561. Telegram 4843 From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Canal Treaty Negotiations.
1) Summary: General Torrijos requests meeting with President to discuss Canal Treaty negotiations and to resolve basic issues. Action requested: Agreement to request provided there is adequate preparation to assure successful outcome.
2) Torrijos has passed following message [text not declassified]
Quote: General Omar Torrijos does not plan to enter into serious treaty negotiations with the United States until after the November U.S. Presidential election. At that time, Torrijos wants to meet personally with President Richard Nixon. This desire reflects Torrijos’ basic distrust of both U.S. and Panamanian negotiators and his conviction that the major treaty issues can only re resolved through direct conversations between himself and President Nixon. Unquote.
3) Comments to Special Ambassador Finch on Oct 10 implied that Torrijos wanted to discuss treaty issues at highest level and reach agreement so negotiators could write draft. He has now made his views more specific in a message that appears to be first positive response to President’s initiative.
4) Basic difficulty with Torrijos’ proposal is that I doubt that Torrijos has made up his mind whether a) he can sell Panamanian public new treaty involving as it must new concessions to U.S. including agreement to expand Canal capacity, or b) he [Page 2] must have some interim arrangements which resolve some thorny problems and prepare political climate for new treaty involving concessions several years hence. Although Panama’s formal effort is to obtain new treaty most of Torrijos’ proposals, efforts and comments over past year suggest that he prefers second option. Nor has Torrijos made up his mind on specific key issues. Before fruitful meeting could take place between President and Torrijos there would have to be frank discussion in Spanish between Torrijos and authorized U.S. official to explore key issues and determine whether he is ready to agree to what U.S. can accept.
5) Foreign Minister Tack is working on reply to Anderson letter of Oct 5. If we wait for that it will probably look very much like the Tack memorandum of August 3 [text not declassified] and we will be further apart than ever. It appears Tack is busy gathering into his hands control over negotiations and plans to propose negotiations be moved to Panama. New Panamanian Ambassador to Washington will have no role. In any event he is inexperienced and almost without qualifications to represent Panama in key Washington position. Two other members of Panamanian team (De la Ossa and Manfredo) will have jobs in Panama and work on negotiations part time if at all.
6) I do not consider it in our national interest to let Panama paint itself further into a corner either publicly or in negotiating positions it presents to U.S. I have recommended a number of times over past three years that we take initiative, that we write the drafts for Panama’s comment and that we avoid pressing Panama to take positions which are bound to be nationalistic and have to be negotiated away. Anderson letter was excellent initiative. But Panamanians are probably reading it not as restatement but new proposal. We should follow up with Torrijos with specifics to avoid misunderstanding and to keep initiative.
7) Specifically, I recommend:
[Page 3]A) That I be authorized to tell Torrijos that I have received his message but before I recommend such a meeting I would have to be confident it has good chance of success and I therefore want to explore with him exactly what he has in mind and whether U.S. positions on key treaty issues acceptable to him.
B) If his answers come close to being reasonable, that General Abrams invite Torrijos to the U.S. within next six weeks in his capacity as Commandant of the Guard to obtain briefing on defense strategy related to Canal, to visit U.S. military installations and also to see U.S. (Torrijos has barest acquaintance with U.S. and this inhibits his ability deal with us.) At time convenient during visit but probably best at end, President could receive Torrijos in his capacity as “Head of Government” of Panama to discuss and agree on course of action and how key treaty issues are to be resolved. In view of General Torrijos’ propensity to slide away from difficult commitments and also to avoid Foreign Minster later trying to talk Torrijos out of what he accepts, Panamanian Foreign Minister should be present in meeting with President. I should also be present because Torrijos especially is ill at ease with unfamiliar U.S. officials, he neither speaks nor understands English and my presence would also help keep him honest.
(In this meeting President could also make clear our attitude on Security Council meeting Panama wants held in Panama in March 1973. I do not recommend presidential letter to Torrijos on Security Council meeting because it would confirm GOP in view it has got a good thing with which to pressure U.S.)
C) U.S. and Panamanian negotiators draft necessary agreement or agreements to give effect to what has been decided.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972. Secret; Exdis. No record of a meeting between Torrijos and Nixon has been found. Torrijos’s comments to Finch are in Document 560. Anderson’s October 5 letter to Tack and Tack’s August 3 memorandum have not been found.↩
- Ambassador Sayre reported that General Torrijos requested a meeting with President Nixon after the U.S. election. Sayre sought authorization to tell the Panamanian head of state that he would not recommend a meeting until he was confident it had a good chance of success.↩