the possible consequences of holding the UNSC meeting in Panama. We wanted our Panamanian friends to recognize that U.S. flexibility on treaty negotiations and our ability to be forthcoming on other matters is ultimately dependent on a favorable attitude in the U.S. Congress.

Noriega also said that “if President Nixon is personally affected by such a meeting, General Torrijos would appreciate it if the President would send a trusted envoy to Panama to inform him personally.” Noriega did not define what he meant by “personally affected. Nor did he say whether Torrijos would, in fact, cancel the SC meeting if a personal envoy went to Panama to convey such a message. However, it seems clear the door is open to a stronger appeal and that Torrijos might be agreeable. I would guess that his price for cancellation, however, would be clear evidence that progress was being made on a solution of the Canal problem acceptable to Panama. Meantime, I have learned through another channel—a close personal friend of Torrijos who recently visited Panama—that the Panamanian leader would welcome a visit and a frank talk with “the man who handles Latin America for Dr. Kissinger.” Torrijos said he wanted to talk candidly, without the obscurity of diplomatic double-talk, about what he thinks needs to be included in a Canal agreement that he can sell to his people. It may be that this “invitation” duplicates Noriega’s mention of a “trusted envoy.

In any case, I am prepared to go to Panama if it would be useful. My contact, who will probably be the next Minister of Finance or Economic Planning in the Torrijos government, thinks it would be. It might provide us with a clearer picture than we have ever had to date as to what Torrijos really wants on the Canal issue. It would also provide another chance to urge cancellation of the UN meeting—or to lay the groundwork for working together to keep it within bounds, if it is held.

But Torrijos would undoubtedly expect some reflection of our own thinking on a future treaty. And that would require careful thought and frank precise instructions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you consider the pros and cons of my going to Panama for a frank talk with Torrijos.

Approve talk with Torrijos
Disapprove

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent to Kissinger through Haig. Kissinger approved the recommendation, and wrote next to Jorden’s name: “I think you should go. HK.” [text not declassified] Tab B, “Previous Scenario 11/1/72,” has not been found. For documents on efforts to release the ships, see Documents 258, 262, and 264 in the Cuba compilation. Jorden traveled to Panama February 9–11, 1973.
2. Jorden discussed efforts to gain the release of two U.S. ships, a possible meeting between President Nixon and General Torrijos, an upcoming UNSC meeting in Panama, and Canal negotiations. If Kissinger thought it were necessary, Jorden stated that he was willing to ascertain from Torrijos what he wanted regarding the Canal negotiations.