283. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin1 2

Post-Apollo Relationships with the Europeans

By memorandum of June 1, 1972 Dr. Kissinger forwarded to the Secretary and Dr. Fletcher, the Administrator of NASA, the President’s decisions as to the acceptable measure and character of European participation in the development and use of the space shuttle system (Tab A). This action was in response to the Secretary’s memorandum to the President on April 29 seeking prompt decisions on these matters and urging that we neither deny European participation in the development of this system nor take a course of action which would indicate a major change in our policy toward relationships with Europe in our post-Apollo space program (Tab B).

Although the President did not accept our suggestions fully, his response met our essential request in that it instructed us to encourage European development of one or more research application modules and it provided us with decisions in time for us to hold political-level discussions in mid-June with a delegation from the European Space Conference (ESC).

The President’s instructions also directed that the Europeans be discouraged, but not precluded from participation in the development of the shuttle (i.e., the booster) and that the space tug to be used with the shuttle be U.S. built. Our recommendation concerning the shuttle had been “do not encourage,” and concerning the tug “defer pending further mutual study.”

[Page 2]

The net effect of two years discussion of this subject is to move from a premise that European cooperation in the development of hardware as well as use of hardware was politically desirable to a posture that cooperation in hardware development is to be tolerated only if it meets stringent fit criteria. Future joint programs, the President said, “should stress joint payload (i.e., satellite) and utilization activities.”

The European purpose during the discussion with the ESC delegation on June 14-16 was to ascertain our current position as to the extent of, and arrangements for, European participation, since the ESC ministers were to meet in mid-July to reach a decision on these matters. The discussions were informal. Dr. Fletcher participated throughout.

At the outset of the discussions we made the President’s policy perfectly clear. We also emphasized that our interest in European participation is essentially a political act reflecting the enduring nature of the ties that bind the US and Europe; that it is not based on commercial or technical considerations. We stipulated that we seek multinational participation and arrangements. In view of NASA’s tight schedule for the development of the space shuttle system we also stipulated the necessity (1) for an early decision in principle by the Europeans whether they intend to participate, (2) for specific European proposals as to the tasks which they will commit to undertake and (3) for the ensuing development of intergovernmental and interagency agreements governing their participation. All these steps should be completed by the end of October. The next step is up to the Europeans.

The Europeans were clearly grateful for the clear and authoritative statement of our position even though it was a disappointment to some of them. They are apprehensive as to their ability to develop an agreed European [Page 3] proposal within the tight schedule which we required. The interests and preferences of the European countries differ substantially and much work remains to be done in Europe, if they are to reconcile these differences and present us a comprehensive proposal.

Last minute developments indicate that the ESC ministers will probably delay their meeting to late September. They understand that we could, in fact, wait until then for their decision in principle.

In sum, we have now brought two and a half years of discussion with the Europeans to a point of decision. We have made a reasonable, albeit somewhat limited, proposal for their participation—one which offers them clear choices and a worthwhile challenge. At this point it is not clear how they will respond.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SP 10 US. Confidential. Drafted by Pollack and Packard and concurred in by Katz. Tab A is Document 282 and Tab B is Document 279.
  2. Pollack reported that President Nixon’s response on European cooperation in the post-Apollo program met the Department’s “essential” request and had provided guidance for a meeting with European Space Conference representatives in June.