279. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1 2

Subject:

  • Post-Apollo Relationships with the Europeans

I wish to bring to your attention my increasing concern about developing U.S. attitudes toward European participation in the development of the post-Apollo Space Transportation System and the need for prompt U.S. decisions in this matter, if we are to control the play of events.

Your name has been closely identified with U.S. efforts over the past several years to encourage European participation in the development of that System—the Shuttle, the Tug and associated research applications modules (RAMs) Tom Paine, alluding repeatedly to what he described as your views, visited each major European capital to invite such participation. In October of 1970 and again in February 1971 Alex Johnson and a sub-cabinet team met with the European space and science Ministers. These and other activities of responsible U.S. officials, including our Ambassadors, have provided the Europeans every reason to believe that the U.S. was seriously interested in having them participate in the development of certain parts of the Shuttle, in one or more, of the RAMs, and especially in the Tug. As an indication of their interest the European governments have already spent or committed a total of $11.5 million on preliminary technical studies.

The European space and science Ministers are scheduled to meet in three weeks (May 19th) to formulate their views with respect to participation, and again in early July to take a final position. We can expect a visit of a high-level European delegation shortly after the May meeting.

Within the last several months U.S. views that we should minimize European participation have begun to harden. These views hold that we should not permit European participation in development of the Shuttle because of domestic economic considerations and the difficulties of sharing such a task with foreign governments and subcontractors. With respect to the Tug they hold that the development task will be too [Page 2] difficult technically to rely on European performance. European participation would thus be limited to development of one or more of the RAMs.

Were the European share of Shuttle development to be truly substantial, these economic and management considerations might well be overriding. However, the extent of their possible participation is now limited to a few specific projects totaling about $100 million out of the total Shuttle program costing $5.15 billion. The advantages of denying their participation at this level do not justify the loss of U.S. integrity abroad.

There is no need to reverse our position now on European development of the Tug, since it is a very advanced project which will require several more years of design study. The Europeans areas yet not convinced that they should undertake it.

My basic worry is that we will buy more trouble with the Europeans than can be justified by the ephemeral domestic advantages that we may gain by denying their participation. To limit them now to development of only a RAM would be judged by them as a clear reversal of our previous policy. Your reputation as a consistent advocate of international cooperation in space and specifically with Europe on the post-Apollo program would inevitably suffer. Furthermore, we ought not to ignore altogether the very real political values that would result from European participation with us in the development as well as the use of the Space Transportation System.

Balancing all these considerations, I suggest:

1.
That we accept, but not encourage, European participation in the tasks in the development of the Shuttle already identified by NASA conditioned on a prior commitment by the European Space Conference (ESC) that it will undertake the subsequent development of one or more RAMs.
2.
That we bring the Europeans to agree that consideration of their undertaking the development of the Tug will be deferred pending further mutual study.
3.
That we conduct negotiations on these matters so as to avoid indicating a major change in our policy toward European participation (i.e. in the proposals which we have already made to the ESC.)

I urge that you approve this course of action in principle and instruct me to reach agreement with the Europeans along these lines.

William P. Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SP 10 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Pollard and Packard.
  2. Rogers called President Nixon’s attention to the negative attitudes developing within the U.S. Government toward European participation in the post-Apollo program, and the need for prompt U.S. decisions.