Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

198. Telegram 113716 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹ ²

Washington, June 24, 1971, 2257Z.

Ref:

• Ankara 4366

For Ambassador from Secretary

1. We have just completed high-level meeting which reviewed reports of your conversations with Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and other Turkish officials. While we are obviously pleased that Turk National Assembly has passed licensing law and matter now going to Senate, and further that Erim is prepared to commit himself to our proposition looking to total eradication by June 1972, we are all agreed that price which GOT is trying to exact from us is outrageous. In particular, the idea of including substantial compensation for assumed losses from illicit production is unconscionable.

2. As we have examined Turkish laws, we do not assume that any Turkish look into the possibilities of postponing the June 30th decree is likely to prove feasible. Our understanding of Turkish law is that the one-year notice to the farmers must be given by 1 July. Moreover, our own view is that the best strategy at the present time is to drive hard and keep the pressure on for an immediate Turk decision before the end of the month which commits the Turkish Government now to the total eradication program. If some means is found by legal subterfuge or otherwise to get around the one-year advance notice requirement, then other reasons for delay and procrastination are apt to come up, including possible increasing criticism in Turkey of so-called American pressure. Our judgment is that the longer Turkish Government delays in biting the bullet, the more problems it is buying for itself with its own farmers who would be directly affected by such decision and in US where opium problem viewed as critical. In other words, Turk decisiveness in laying out an explicit program, as a follow up to the action already taken by the National Assembly, offers the best chance in our judgment for the Turk Government to make the kind of positive impact on its own people as well as the world community.

3. As to the possibilities you discuss, we do not like the idea of introducing outsiders such as IBRD experts, to make price determination. This is a matter that has to be sorted out between the US and Turkey; basically it is a question of negotiating the price.

4. As negotiating counter, you may indicate we prepared to compensate for losses from legal opium sales and assist in agro-industrial program by grant of additional $10 million in FY 1972. In any event, we would not want you to go any further at this point than a willingness on your part to recommend to USG, without making any commitment, that over next two years US will consider grant of $20 million. You should make clear that these funds would be over and above the 10-15 million dollars proposed for compensation farmers and for losses of hard currency earnings.

5. You should also make clear that given the emotional content of this problem both in the Congress and with American public, failure of GOT to take dramatic step at this time will put in jeopardy totality of US assistance programs for Turkey. You should express this as your flat judgment.

6. We believe that it is too early for us to consider course you list of withdrawing from attempt to influence Turkish performance and leaving them to solve problem “in their own way”, as the damage to their interests, as well as our own, must be avoided if at all possible. We believe, further, that Congressional pressures with threat of punitive measures could not be contained by solution which permits continued production beyond 1972.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS TUR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and Connally; and approved by Rogers.
2. In a personal message for Ambassador Handley, Secretary of State Rogers instructed him to keep the pressure on Prime Minister ERIM. Rogers noted, however, that the United States was not prepared to provide compensation for assumed losses from illicit production.