560. Memorandum From Edward Ridley Finch, Jr. to the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin)1 2
Dear Jack:
Reference is made to President Nixon’s personal and confidential letter to General Omar Torrijos of Panama dated October 9, 1972, delivered by me at a lengthy porch conference with General Torrijos. Am pleased to submit to you, as requested, this personal and confidential memo for our meeting with President Nixon. This memo summarizes some of what I reviewed Thursday evening, October 12th, with you, on the eve of my return to U.S.A. I will bring the gift to President Nixon from the Governor of the Canal Zone to Washington, D.C. when you advise me of the date and time it will be convenient for us to meet with President Nixon. As to the formalities as the President’s Special Envoy and Ambassador for the Inaugural, these were carried out as scheduled.
The letter from President Nixon to President Lakas was presented along with the President’s gift to President Lakas and he was pleased with it. Lakas is a friend of the United States. He is aware and appreciative of U.S. financial assistance. He is distressed over continued poverty in Panama. He gives assurance that he will cooperate with the United States in regards to the Johnny and Layla Express matter and the return of Captain Villa. He was reminded of President Nixon’s public commitment to secure Villa’s release and assures me he will follow this up. On all other matters he “ducked” and referred me to General Torrijos. The private conference with President Lakas lasted about 45 minutes. Information concerning it was discussed in person with you and will be with President Nixon, to the extent he wishes.
[Page 2]The conference with General Torrijos took place about 6:00 P.M. on the porch of his home, in shirt sleeves, for approximately 1 1/2 hours. President Nixon’s letter of October 9, 1972, with translation into Spanish, and a pair of Presidential Seal cuff links were presented to General Torrijos, with President Nixon’s congratulations. I thanked General Torrijos for his current cooperation on the drug and narcotics problems. Told him of President Nixon’s personal interest and firmness of purpose in respect to traffic in dangerous drugs and asked him for his public and private cooperation in the same. After discussion about its effect on youth in Panama and in the United States, he agreed to continue and expand his cooperation in this matter. Publicly at a press conference the following day he did so for the first time. It is a sensitive matter for certain reasons in Panama, but we succeeded. The next subject discussed was the Pan American Highway and the cattle hoof and mouth disease. General Torrijos said that Panama had taken the necessary steps with regards their side of the Columbian border for a health zone but that Columbia had done nothing. He wants U.S. pressure on Columbia. I have taken one “opportune” step in that direction already. He asked me to personally convey this message about pressure on Columbia on Aftosa to President Nixon and to assure President Nixon of Panama’s cooperation on this matter.
General Torrijos is an impetuous, strong, quiet man of little talk, of limited legal and limited strategic military education. He asked me to thank President Nixon for the five U.S. planes recently sent him. He said he is sitting on a powder keg as far as the Panama Canal is concerned. He said to me that he would prevent a civil confrontation at the Canal border until after the election and that he had gone to the University once personally quite recently, to put a stop to growing student and civil unrest. He repeated his remark the U.S. and Panama are sitting on a powder keg. I could not get any assurance from him that it will not blow up and give us a Christmas present between election and the first of the year, or soon thereafter. At this point the General’s wife brought us some cold soft drinks.
General Torrijos repeated his assurance that he would keep everything quiet until after the U.S. elections although I did not ask him to do this. In my opinion, the situation [Page 3] would blow up much sooner except for Torrijos and U.S. economic aid to Panama. Torrijos dislikes Congressman Bowe and said so clearly. I explained that because of President Nixon’s problems with our Congress that Congressman Bowe might “turn around” and be an excellent appointment for Panama and not the match that will light the fuse, as to the Canal confrontation, which Torrijos thinks will happen. My suggested solution is to delay the appointment of Congressman Bowe as the new Ambassador to Panama until the middle of 1973. Ambassador Sayre is doing a quite superb professional job and the top level Panamanians trust him. We should not change horses in midstream.
As President Nixon’s letter to him requested, I pressed General Torrijos to stop discussing the Panama Canal issue in the U.N., OAS and in the press. Torrijos said he had to let some PR out occasionally just to let steam out of the kettle to help him keep the situation cool in Panama. He stated he wants joint control of the Canal by Panama and the United States. He wants U.S. Southern Command eliminated. These items he constantly reverted to. In my opinion, General Torrijos should be invited at once to the U.S., and particularly to see NORAD, as he has no concept of ballistic missile defense. He does not realize that Panama has no capability without the U.S. in that regard. He was most pleased that I offered to go out in the field in Panama with him. I pointed out to Torrijos Mr. Anderson’s very recent excellent memorandum to Panama on the proposed new Canal Treaty. He knew of it. Torrijos will not move back to Treaty negotiations until the U.S. shows him he is dealing with a Kissinger who will stay on the job and give him some firm and final answers. Only on that basis is he willing to negotiate a new Canal Treaty now. He definitely will not at the present level of negotiations. He repeated this point. He also again repeated the point about elimination of the U.S. Southern Command. There are some solutions to this which I do not wish to discuss in a written memorandum. Some of these were discussed with our General Underwood. Torrijos is clear that steady very high level U.S. initiative is needed now. We should do so while we still have time and before the year ends. Torrijos was pleased by the fact that he felt that President Nixon had truly sent a Personal Envoy as Special Ambassador. (He knew that my nephew was married to Tricia!)
[Page 4]We next discussed the Pan American Highway, the Darien Gap, and the Aftosa problem with Columbia. Torrijos has cooperated on this and strongly wants U.S. pressure on Columbia now in regards to it. He said so. If we go high level with a Kissinger on the U.S. side then Torrijos assured me privately he would go for a new Canal Treaty as President Nixon requested in his personal letter to him of October 9th. It is clear that there is a country-to-country high level communications gap here, apart from the policy gap. This is mainly due to the U.S. dealing with Panama as though it were a communistic nation rather than an ally. The U.S. has inadvertently or deliberately denied Panama the last few years certain rights which we could have granted to them safely. For example, sharing the unused Colon Airport, Navigational Aids on Islands, etc. I cross-checked very discreetly at least a half dozen items with top U.S. and top Panamanian officials. Are we deliberately holding back and deliberately irritating General Torrijos and the Panamanians over a period of time? This will not create a Treaty negotiation atmosphere, which President Nixon wants. General Torrijos is truly irritated as are the Panamanian people over a period of time. U.S. policy must be clarified and we do need a Kissinger for Panama now. Delay in this situation will be dangerous. Torrijos is a man who sometimes does not know the consequences of what he says, privately and publicly, especially in certain legal and strategic military areas. Torrijos probably will decide in the next few months which way he wants to go and if time continues to run against the U.S., it will be impossible to avoid a future Panama Canal border confrontation.
Mrs. Finch created much good will and good PR there for the U.S. by hospital visits and clinic visits, etc., which two Panamanian cabinet ministers and President Takas mentioned to me.
It is a pleasure to have been of some small service to President Nixon and the United States and I will await your call. I simply cannot put into a memorandum all of the information which should be given to the President and only some of which I had the opportunity to discuss with you on the eve of my return to the United States.
[Page 5]Best personal regards and will await your call. Congratulations, Jack, on the great job you are doing for the U.S.
Cordially,
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. TLE Sensitive; Personal and Confidential; Nodis. An attached handwritten note reads: “JDI [Irwin] has asked ARA to redraft Finch’s report to make it less sensational. He will ask Finch to sign redrafted version and then send it to WH [White House] under Irwin/Pres memo. This version being given only to ARA and us. Ted—do you want a TLE sensitive for now?” The later version of the letter was sent to the President on November 13 and is ibid., POL 2 PAN. Nixon’s October 9 letter to Torrijos is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Panama, President Demetrio B. Lakas. Nixon’s letter to Lakas has not been found.↩
- Finch recounted his conversation with General Torrijos and President Lakas over topics in U.S.-Panamanian relations, including narcotics, the Pan American Highway, and the Panama Canal.↩