301. Memorandum From Harold
Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1
2
Washington, March 27, 1972
[Page 1]
SUBJECT:
- Supporting the Kurdish Rebellion
The Iranian intelligence service, SAVAK, has again [less than 1 line not
declassified] urged that we provide assistance through [less than 1 line not declassified] to the Iraqi
Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani.
Similar approaches have been made over the last ten years and have been
turned down. The British have also avoided involvement. The Israelis are
probably paying Barzani a sizeable monthly subsidy,
and King Hussein when he comes here may support US involvement. [2 lines not declassified]
According to a CIA report, the Soviets
have urged Barzani and the Kurds to join a national
front government in Iraq which would include Communists, Nasirists and
Kurds under the Ba’th Party of Iraq. As you may know, the Kurds have
been relatively quiet for the last two years or so. The purpose of any
move the Iranians supported now would be to try again to overthrow the
Iraqi Ba’thist government and to reduce chances of Soviet entrenchement
in Iraq. There are reports that a Soviet treaty with Iraq similar to
that one with Egypt is in the offing.
State Department and CIA are inclined to
continue to avoid involvement. For one thing, any assistance that may be
needed by Barzani is fully within the capability of
Iran or Israel to provide. There is nothing absolutely needed from us
except that they want to involve us. Another factor is that the odds are
against the Kurds succeeding. Also, our involving ourselves for the
first time at this point could be regarded by the Soviets as a move
directed against them.
My instinct is to remain out of this as we have in the past, but I felt
that you ought to be aware because of the Soviet angle.
[Page 2]
RECOMMENDATION: That I tell CIA we concur in their judgment that we
should not involve ourselves.
Approve [HK] Other __________
Attachment
Report
Washington, undated
[Page 3]
SUBJECT:
- Iranian Approaches to U.S. Government
In late November 1971 SAVAK
predicted to [less than 1 line not
declassified] that a national front government would be
formed in Iraq “within three or four months”. This government would
include communists, Nasirists and Kurds subservient to the Ba’th
Party of Iraq (BPI) and would
represent a situation antithetical to both Iranian and U.S.
interests. SAVAK [2 lines not declassified] stated that Kurdish
leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani represented the
only available figure around whom effective anti-BPI activity could be organized.
In early March 1972, SAVAK [less than 1 line not declassified] and
reviewed events which at that time had led up to increasingly close
Soviet ties with Iraq and joint Iraq-Soviet pressures on al-Barzani
to reach an agreement with both the BPI and the Communist Party of Iraq. SAVAK viewed these developments as
presaging further Soviet inroads with consequent difficulties for
Iran and for the Gulf. At this time SAVAK again asked for U.S. assistance against the
BPI, assistance which would
include financial aid, military equipment and political action, all
involving al-Barzani.
Concurrently, [less than 1 line not
declassified] reporting on the Soviet pressures, an also
reported that al-Barzani was planning to send a
letter to Secretary of State Rogers requesting U.S. support against the BPI. All of these developments have
been reported to the Department of State via Memorandum, [1 line not declassified].
On 15 March 1971, SAVAK [less than 1 line not declassified] and said
that al-Barzani had asked SAVAK to inform USG that if the present trend
continued, Iraq would assume a status similar to that of the East
European satellites [1 line not
declassified]. SAVAK again
asked for USG support for al-Barzani
in order to forestall the formation of a national front government
in Iraq and thereby the formation of a preponderantly
[Page 4]
communist government.
SAVAK stated that USG assistance could be channelled
secretly through [less than 1 line not
declassified] with only al-Barzani
being aware.
It should be noted that similar requests have been made to the USG by SAVAK on behalf of al-Barzani over
the past ten years. [2 lines not
declassified]
Attachment
Report
Washington, March 20, 1972
[Page 5]
Subject:
- Soviet Contacts with Barzani
Following the visit of Saddam Taqriti to Moscow in February 1972, the
Iraqi Ba’ath Government approached the Kurdish leadership asking it
to sign the “National Covenant”. A few days later, on 28 February, a
Soviet delegation of four persons arrived at the Hqs of Mulla
Mustapha Barzani. The appearance of the group was an unusual and
extraordinary event and is regarded to be of significance.
The Soviets were:
- (1) RUMANYTSEV, of the International Department of the
CPUSSR.
- (2) FIODOROV, who was presented as no. l’s assistant. A person
of the same name is serving in the Soviet Embassy in BAGHDAD and
the two might be identical.
- (3) AZAROV, First Secretary in the BAGHDAD Embassy.
- (4) KHAJIEFF, not identified.
They made the following proposals:
- (1)
- The Kurds should sign the National Covenant and join the
Popular Front, led by the Ba’ath Party. The Communists will
be joining the Covenant.
- (2)
- The Soviets will establish a liaison with the Kurds. A
Soviet mission with W/T contact will be stationed at
Barzani’s Hqs with the task of
maintaining contact and “protecting”
Barzani.
- (3)
-
Barzani was invited to visit the Soviet
Union and assurances were given for his safe passage.
- (4)
-
Barzani was promised Soviet support
should he go along with the above proposals.
It is possible that the Iraqi-Soviet move is of considerable
geopolitical significance. Possibly the purpose of this move is to
free the Iraqi forces for military-political action in the Persian
Gulf, to be directed also against the oil interests in that
area.
