304. Memorandum From Andrew Killgore
of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of
State to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs (Sisco)1
2
Washington, April 3,
1972
[Page 1]
SUBJECT:
- Kurdish Appeal U.S. Assistance
Attached, is a memorandum of the Uthman-Scotes conversation. Uthman made an appeal for direct or
indirect U.S. assistance to enable Barzani to
establish an Iraqi Arab-Kurdish “liberation movement” in Iraqi Kurdistan
with the aim of overthrowing the Ba’athi regime in Baghdad. He also
transmitted a letter to the Secretary (see attached rough translation)
in which Barzani makes the same appeal. He has
requested an answer to this appeal by Thursday, April 6.
Our initial reaction to this appeal is negative based on our views that
(a) a Barzani-dominated regime would have
difficulty surviving in the face of what would doubtless become
consolidated Arab opposition to it from both inside and outside Iraq;
(b) the Soviets are so well established economically in Iraq that even
if Barzani succeeds in overthrowing the Ba’athis,
it is unlikely that he could break Iraq’s ties with Moscow unless we
were prepared to step in with immediate and perhaps large-scale
assistance; (c) USG support for a coup
operation which at best appears to be ill organized would be difficult
“to conceal and thus the USG would risk
further strains on its relations with the other Arab states because of
support for a non-Arab movement backed by other non-Arab states (Iran
and Israel) against “the Arabs”; (d) facilitating the coming to power of
a Kurdish-supported government in Baghdad also risks arousing the
expectations of Kurds in neighboring Iran and Turkey, thus
causing-concern in at least Turkey if not Iran; (e) any encouragement to
the Kurds can only give further impetus to Kurdish nationalist
aspirations which aim eventually to establish a separate state of
Kurdistan, a step which would be retrogressive in that it would
represent further fragmentation in an already fragmented area.
Despite the above initial reaction, we have discussed this matter with
Roy who agrees that it would be useful if we had an informal review of
the Kurdish situation with Mike Waller of CIA before making any final decision regarding the Uthman
appeal. CIA has also been getting
through independent sources the same information and similar appeals.
Such a review would be in line with your thoughts expressed to Tom
Scotes at the
[Page 2]
airport
yesterday that we continue to update our assessments and not be guided
solely by conventional wisdom concerning such matters.
Meanwhile, we would recommend that you brief the Secretary orally about
this problem in view of the fact that the letter from
Barzani is addressed to him.
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, April 3, 1972
[Page 3]
SUBJECT:
- Kurdish Appeal for U.S. Assistance
PARTICIPANTS:
-
T.J. Scotes, Esq.,
Officer-in-ChargeJordanian Affairs
- Zayd Uthman, Special Emissary from Mulla Mustafa
Barzani
SUMMARY
During an April 3 meeting arranged at his request Zayd Uthman,
Special Emissary from Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, made the
following points to Iraqi Desk Officer Thomas J. Scotes:
- a)
- As a result of the recent visit to Moscow by Saddam Husayn
al-Tikriti, Assistant
Secretary General of the Iraqi Ba’th Party, Soviet influence
in Iraq has been dramatically enhanced.
- b)
- The Soviets are now pressing Mulla Mustafa to join the
Iraqi Ba’th party and the Iraqi Communist Party in the
formation of a national front government as part of a Soviet
effort to consolidate their position in Iraq.
- c)
- Mulla Mustafa does not wish to participate in a national
front government because he fears that the Ba’th Party will
use this proposal as a ploy to destroy the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP).
- d)
- Mulla Mustafa Barzani appeals to the U.S. Government for
financial and military assistance to enable him to establish
in Iraqi Kurdistan an Iraqi government-in-exile consisting
of Kurds and Arabs, as a stepping-stone leading to the
overthrow of the Iraqi Ba’th Party.
- e)
- U.S. assistance can be made available to
Barzani directly or indirectly for
example through King Hussein. If it is not furnished in the
near future, Mulla Mustafa will
[Page 4]
not be able to withstand the Soviet
and Ba’th pressures which in turn will result in the
eventual Sovietization of Iraq thereby threatening Free
World interests in the Persian Gulf as well as Iran and
Turkey.
- f)
- Uthman conveyed a letter in Arabic from
Barzani to Secretary Rogers in which
Barzani makes the same appeal as
above. Uthman requested an answer to this appeal before his
departure from Washington in April 6.
- 1.
-
Barzani Plea for U.S. Assistance.
Uthman stated that he is coming on a special mission from Mulla
Mustafa Barzani to the United States to seek U.S. assistance at
a critical time in the history of Iraq and of the Kurdish
national movement. Uthman continued that as a result of the
recent trip to Moscow by Saddam
Hussein Tikriti, Assistant Secretary General of
the Iraqi Ba’th Party, the Soviets are now supporting the Iraqi
Ba’th Party’s effort to establish a national front government in
Iraq. This Soviet support has taken the form of Soviet pressure
on Mulla Mustafa Barzani to accede to the Ba’thist request. A
high-ranking Soviet Communist Party official was recently in
Kurdistan trying to persuade Barzani.
Barzani, however, feels that if the
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
joins with the Iraqi Ba’th Party and the Iraqi Communist Party,
the Kurdish national movement will in time be subverted and its
force dissipated. Uthman explained that the Soviets aim through
their support of a national front stratagem to establish and
consolidate further their position in Iraq, particularly at a
time when their position in Egypt and Syria seems to be
unpredictable. Uthman continued that Soviet economic and
political interests in Iraq have grown dramatically over the
last several years, and the Soviets wish to protect this
investment. Moreover, the Kurds believe that the Soviets intend
to use Iraq for subversion not only in the Gulf but against Iran
and Turkey as well. Uthman concluded that the stakes are high
and that only the U.S. can, by supporting
Barzani either directly or indirectly,
stem the Soviet tide In response to my question, Uthman stated
that the Kurds have been in touch with both the Shah and King
Hussein. The former, however, blows hot and cola-in his support
of the Kurdish national movement. Barzani
cannot commit himself to an all-out struggle against the Ba’th
regime in Baghdad on the basis of such unpredictable support.
King Hussein, sympathetic
though he may be, has been unable to promise the Kurds anything
but moral support. He has expressed, however, his willingness to
go to Tehran to solicit further assistance from the Shah.
Barzani can wait no longer for either
the Shah or King Hussein.
The Soviets and the Iraqi Ba’th leadership are pressing him for
an answer in the next three or four
[Page 5]
weeks. It is for this reason that
Barzani decided to send a letter (see
attached rough English translation) to the Secretary of State in
which he makes a final appeal to the U.S. for help. If this help
is not forthcoming, Barzani will be obliged
to join the national front, and the West’s last opportunity to
thwart Soviet designs in Iraq will have been lost.
- 2.
-
Barzani Plan. Uthman then
explained how Barzani intends to proceed if
U.S. assistance is forthcoming. Uthman noted at the outset that
the U.S. might wish to make its assistance available to the
Kurds indirectly as for example, through King Hussein. This would be
acceptable to the Kurds, who in any event trust King Hussein. Uthman continued that
he, on behalf of Barzani, has been in touch
with “reputable” Iraqi elements who are opposed to the Ba’thists
and who are prepared to cooperate with the Kurds in an attempt
to overthrow the Ba’th regime. These Arab elements, however,
will make no overt commitment to support
Barzani until they are assured of U.S.
support, both moral and financial. Uthman repeated several times
that once U.S. support becomes known, these elements will flock
to Barzani in the north which will then be
used as a center from which to launch initially a propaganda
attack against the Ba’thist regime to be followed by whatever
military action is required. In response to questions, Uthman
was unwilling to be specific concerning military actions, saying
that details would be worked out later. Uthman was certain that
in view of the strong antipathy toward the Ba’thist regime in
Iraq, both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi people will welcome the
establishment of a “liberation” movement located in the north.
Uthman indicated that the Kurds have already been in touch with
disaffected elements in the Iraqi Army which are only, waiting
for the signal to come over to Barzani. Of
course, Uthman continued, Barzani must be
in a position to pay these men their salaries as well as to
maintain their families if and when they defect. This financial
support would be in addition to the current financial support
which Barzani must make to his own Kurdish
irregulars (Pishmerga). At the present time the Iraqi regime
pays Barzani approximately 150,000 Iraqi
Dinars (about $420,000) a month to support the Kurdish
irregulars. If Barzani refuses to go into
the national front, Uthman continued, it was likely the Iraqi
Government will cut off this payment, thereby leaving
Barzani with no money to support his
troops (in this regard Uthman observed that there are now
approximately some 24,000 Pishmerga either under arms or able to
mobilize within 24 hours. Uthman added that if funds become
available, the Kurds can raise approximately 50,000 men in the
north in a few months time.) Uthman said that
Barzani would also need “offensive”
weapons to supplement the “defensive” weapons which the Kurds
now possess.
- 3.
-
Ba’ath Demands of
Barzani. Uthman said that as
part of Barzani’s willingness to
participate in a national front government, the Iraqis expect
Barzani to close his part of the border
with Iran and permit the stationing of Iraqi troops in the
north. Barzani is unwilling to accept these
proposals. The Soviets have been endeavoring to ease
Barzani’s apprehensions by expressing
their willingness to send a high-level Soviet official to stay
in the north with Barzani to assure that
the Iraqi Ba’athists would keep their part of the agreement
which would involve ostensibly the granting of autonomy to the
north. Barzani does not trust either the
Soviets or the Ba’athists.
- 4.
-
Soviet Aims. Uthman repeated several
times his assessment of Soviet aims in Iraq and in the area. As
mentioned above, Uthman stated that initially the Soviets wished
to protect their major economic and political investment in
Iraq. In this connection, Uthman opined that the Soviets may
also have their eyes on Iraqi oil. He said that the Kurds have
heard from a reliable source that Saddam Husayn has sought
Soviet views and assistance in connection with the possible
nationalization of the British and American shares of the IPC consortium. Uthman continued
that the longterm goal of the Soviets in Iraq is to use it as a
center by which to outflank Turkey and thereby NATO, as well as to subvert Iran
and the Persian Gulf. Uthman said that the Soviets are already
helping the Iraqis put up a missle defense system at Shu’aybah
Air Base near Basra. Soviet military advisors are also
widespread in the Iraqi Army.
- 5.
-
Past Iranian Involvement. Although
expressing Kurdish appreciation for Iranian assistance in the
past, Uthman opined that the Iranians either do not know how to
deal with Iraqis or are using the Iraqi situation for their own
ends. He inclined to the latter view, noting that the Iranians
have tried to prevent the Kurds from seeking to make contacts
with other possible sources of assistance such as the Uthman
stated his view that the Iranians are short-sighted if they
believe that they can use the Kurds and the other moderate
Iraqis in this manner. Uthman opined that continued instability
in Iraq should not be an Iranian goal, as it now appears to
be.
- 6.
-
Egyptian Approach to
Barzani. Uthman said that
recently Egypt sent some emissaries to
Barzani who expressed Syrian and
Egyptian interest in cooperating with the Kurds for the purpose
of overthrowing the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad. The Egyptians,
however, indicated that it would be necessary for the Kurds to
cooperate with Arab “nationalist” elements which
Barzani is not prepared to do because
of his belief that these elements are generally discredited
among the Iraqi people.
[Page 7]
Situation in the North. According to
Uthman, the situation in the north is quiet. Despite reports of
central government assistance to the Kurds, Uthman alleged that very
little has in fact been accomplished. This is one reason why
Barzani has become disillusioned with the
Ba’athist regime and its promises. In addition, of course, the
recent assassination attempt on Barzani’s life
did little to enhance the credibility of the Ba’athist regime among
the Kurds. Although Arab settlers have been leaving the Arbil area,
the Baghdad Government is continuing to bring Arab settlers into the
Kirbuk region in an obvious effort to Arabize that area before any
plebiscite is held. (Barzani doubted that such
a plebiscite would ever be held.) Meanwhile,
Barzani’s prestige among the Kurds has
never been higher. Almost all of the tribes now support him
including such traditional Barzani tribal
rivals as the Lolans, the Harkis and the greater part of the
Zibaris. In addition, the Jalal Talabani faction of the KDP is now completely behind
Barzani with Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmed in
the north at Barzani’s headquarters.
Situation in Baghdad. Uthman described the
situation in Baghdad as one of growing opposition to the regime. He
added, however, that the terror employed by the Ba’athists has cowed
most of the population. Be said that the torture being used in Iraqi
prisons is much worse than any of the Communist regimes have ever
used in the past. In this regard, he said that the East Germans are
reportedly training the Iraqi secret police. Uthman reiterated the
readiness of the Iraqi Arab population to support any movement which
would lead to the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime. He qualified
this, however, by saying that the Iraqi Arabs would not support “old
regime” elements or “sloganeering” Arab nationalists.
