Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

559. Special National Intelligence Estimate 84–72¹ ²

SNIE 84–72

Washington, May 11, 1972

(Supersedes SNIE 84–71)

PANAMA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY FACTORS BEARING ON CANAL NEGOTIATIONS

[Omitted here are a map and the table of contents.]

NOTE

In this special Estimate, requested by the Department of State, we examine various political and military factors in the Panamanian situation which bear on the current negotiations for a new canal treaty. In the first part we discuss the nature and political direction of the Torrijos government and its probable negotiating stance over the next year or so. In the second part we consider the likelihood of various military and security threats to the canal and assess the probable reactions of the Panamanian Government under a new treaty relationship. In this section, our discussion and judgments necessarily extend beyond a one to two year time frame. Obviously, however, the precise nature of threats to the canal which might develop during the entire term of a new treaty cannot be fully anticipated.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Over the next year or so, Torrijos seems likely to establish a constitutional framework for his hold on power and to move Panama along an increasingly nationalistic and independent course. The influence of communists and other radicals in the government has increased, but they are not in a position to challenge the leadership of Torrijos. Although he lacks a political base, there appears to be no immediate threat to Torrijos’ rule either from within the National Guard or from the formerly dominant civilian groups.

B. Continued uncertainty about how much he can get from the US in a new treaty might cause Torrijos to drag out the negotiations for a considerable period. But at some point over the next year, he is likely to face up to the hard decisions he must make on the treaty issue. If he concludes that the treaty package offered by the US adequately meets his personal and political requirements and that he cannot extract additional concessions, he would probably be willing to compromise on remaining unresolved issues and reach a settlement. If, on the other hand, he should conclude that there is no longer any hope of getting a treaty offer from the US which satisfies his basic needs, he would probably try to exert more drastic pressure against the US. In such circumstances, he might gamble on a direct challenge to the US presence in Panama. This could lead to violent clashes along the Canal Zone border. Discussion of the factors influencing Torrijos’ negotiating posture is contained in paragraphs 16 through 23.

C. If the USSR became involved in hostilities with the US or with an important US ally—in a situation in which the Panama Canal was of particular importance to the US—Moscow would almost certainly consider an attack on the waterway. The main deterrent against such an attack would be fear of prompt, direct retaliation by US military forces. Thus, short of a general war, we believe there is little likelihood of a military attack on the canal, under either the present treaty or a new one. The present lock canal is vulnerable to sabotage by a fanatic or by an extremist political group. In times of stress, particularly in the volatile atmosphere of Panamanian politics, nationalist pressure against the US might lead to harassment of US installations in the canal area. But any Panamanian government would have a strong vested interest in maintaining canal operations, particularly under a new treaty which gave Panama increased jurisdiction and economic benefits. Discussion of external and internal threats to the canal is contained in paragraphs 26 through 36.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the estimate.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates, Part 3. Secret.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency discussed the political stance and probable negotiating position of the Torrijos regime regarding the Canal. In addition, the Agency analyzed different threats to the Canal and the possible reaction of the Panamanian Government to those threats under a new treaty relationship.