Dominican Republic


267. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Karamessines) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, March 6, 1969.

Deputy Director Karamessines reported that the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) planned for an anti-government uprising which ultimately failed. CIA informed the Dominican Government, which responded by guarding the anticipated targets of the MPD and forestalling the uprising before it could get underway.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDP Registry, Job Number 80–B01086A. Secret. The memorandum bears Karamessines’ typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.


268. Telegram 1129 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, April 16, 1969, 2355Z.

The Ambassador met with President Balaguer to discuss the killing of four police and military officers by anti-government elements. Balaguer indicated that initial reactions by the Dominican security forces had been brought under control.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret. It was repeated to Sago de los Caballeros. On April 15, the Embassy detailed several incidents of violence against the military and the police. (Telegram 1099 from Santo Domingo, ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I) Intelligence Note No. 318, April 25, from Hughes to Rogers detailed the ongoing political violence and the difficulties faced by the Dominican Government in preventing reprisal attacks against the left by official security forces. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 DOM REP)


269. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 22, 1969.

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon approve a special sugar allocation for the Dominican Republic to support the Balaguer administration’s efforts at stabilizing the Dominican economy and demonstrate the continued United States support of the constitutional government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. President Nixon approved Kissinger’s recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A is a May 23 memorandum from the President to Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, which President Nixon signed. Attached but not published at Tab B is a May 14 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Richardson to the President.


270. Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 23, 1969.

During Governor Rockefeller’s June visit to the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer requested that the United States provide his country with an increased permanent sugar quota. Executive Secretary Eliot indicated that the Dominicans should not be encouraged to pursue such an increase. Instead, the Department of State suggested that the Dominicans work to diversify their economy while increasing efficiency on existing plantations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Attached as an enclosure and published is a memorandum detailing the issues raised by Balaguer during meetings with Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Eliot’s memorandum was written in response to a July 22 memorandum from Kissinger to Walsh. (Ibid.)


271. National Intelligence Estimate 86.2–69, Washington, September 25, 1969.

The National Intelligence Estimate described the political situation leading to national elections in May 1970 and predicted increased political instability and the possibility of a military coup. On the economic front, the estimate indicated that the Dominican Republic would continue to “depend upon the maintenance of U.S. aid programs at present high levels—supplemented by further special allocations of the U.S. sugar quota.”

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 373, Prospects for the D.R. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of their jurisdiction.


272. Telegram 4140 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, October 21, 1969, 0035Z.

Ambassador Meloy relayed his agreement to shift training and funding responsibilities for the Dominican National Police Department of Special Operations to AID’s Public Safety Program.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Santo Domingo, 1963–79. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel.


273. Telegram 4579 from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, December 6, 1969, 1745Z.

The Embassy reported a deteriorating political situation, marked by increased violence and the possibility of a military coup, particularly if President Balaguer decided not to run for reelection. The Embassy recommended that the United States work to “dissuade would-be plotters” while ensuring that should Balaguer run, he would have a “plausible opposition participating in the elections.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2–2 DOM REP. Confidential. It was repeated to Sago de Los Caballeros, Port-au-Prince, CINCLANT, USCINCSO, and DOD.


274. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable, Washington, January 17, 1970, TDCS–314/00645–70.

CIA reported that, if the Dominican National Police did not release Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) Secretary General Maximiliano Gómez Horacio, the MPD would kidnap a U.S. Embassy official as collateral to ensure Gómez’s release.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Field Dissem: State, Army, Navy, Air Force. An advance copy was transmitted to the White House, Department of State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NIC, NSA, OCI, and FBI.


275. Telegram 620 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 18, 1970, 1635Z.

Ambassador Meloy discussed the upcoming elections with President Balaguer. During the meeting, the Ambassador reminded Balaguer that the United States remained neutral, supported an orderly transfer of power, and strongly opposed any change through violent means.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential. It was repeated to USCINCSO and USCINCLANT for POLADS. In telegram 598 from Santo Domingo, March 15, Meloy reported that he had relayed the same information to Sacha Volman of the PRD. (Ibid., POL 14 DOM REP)


276. Telegram 696 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 24, 1970, 0330Z.

On March 24, U.S. Air Attaché Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, was kidnapped, presumably by members of the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD). Ambassador Meloy reported that he had pressed President Balaguer to accept the kidnappers’ demands. The Ambassador also indicated concern over evidence that Dominican security forces might be opposed to negotiating with “their enemies of the left.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. The Embassy in Santo Domingo reported Crowley’s kidnapping in Telegram 677, March 24. (Ibid.) Attached but not published is the CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/03286–70, March 24, which confirmed the Ambassador’s concern that there was “considerable opposition on the part of military officers to the idea of complying with the demands of the kidnappers….” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic)


277. Telegram 43343 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, March 25, 1970, 0525Z.

The Department of State concurred with Ambassador Meloy’s concerns and instructed him to take “personal vigorous effort to persuade Balaguer to release prisoners and take effective steps to obtain safe return of Col. Crowley.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret; Limdis; Flash. It was drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Nelson Ledsky (S/S). For telegram 696 from Santo Domingo, see Document 276. On March 25, the Ambassador reported in Telegram 700 from Santo Domingo that he had gotten President Balaguer out of bed to ascertain “the intentions of the GODR and what steps had been taken to secure Col. Crowley’s safety and eventual release.” (Ibid.)


278. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1970, 1 p.m.

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon sign a message to President Balaguer persuading him to agree to the demands of Colonel Crowley’s kidnappers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic. Secret; Sent for action; urgent. A draft message from President Nixon to President Balaguer is attached. For the message as sent, see Document 279.


279. Telegram 43508 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, March 25, 1970, 1847Z.

The Department of State instructed Ambassador Meloy to deliver a private message from President Nixon urging President Balaguer to agree to the terms of the terrorists who had kidnapped Lieutenant Colonel Crowley.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential; Exdis, Flash. Drafted by Crimmins and Hurwitch; cleared by Hawley, Vaky, and Johnson; and approved by Crimmins. In telegram 709 from Santo Domingo, March 25, Ambassador Meloy indicated that he had delivered President Nixon’s message to Balaguer. According to Meloy, he told Balaguer “that it was not intended that President Nixon’s letter to him be made public.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic)


280. Telegram 718 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 26, 1970, 1705Z.

The Embassy reported that the Government of the Dominican Republic had reached an agreement with Lieutenant Colonel Crowley’s kidnappers to free him in exchange for 20 prisoners.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USCINCSO and USCINCLANT for POLADS, OSI District 27, DIA, USAFFLDACTYGP Ft. Belvoir, VA, and Mexico City. In Telegram 733 from Santo Domingo, March 27, Ambassador Meloy reported that Crowley had been released and that he had arrived at the Embassy at 2140 hours, March 26. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic)


281. Special National Intelligence Estimate 86.2–70, Washington, April 30, 1970.

This estimate assessed the short-term prospects for political stability in the Dominican Republic both before and after the scheduled May presidential elections, in addition to the implications for the U.S. policy objectives.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of their jurisdiction


282. Notes From Weekly Meeting of Inter-American Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 8, 1970.

[1 page not declassified]

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic, 1969–1972. Secret.


283. Intelligence Note RARN–24, From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 2, 1970.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported increased left-wing violence, countered by extra-legal violence by the security forces, leading to fears of indiscriminate repression by the Dominican Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Note prepared in INR/American Republics by Misback, LaMazza, and Summ.


284. Telegram 1712 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, July 8, 1970, 2045Z.

On July 7, Ambassador Meloy met with President Balaguer to congratulate him on his electoral victory and to discuss Balaguer’s plans for the next four years and the role of U.S. assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential.


285. Telegram 109195 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, July 9, 1970, 2028Z.

In the wake of escalating anti-left violence, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Hurwitch expressed the Department of State’s concern that the Government of the Dominican Republic might be implicated. Hurwitch requested the Ambassador’s judgment on the usefulness of approaching President Balaguer or other high-level Dominican officials to express concern over the mounting violence and dangers that the official counter-terrorism campaign could reverse economic and political progress.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret. Drafted on July 8 by Warner (ARA/CAR); cleared by Broderick (ARA/CAR); and approved by Hurwitch.


286. Telegram 1893 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, July 29, 1970, 2325Z.

In a discussion with Secretary of State for the Armed Forces General Pérez y Pérez regarding an apparently planned program of terrorism and counter-terrorism, Ambassador Meloy discouraged him from taking repressive actions that might alienate the Dominican population.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential.


287. Telegram 3140 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, December 1, 1970, 1845Z.

The Embassy recommended continued support for the Dominican Police Division of Special Operations (DSO) through the end of FY1972 since it was the only security force capable of coping with the initial stages of a potential rural-based subversive threat.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Santo Domingo, 1963–1979. Secret; Roger Channel. In telegram 201095 to Santo Domingo, December 10, the Department responded that AID funding for the DSO would continue in FY1972, but that it would be phased out and replaced by GODR funding. (Ibid.) In telegram 1969 from Santo Domingo, May 26, 1971, the Embassy reported that AID had phased-down police assistance and would eventually phase out such assistance entirely. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP)


288. Central Intelligence Agency Information Special Report, CSDB 312/00757–71, Washington, March 16, 1971.

On March 10 and 11, intelligence sources reported that a group of Paris-based Latin American revolutionaries were plotting to assassinate President Balaguer with the cooperation of former Dominican General Elías Wessin y Wessin and other prominent Dominican exiles.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. On a March 16 covering memorandum from Acting Deputy Director for Plans Cord Meyer to the Director of Central Intelligence, there is a handwritten note that reads, “I checked this out w/Brownie. He doesn’t put much stock in it. We can discuss if you like. R.H.” In telegram 2600 from Santo Domingo, July 2, the Ambassador reported that Balaguer had asked that the U.S. bar Wessin y Wessin from entering the United States. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 DOM REP) In telegram 120410 to Santo Domingo, July 2, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to ask the GODR to relieve Wessin of his passport, which contained a U.S. visa. (Ibid.) In telegram 2618 from Santo Domingo, July 5, the Embassy reported that Wessin y Wessin was expelled from the Dominican Republic. (Ibid.)


289. Letter From the President of the Dominican Republic (Balaguer) to President Nixon, Santo Domingo, May 19, 1971.

President Balaguer requested an increase in the Dominican Republic’s special sugar allocation to ensure the country’s economic and political stability.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. The translation of Balaguer’s original letter has no classification marking. President Nixon responded to Balaguer’s letter on June 30, indicating that his request would “be taken into account.” (Ibid.) On July 13, the CIA’s Office of National Estimates (ONE) noted that the U.S. House of Representatives cut the Dominican Republic’s sugar export quota by 25 percent. If the house reduction became law, CIA estimated it would deal a serious blow to the Dominican economy. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Office, Job 79–T00918A, LA Staff Notes, LA Staff Note No. 3–71, 1971, Box 3)


290. Conversation Among President Nixon, Gulf-Western Chairman Charles Bluhdorn, the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman), and Secretary of Commerce Peterson, Washington, June 16, 1971, 3:40–4:30 p.m.

Gulf-Western Chairman Bluhdorn lobbied President Nixon for an increase in the Dominican Republic’s sugar quota.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 523–4, Oval Office. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume.


291. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1971.

The Department of State called President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s attention to the fact that the Senate Finance Committee proposed to eliminate the President’s discretionary authority for special allocations under the pending Sugar Act. The Senate’s decision came after President Nixon had already signed an undelivered letter indicating approval of a special sugar allocation for the Dominican Republic. The Department of State recommended that a new letter be drafted to include the caveat that any special sugar allocation would be contingent on Congress.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Ted C. signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typeset signature. Attached is a draft of a suggested revised letter. On July 22, President Nixon signed the revised letter. (Ibid.)


292. Telegram 3023 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, July 31, 1971, 0010Z.

The Embassy reported that Ambassador Meloy met with President Balaguer to express concern over the climate of violence in the Dominican Republic, particularly the reported role of Government forces in repressive acts and apparent violations of constitutional rights and civil liberties.

Source: National Archives, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential.


293. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 20, 1971.

Ambassador Meloy met with Ramón Castillo, Dominican Consul General in Tokyo, who indicated that President Balaguer was concerned that press criticism in the United States might have a negative influence on U.S. sugar legislation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 DOM REP. Confidential. It was drafted by Meloy. In telegram 0126 from Santo Domingo, January 10, 1972, the Embassy, in its year-end assessment, reported that “Balaguer gained an important psychological victory with the passage of the U.S. sugar legislation which provided an ample quota for Dominican sugar.” (Ibid., POL 2 DOM REP)


294. Telegram 913 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 1, 1972, 2315Z.

The Embassy reported that President Balaguer had announced an agrarian reform.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential; Priority.


295. Telegram 197500 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, October 31, 1972, 1606Z.

Ramon Castillo visited Deputy Director INR/RAA Alfonso Arenales to ascertain State Department views on President Balaguer’s agrarian reform and his possible reelection to a third term. Arenales indicated that he was unaware of any changes in the Department’s favorable view of the Balaguer administration.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Arenales; cleared for information by Burke; and approved by Hurwitch. Repeated to Santo Domingo and Saigon.