170. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1 2
SUBJECT:
- Nigerian Relief Status Report
At Tab A is a State Department appraisal of the situation in Nigeria and a run-down of present and proposed actions. The State report illustrates all too clearly the very serious problems we face—both in the realities of the situation and bureaucratically here—in dealing with this tragedy.
The main points of the State memo—set beside updated information or relevant facts State did not explain—are as follows:
1. State says Nigerian relief is “progressing reasonably well” and first-hand reports indicate a return to “normal”. But: Several eyewitness reports so far (Tab B) report “critical” conditions. One American doctor just out of Biafra says one million could die in the next three weeks.
2. State says the International Observers toured the war zone and bear out optimism. But: The observer team got only to the fringe of the enclave, travelling behind Federal troops. Thus they were separated from the mass of the fleeing Biafrans. And, as they have admitted publicly, they were not qualified medically to judge the relatively few people they saw.
Incidentally, Gowon has turned down any increase in the observers. So far, we have no evidence of military atrocities.
3. State says we are sending in an urgent “survey team” to assess the need. [Page 2] But: The Federals prohibited our teamʼs travel to the affected area over the weekend. They were given permission to go in today, but are still not clear on permission to examine the area in detail.
4. State reports a series of U.S. actions, including a distribution of funds and a Nigerian request for 50 jeeps which is yet unconfirmed. But: Though the Nigerians requested the 50 jeeps and 50 trucks today, the hard fact is that after your offer one week ago, no significant U.S. aid is yet flowing into Nigeria, and least of all into the starving area. The prospects are that the Nigerians will ask us only for marginal items such as small vehicles or generators. Our actions thus far sum up to readiness, not results.
State concludes that we must continue to observe Nigerian sensitivities about running relief themselves, and thus avoid pressing “unneeded” aid. This means, in effect, leaving the job to the Nigerian Red Cross relying solely on trucking in locally stored food.
The Case for Action
The facts on the magnitude of the need—which underlie our reliance on the Nigerians—are fundamentally in dispute. During October and November, Ambassador Ferguson sent a special U.S. relief survey team into Biafra. The team was led by Dr. Karl Western, an expert from our Atlanta Communicable Diseases Center. Dr. Westernʼs findings—and his resulting analysis this week of the current crisis—argue that State/AID and the Nigerians are grossly underestimating the emergency. The Western Report is the only scientific survey made of conditions inside Biafra. All other figures, on which State/AID are planning, are estimates from the outside.
The most vital factors in the crisis bear on two judgments: (a) how much food is necessary for how many people, and (b) the objective ability of the Nigerians to handle the need, as they claim. The findings of Dr. Western (and nearly all other eyewitnesses) compare the State/AID position as follows:
1. The Food Need
—State, working on reports from our AID mission in Lagos and “Nigerian estimates, plans on 2,000 tons needed per week to feed less than a million starving people.
[Page 3]Dr. Western and others found:
—between 3 and 4 million in Biafra, of whom nearly half require full rations just to survive while the rest need 500–600 calories to stave off starvation edema. This means 6,000 to 10,000 tons per week (Ferguson estimates at least 13,000 tons).
—although State and the Nigerian plans rely on local foods, the exhaustion or devastation of fertile areas—plus the fact that January–March are the worst agricultural months anyway—mean far too little local food available.
—while State and Nigerian plans (2,000 tons) are based on how much food Biafra was getting by airlift, the mass social disruption of the collapse plus the deterioration Biafrans were experiencing even with the airlift (which goes to explain the military collapse) argue that the needy will not be saved by the old 2,000 ton figure.
—While Nigerians (and State) have pointed to initial observer reports of good condition, historical experience with famine (e.g. The Western Netherlands in 1945, The Irish Potato Famine) indicates fragmentary reports are unreliable and first estimates of need are always very deficient.
2. The Ability of the Nigerians
—State/AID think the Nigerians seem able to meet the need. Dr. Western and others, who worked on the Federal side as well, contend:
—the past history of the Nigerian relief effort is not hopeful. One estimate charged that only 15% of the food available actually got through over several months last year.
—The Nigerian relief teams are already strained to feed 500,000 needy behind the old Federal lines. They cannot abandon that half-million. Even if they did, the 19 Nigerian teams are at a ratio of 1 relief worker per 4,000 needy Biafrans. Training for new workers is slow and an untrained volunteer does more harm than good.
—Though they have more than 200 trucks available or on the way, the Nigerians cannot organize the kind of truck-lift [Page 4] it takes to get in anything close to 6,000 tons a week. In the nine days since Biafra has been without outside relief, we have reports of only 140 tons going in by truck.
Dr. Western and his colleagues are willing to put their reputations on the line in the objective judgement that some portion of 1 to 1.5 million Biafrans will probably die of starvation or disease in the next two weeks unless there is a massive injection of high protein food into the area of greatest need. This means precisely the round-the-clock airlift into Biafra which the Feds proudly argue is “unnecessary” (and which State is advising not to suggest).
The Bureaucratic Positions
State and AID have long discredited eyewitness accounts from Biafra, on the grounds of pro-Biafra “bias” among relief workers. That charge hardly applies to Dr. Western (our own objective expert), yet present planning somehow presumes Dr. Western cannot be right. The Western Report has been available to the bureaucracy for 6 weeks.
AID probably disregards the Western Report because it proves them so far wrong. State finds Westernʼs data unpalatable because it points to a show-down with Nigeria. Thus the disparity between Stateʼs policy this week and the clear dictates of Westernʼs analysis.
No one will ever know conclusively the facts of the Biafran tragedy. The war, the chaos, the terrain make that impossible. But given the human stakes and the scientific weight of the Western survey, the presumption must be in favor of greater need—rather than the opposite. The price of under-estimating—when we have expert opinion to the contrary—could be millions of dead.
The Domestic Political Problem
There is a good possibility of a storm gathering here, ready to break as soon as the first reports of mass need hit the papers (as they will when reporters get out of Lagos and into the area). Your quick moves last weekend signalled recognition of need and urgent response. State has spent the past week saying (a) we donʼt know the need, (b) the Nigerians can handle the problem, and (c) in any case, we wonʼt push them.
Senator Kennedy is holding hearings this coming week. Senator Goodell and others will be giving press conferences. Catholic, Protestant and [Page 5] Jewish groups are reported planning national appeals for action. The bipartisan pressure on this issue is likely to revive quickly. Catherine Menninger (Dr. Menningerʼs wife) has already referred to the Western Report in the Post, and the pursuit of that subject could be explosive.
The Necessity for Decision
Time will not make the Nigerians less proud or more cognizant of a need which requires scientific rigor to perceive. Even if our survey team leaves tomorrow, it will take days to “prove” Western and other eye-witnesses are wrong. If the need is massive, the moment when our decision will affect the saving of lives is now fleeting.
There is no prospect that others will act first. Clyde Ferguson did not report it in his cables, but he told my staff privately last night that Prime Minister Wilson told him he expects at least a half-million deaths. The British, Ferguson reports, are deeply cynical about this problem and are as unwilling to push the Federals now as during the war.
Ferguson and Newsom were briefed orally today by Dr. Western and his team, and the facts seem finally to have sunk in. State reports it is moving to approach the Federals. They will do so, however, still in a low-key, and we do not have the luxury of time for gradual persuasion.
The Nigerians may balk despite our evidence, but we must convey it quickly and powerfully to protect your position in the likelihood of further disaster.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you instruct an immediate approach to General Gowon in strong terms to present the potential disaster and a proposal for an immediate airlift into the severely affected area.
Approve_______ Disapprove
[Page 6]- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Tab B is not published.↩
- Kissinger provided the President with a status report on relief, comparing the findings of Dr. Karl Western, CDC, based on a survey of Biafra in October/November 1969, with those presented in an attached memorandum from Rogers. Western stressed that there would be a completely unacceptable magnitude of starvation and suffering. Rogers disagreed, noting that FMG claimed to have the situation under control.↩